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INTRODUCTION

AVID CURRIE once referred to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c), the separate claim removal provision, as "one of the most unfortunate

provisions in the entire Judicial Code."' He argued that every time

Congress tinkered with separate claim removal, it made a bad situation worse.' Currie, and others, called on Congress simply to repeal
§ 1441(c). 3 In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee, a distinguished group of judges, legislators, academics, and practicing lawyers
appointed by the Chief Justice pursuant to an act of Congress to study
the federal courts, agreed that § 1441(c) should be repealed. 4 Con-

gress 5responded, not by repealing § 1441(c), but by amending it
again.
As amended, § 1441(c) now reads:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action
within the jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title is
joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes
of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may
determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion,
may remand all
6
matters in which State law predominates.

Several commentators have asserted that the 1990 amendment
has left § 1441(c) either useless, unconstitutional, or both.7 Charles
1. David P. Currie, The FederalCourts and the American Law Institute, Part 1, 36
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 22 (1968).
2. Id. at 25 (commenting that there is no "excuse for perpetuating this confusing,
complicated, and unequal provision, which with every amendment has increasingly
done more harm than good").
3. Id. at 25 n.120; William Cohen, Problems in the Removal of a "Separate and
Independent Claim or Cause of Action", 46 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 41 (1961); see also John
H. Lewin, The Federal Courts' Hospitable Back Door-Removal of "Separate and
Independent" Non-Federal Causes of Action, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 423, 431-42 (1953) (arguing that § 1441(c) is unconstitutional); Charles Rothfeld, Rationalizing Removal,
1990 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 221, 239 (advocating repeal, unless the statute is made effective
by allowing removal whenever a single defendant could remove if sued on alone).
4. Federal Courts Study Comm., Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee
94-95 (1990).
5. The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 312, 104 Stat.
5089, 5114 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (Supp. V 1993)).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (Supp. V 1993). Actually, the amended 1990 statute provided that the district court "may may remand all matters in which State law predominates," but this obvious error was corrected in 1991. Act of Dec. 9, 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-198, § 4, 105 Stat. 1623.
7. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard et al., Cases and Materials on Pleading and Procedure: State and Federal 443 (7th ed. 1994) (noting that amended § 1441(c) is "almost entirely superfluous," that it is "much more trouble than it can possibly be
worth," and that it should be repealed); David D. Siegel, Changes in FederalJurisdiction and Practice Under the New (Dec. 1, 1990) JudicialImprovements Act, 133 F.R.D.
61, 79 (1991) (remarking that § 1441(c) "may have to grope for some gainful employment"); see also Paul M. Bator et al., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the
Federal System 275 (3d ed. Supp. 1993) [hereinafter Hart & Wechsler] ("Does what is
left of § 1441(c) have any constitutional application in cases not removable under the
general removal provision in § 1441(a)?"); Larry L. Teply & Ralph U. Whitten, Civil
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Wright argues bluntly: "Section 1441(c) is the product of a long and
interesting history. The present statute, however, is useless and ought
to have been repealed."8 Douglas McFarland contends that the 1990
amendment left § 1441(c) a mere "unconstitutional stub."9 Essentially, the argument is that § 1441(c) is useless because federal questions claims, along with state claims within supplemental jurisdiction,
are removable under § 1441(a);' 0 and insofar as § 1441(c) purports to
authorize the removal of state claims outside supplemental jurisdiction, it is unconstitutional.
To demonstrate that these commentators are wrong, this Article explores the "long and interesting history" that produced § 1441(c)."
Its history reveals that § 1441(c) is the current response to an everpresent problem: What to do when a case filed in state court includes
both a claim within federal jurisdiction and a claim outside federal
jurisdiction.
In the first half of our country's history-before federal trial courts
had general federal question jurisdiction-this problem arose principally in diversity cases. 2 For example, a citizen of New York might
sue a citizen of New Jersey in a New York state court and then join a
claim against a citizen of New York. If sued on separately, the claim
against the citizen of New Jersey would be within the federal court's
diversity jurisdiction on removal; the claim against the citizen of New
York, however, would not.
In the second half of our country's history, the breadth of the federal question jurisdiction of federal trial courts expanded, and the
problem began to arise in federal question cases as well.1 3 For example, a California plaintiff might sue a California defendant in state
court for a violation of federal trademark laws, joining a claim against
the same defendant for breach of contract. If sued on separately, the
trademark claim would be within the federal court's federal question
Procedure 154-55 (1994) (stating that § 1441(c) may be "superfluous" or "unconstitutional," but suggesting a way to avoid the dilemma by construing Article III more
broadly than the Supreme Court has, and by construing the supplemental jurisdiction
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. V 1993), more narrowly than its text); Robert C.
Casad, PersonalJurisdiction in Federal Question Cases, 70 Tex. L Rev. 1589, 1618
(1992) ("In the absence of diversity of citizenship... federal jurisdiction cannot constitutionally extend to the 'separate and independent' state law claim in most private
lawsuits."); Joan Steinman, Supplemental Jurisdictionin § 1441 Removed Cases: An
Unsurveyed Frontier of Congress' Handiwork, 35 Ariz. L. Rev. 305, 321-22 (1993)
(noting that § 1441(c) may be "superfluous" or "unconstitutional" but making no effort to settle the issue, instead assuming for the purposes of her article that it is "both
constitutional and useful").
8. Charles A. Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 39, at 233 (1994).
9. Douglas D. McFarland, The UnconstitutionalStub of Section 1441(c), 54 Ohio
St. LJ.1059 (1993).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1988).
11. Wright, supra note 8, § 39, at 233.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 61-131.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 107-64, 226-70.
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jurisdiction on removal; the breach of contract claim, however, would
not.
A similar issue arose for cases filed directly in federal court: What
to do when a case filed in federal court includes both a claim within
federal jurisdiction and a claim that, by itself, is outside federal jurisdiction. In this situation, the response was the creation of what is now
called supplemental jurisdiction. 14 Supplemental jurisdiction enables
federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over a claim that would be
outside the scope of federal jurisdiction were it not for its relationship
to a federal claim. 15
Supplemental jurisdiction has grown considerably over the years.
In 1990, as part of the same act that amended § 1441(c), Congress
extended supplemental jurisdiction to the constitutional limit. 16 Nevertheless, even under current doctrine, supplemental jurisdiction is
14. Over the years, supplemental jurisdiction has been variously called pendent,
ancillary, auxiliary, incidental, and dependent jurisdiction. Texas Employers Ins.
Ass'n v. Felt, 150 F.2d 227, 234 (5th Cir. 1945). Charles Wright asserts without elaboration that it was "convenient" and "useful" to distinguish between pendent jurisdiction, "referring to those claims asserted by plaintiffs in their complaints," and
ancillary jurisdiction, "refer[ring] to the joinder, ordinarily by a party other than the
plaintiff, of additional claims and parties after the complaint has been filed." Wright,
supra note 8, at 120 n.42. It is doubtful that the distinction was ever as convenient or
useful, or as clear, as Wright suggests. Cf Richard A. Matasar, A Pendent and Ancillary JurisdictionPrimer: The Scope and Limits of Supplemental Jurisdiction,17 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 103, 104 n.1 (1983) ("Pendent jurisdiction dealt with the addition of
claims and parties by plaintiffs, and ancillary jurisdiction dealt with the addition of
claims and parties by defendants or intervenors."). For example, the Supreme Court
in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978), treated the case
as involving the limits of ancillary jurisdiction. Id. at 376. Later, however, the Court
described Kroger as involving pendent (more precisely pendent-party) jurisdiction.
Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 550 (1989). Now that Congress has settled on
one term, "supplemental," to cover all such jurisdiction, there is little reason to insist
on the distinction. This Article uses the term supplemental jurisdiction, unless the
historical context calls for use of the term then in vogue.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 227-57; see generally Denis F. McLaughlin,
The Federal SupplementalJurisdictionStatute-A Constitutionaland Statutory Analysis, 24 Ariz. St. hJ. 849, 861-65 (1992) (explaining the need for supplemental
jurisdiction).
16. The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 310(a), 104
Stat. 5089, 5113 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (Supp. V 1993)). Section 1367(a)
now provides:
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided
otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts
have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within
such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy
under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (Supp. V 1993). Section 1367(b) precludes the exercise of certain
kinds of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases, and § 1367(c) permits the district
court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in certain circumstances. 28
U.S.C. § 1367(b)-(c) (Supp. V 1993).
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not broad enough to permit federal courts to hear all claims that the
law of joinder allows to be joined.' 7 This persistent gap between supplemental jurisdiction and the law of joinder presents a recurring
problem in the context of removal: What to do when plaintiffs use
state joinder law to join claims that are within federal jurisdiction, including supplemental jurisdiction, with claims that are outside federal
jurisdiction.
To address this recurring problem, three general approaches are
possible.'" First, the entire case could be removable whenever any
part of it falls within the federal court's removal jurisdiction. Second,
the part of the case that would be within federal jurisdiction if sued on
alone could be removable, leaving the rest of the case in state court.
Third, no part of the case could be removable unless the entire case
falls within the federal court's removal jurisdiction.
From the time of the Judiciary Act of 1789,19 the fundamental approach has been the third one-no part of a case can be removed
unless the entire case is within federal jurisdiction. This is still the rule
under the basic removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 0 As a result,
state joinder rules, which have always been a step ahead of evolving
federal supplemental jurisdiction concepts, can be used to block
removal.
In 1866, Congress sought to prevent plaintiffs from using state joinder rules to block removal by permitting removal of parts of cases.2 '
Such piecemeal removal, however, was quickly abandoned because of
the confusion, cost, and embarrassment it caused.' Instead, Congress
enacted a special removal statute-which ultimately evolved into
§ 1441(c)-to permit removal of the entire case in certain circumstances.2 Congress's abandonment of piecemeal removal, however,
did not stop the courts from occasionally permitting piecemeal re17. See infra text accompanying notes 301-07.

18. Cf Texas Employers, 150 F.2d at 234 ("Congress has a reasonable range of
legislative discretion to determine whether such suit, in its entirety, shall be left in the

state court, removed to the federal court, or split into two parts.").
19. Ch.20, 1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1988). Section § 1441(a) provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action

brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to
the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing
the place where such action is pending. For purposes of removal under this
chapter, the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be
disregarded.
Id. Section 1441(b) prevents the removal of diversity cases where there is an in-state
defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1988).
21. See infra part I.B-C.
22. See infra part I.C.
23. See infra part I.D.
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moval based on a determination that the part of the case that would
remain in state court was somehow "really" a separate lawsuit.24
In 1948, Congress enacted § 1441(c), repudiating the decisions that
permitted piecemeal removal.1 Unfortunately, some judges-including Judge Posner and then-Judge Breyer-continued to rely on these
decisions to conclude that piecemeal removal is permissible in some
circumstances.2 6 In 1990, Congress amended § 1441(c), reemphasizing
its conviction that piecemeal removal is prohibited and underscoring
its view that without § 1441(c), state joinder rules could be used to
prevent removal.2 7
Thus, while § 1441(c) has beenabused by commentators for years, it
is both useful and constitutional: it is the only statutory mechanism
that prevents plaintiffs from using state joinder rules to defeat removal. Those who find it useless either overlook the fact that supplemental jurisdiction is narrower than the law of joinder or fail to
recognize that § 1441(a) only permits removal of entire cases and only
if the entire case is within federal jurisdiction. 8 Those who find it
unconstitutional ignore the fact that it is constitutional for Congress to
act to prevent plaintiffs from using state joinder rules to defeat
removal.2 9
Furthermore, this old and abused dog is not only useful and constitutional, but it has learned a new trick. Federal district courts around
the country have begun to use the amended § 1441(c) to remand, in
their entirety, federal question cases that have been properly removed
from state court. 30 This development is significant for three reasons.
First, it flies in the face of conventional wisdom which tells us that a
federal district court has "no discretion to remand a ...federal law
claim."' 31 Second, while there is strong support in the district courts
for the conclusion that they now possess the power to remand federal
question cases, there is little support in the academy for the claimed
power.3 2 Third, remand decisions are largely, although not com24. See infra text accompanying notes 99-115, 124-31, 137-64.
25. See infra part II.

26. See infra text accompanying notes 258-70.
27. See infra part III.A.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 316-23.

29. See infra text accompanying notes 306-12.
30. See infra part IV.A.

31. Burks v. Amerada Hess Corp., 8 F.3d 301, 304 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Buchner v. FDIC, 981 F.2d 816, 817 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that a district court has no
discretionary authority to remand a case over which it has subject matter jurisdiction);
In re Wilson Industries, Inc., 886 F.2d 93, 96 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that a district
court has no discretion to remand a case in which a federal question claim remains,
even if the claim that justified removal is withdrawn); Wright, supra note 8, at 253
n.23 (endorsing Buchner).
32. Maurice Rosenberg et al., Elements of Civil Procedure: Cases and Materials

35 (5th ed. Supp. 1993) (suggesting that it would have been better to provide that the
district court may remand supplemental claims under § 1441(c) in the same circumstances as it can dismiss supplemental claims under § 1367(c)); Teply & Whitten,
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pletely, insulated from review by appellate courts.3 3 Particularly in
supra note 7, at 156 (asserting that § 1441(c) should not be construed to permit remand of an entire case); Wright, supra note 8, at 240 (finding remand of entire case
under § 1441(c) "surprising[ I"); id. at 253 (endorsing narrow remand power); John B.
Oakley,Recent Statutory Changes in the Law of FederalJurisdiction and Venue: The
Judicial Improvements Acts of 1988 and 1990, 24 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 735, 750 (1991)
(presuming that "matters" under § 1441(c) means "claims" and thus concluding that
the provision does not authorize remand of an entire case); Thomas M. Mengler et al.,
Recent FederalCourt Legislation Made Some Noteworthy Changes, Nat'l LI.,Dec. 31,
1990-Jan. 7, 1991, at 20-21 (asserting that § 1441(c) should not be construed to permit
remand of an entire case); see also Richard H. Field et al., Material for a Basic Course
in Civil Procedure 65 (6th ed. 1990 & Supp. 1994) (criticizing courts that remanded
entire cases); 14A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3724, at
122-24 (2d ed. Supp. 1994) [hereinafter Wright & Miller] (same). But see Siegel,
supra note 7, at 78 ("If 'matters' is construed to include all 'claims', then a combination of claims in which a federal claim is one but in which state law is found to
'predominate' may justify a remand of the whole case."); cf. Mitchell N. Berman,
Note, Removal and the Eleventh AmendmenL" The Case for District Court Remand
Discretion To Avoid a BifurcatedSuit, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 683, 738 (1993) ("[Tlhe only
effect of the change in wording is to enable district courts to remand claims technically within their 'arising under' jurisdiction.").
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) provides:
An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed
is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a
case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1443
of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.
28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1988). While, on its face, this statute would appear to bar any
review of remand orders other than those removed under the civil rights removal
statute, the Supreme Court has held that it only bars review of remand orders that are
based on § 1447(c). Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 343
(1976). At the time of Thermtron, § 1447(c) required remand when the case was removed "improvidently and without jurisdiction," so that if the district court based its
remand decision on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or seemingly just intoned
these magic words, all review was barred, no matter how erroneous the decision. Id.;
see, e.g., Gravitt v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 430 U.S. 723, 723 (1977) (per curiam)
(holding that § 1447(d) "unmistakably commands" that remand order under § 1447(c)
is unreviewable); In re Merrimack Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 587 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1978)
(holding that district court's invocation of § 1447(c) precluded review of remand
order).
In 1988, § 1447(c) was amended to provide a time limit for motions to remand due
to defects in the removal procedure, but it requires remand at any time it "appears
that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction." Judicial Improvements and
Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1016(c), 102 Stat. 4642, 4670 (1988).
Thus, if a district court remands on the basis of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
the remand decision is unreviewable. See, eg., Tillman v. CSX Transp., Inc., 929 F.2d
1023, 1026-27 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that review was precluded because district
court remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, even though court did not cite
§ 1447(c) in its remand order).
On the other hand, if a district court remands for some reason other than those in
§ 1447(c), the § 1447(d) bar on review does not apply. Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 345-46.
This does not mean that an appeal may be taken, because an order of remand is
ordinarily not a final appealable order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Id. at 352-53; see, e.g.,
Executive Software N. Am., Inc. v. United States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of
Cal., 24 F.3d 1545, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that an order of remand is not a final
appealable order); cf Waco v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 293 U.S. 140, 143
(1934) (permitting appeal where decision on merits precedes remand order "in logic
and in fact"). Instead, the available method of review is by petition for the extraordi-
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these days of managerial judges who often worry about the size of
their dockets,34 a controversial doctrine that permits district court
judges to remand federal question cases deserves careful attention.
Part I of this Article examines the history and development of removal from the Judiciary Act of 1789 to the Judicial Code of 1911,
focusing on the extent to which plaintiffs could use state joinder rules
to block the availability of a federal forum for defendants. Part II
reviews the changes in removal brought about by the Revised Judicial
Code of 1948, including the enactment of the original version of
§ 1441(c), and discusses the grant of discretion to remand under the
1948 Act. Part III introduces the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990
and demonstrates the usefulness and constitutionality of the amended
§ 1441(c). Part IV examines the truly innovative provision of
§ 1441(c), the amended remand clause, and discusses how it has been
used to remand federal question cases in their entirety. Finally, this
Article concludes that, although virtually all of the decisions that permit remand of federal questions cases misread the amended § 1441(c),
the district judges are on to something-there is a legitimate basis, in
limited circumstances, for remanding federal question cases.
I. THE PREDECESSORS OF SECTION 1441(c)
Article III of the United States Constitution permits federal courts
to exercise jurisdiction in certain enumerated kinds of cases and controversies. That power can be exercised in three basic ways: First,
nary writ of mandamus. Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 353; see, e.g., Westinghouse Credit

Corp. v. Thompson, 987 F.2d 682, 683-85 (10th Cir. 1993) (considering and denying
petitioner's application for a writ of mandamus). For example, in Thermtron, the
Supreme Court held that a writ of mandamus could issue against a district judge,
compelling him to exercise jurisdiction where he had remanded simply because his
docket was crowded. Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 353.
There are many unanswered questions regarding when and how remand decisions
are reviewable. See generally Wright, supra note 8, at 254-55 (outlining exceptions to
the usual rule that remand orders are nonreviewable); 15A Wright & Miller, supra
note 32, § 3914.11, at 696-718 (discussing application of finality principles to orders

involving remand of cases removed from state courts); id. § 3914.11, at 64-69 (Supp.
1994) (same); Mark Herrmann, Thermtron Revisited: When and How Federal Trial

Court Remand Orders are Reviewable, 19 Ariz. St. L. J. 395 (1987) (criticizing Thermtron and attempting to reconcile with other cases); Joan Steinman, Removal, Remand,
and Review in Pendent Claim and Pendent Party Cases, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 923 (1988)
(discussing problems that have arisen and could arise in federal question cases removable under § 1441(a) and (b)); Rhonda Wasserman, Rethinking Review of Remands:
ProposedAmendments to the FederalRemoval Statute, 43 Emory L.J. 83 (1994) (advo-

cating discretionary appellate review of removal orders); Comment, Removal, Waiver,
and the Myth of Unreviewable Remand in the Fifth Circuit, 45 Baylor L. Rev. 723

(1993) (analyzing current Fifth Circuit law governing reviewability of remand orders).
The point here is that it is difficult to obtain review of remand decisions, and district
judges know it.
34. See generally Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374 (1982)
(examining the active role judges have assumed in managing their dockets).
35. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Specifically, Article III provides:
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Congress can provide for a federal appellate court to review the judgments reached in cases litigated in the state courts. Second, Congress
can provide for a federal trial court to hear and determine cases filed
as an initial matter by a plaintiff.3 6 Third, Congress can provide for
the removal to a federal trial court of cases filed in state trial courts.

Over the years, Congress has used these three mechanisms in various
combinations to provide a federal forum for certain cases and controversies but has never provided a federal forum for all of the cases and
controversies that fall within Article III.
Removal jurisdiction is the oddest and least understood of these
three mechanisms. In 1912, Judge McPherson remarked: "That there
is no other phase of American jurisprudence with so many refinements and subtleties, as relate to removal proceedings, is known by all
who have to deal with them. ' 37 This statement remains true today.

Commentators often note that removal jurisdiction is nowhere explicitly mentioned in the Constitution,38 yet the same is true of federal
court review of state court judgments39 and the direct filing of cases by
The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and
maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be
a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-between a State
and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id cl. 1.
36. Of course, Congress can also provide for federal appellate review of decisions
of federal courts.
37. Hagerla v. Mississippi River Power Co., 202 F. 771, 773 (S.D. Iowa 1912); see
also Harper v. Sonnabend, 182 F. Supp. 594, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (observing that removal under § 1441(c) "luxuriates in a riotous uncertainty"); James H. Lewis, Removal of Causes 8 (1923), quoted in Note, The Constitutionalityof Federal Removal
JurisdictionOver Separable Controversies Involving Citizens of the Same State, 94 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 239, 239 (1946) ("The law relating to the removal of causes from State to
Federal Courts may be justly characterized as a snare and a delusion.").
38. E.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 5.5, at 322 (1994); John J.
Cound et al., Civil Procedure, Cases and Materials 323 (6th ed. 1993); Wright, supra
note 8, § 38, at 223; 14A Wright & Miller, supra note 32, § 3721, at 187; Vincent
Rotolo, Basic Principles of Jurisdiction of the U.S. District Courts Over Civil Actions
Removed from State Courts, 17 Rev. Jur. U.I.P.R. 265, 265 (1983); Michael E.
Solimine, Remova4 Remands, and Reforming Federal Appellate Review, 58 Mo. L
Rev. 287, 289 (1993); Steinman, supra note 33, at 926; Bradford G. Swing, Federal
Common Law Power to Remand a Properly Removed Case, 136 U. Pa. L Rev. 583,
587 (1987).
39. Richard A. Matasar, Rediscovering "One Constitutional Case". Procedural
Rules and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test for SupplementalJurisdiction,71 Cal. L Rev.
1399, 1428 (1983) ("The Constitution does not explicitly authorize the Supreme Court
to review decisions of state courts."); see also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304,314 (1816) (acknowledging that the Constitution does not expressly contemplate Supreme Court review of state court judgements), revg Hunter v. Martin, 18
Va. (4 Munf.) 1 (1814).
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plaintiffs in lower federal courts.4" All three are simply mechanisms
to bring cases into the federal courts for adjudication. 4 '
A. Removal Under the JudiciaryAct of 1789
The first Congress chose to utilize all three distinct mechanisms in
the Judiciary Act of 1789.42 The Act provided for a federal appellate
court-the United States Supreme Court-to review judgments denying a federal claim rendered by the highest court of a state in which a
decision could be had.43 Also, the Act provided for a federal trial
In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, the Virginia Court of Appeals resisted a mandate
issued by the Supreme Court, contending that the Court's power of appellate review
extended only to judgments of inferior federal courts and not to the judgments of a
court of another sovereign. Martin, 14 U.S. at 305. The state court, however, did
concede that removal of cases to federal court before judgment was permissible.
Hunter, 18 Va. at 12-16. The Supreme Court, of course, rejected the exaggerated view
of state sovereignty posited by the Virginia Court of Appeals but justified review of
state court judgments, in part, by viewing the writ of error as a removal mechanism.
Martin, 14 U.S. at 349-50; see also Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
590, 618 (1874) (referring to Supreme Court review of state court judgments as "removal of cases from the State courts"); Hart & Wechsler, supra note 7, at 1767 (referring to Supreme Court review of state court judgments as a form of removal); cf.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 24, 1 Stat. 73, 85 ("And the Supreme Court shall not
issue execution in causes that are removed before them by writs of error, but shall
send a special mandate to the circuit court to award execution thereupon."); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(b) (1988) (authorizing district courts to issue writs of certiorari to state courts
in support of removal jurisdiction).
40. Chemerinsky, supra note 38, § 5.5, at 322 ("Article III defines the matters that
federal courts may hear, but it is silent as to the procedures that may be used to
initiate federal court jurisdiction.").
41. The constitutionality of removal is beyond question. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 272 (1879) (holding that removal of a criminal case to federal court
does not invade state jurisdiction); Railway Co. v. Whitton's Adm'r, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
270, 289-90 (1871) (confirming constitutionality of removal of state action to federal
court).
42. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). For
a description of the Judiciary Act of 1789, see Hart & Wechsler, supra note 7, at 30-34.
43. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 25. Technically, Article III bestows the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction, and legislation constitutes an "exception" to its jurisdiction. Ex
parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513 (1868) (observing that because statute affirming Supreme Court jurisdiction is read as implied negation of other jurisdiction,
"it was an almost necessary consequence that acts of Congress, providing for the exercise of jurisdiction, should come to be spoken of as acts granting jurisdiction, and not
as acts making exceptions to the constitutional grant of it").
Congress has never authorized the lower federal courts to review formally the judgments of state courts, although habeas corpus for state prisoners in custody pursuant
to state court judgments is sometimes seen as the functional equivalent. Rogers v.
Platt, 814 F.2d 683, 694-95 & n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (insisting on explicit Congressional
direction before reviewing state court judgment, but contrasting habeas jurisdiction);
see also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923) (noting that the jurisdiction possessed by the District Courts is strictly original and precludes the exercise of
appellate review); James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The AnachronisticAttack on Habeas Corpus/DirectReview Parity, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1997, 1998 (1992)
("Today, a district court's habeas corpus review of the constitutionality of a state
criminal conviction and the Supreme Court's direct review of the same question are
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court-in some cases the United States Supreme Court, in other cases
the United States Circuit Court or the United States District Courtto hear and determine certain cases filed in those courts as an initial
matter. 44 Finally, the Act provided for the removal
of certain cases
45
commenced in state court to a federal trial court.
Although the three mechanisms were distinct, considerable overlap
existed between the trial jurisdiction of circuit courts upon a direct
filing and upon removal. Most significantly, cases involving more than
$500 between a citizen of the state where the suit was brought and a
citizen of another state could either be brought directly in a federal
circuit court or, if filed in state court, could be removed to a federal
circuit court by the out-of-state defendant.4 Yet even in this instance,
the overlap was not complete-an in-state defendant sued by an outof-state plaintiff in state court could not remove. 47 Nevertheless, in
those areas where overlap existed, judicial precedents from direct fling cases were often relied upon in removal cases.
48 involved a suit filed diThe famous case of Strawbridge v. Curtiss'
rectly in the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts. Chief
Justice John Marshall's concise opinion, which was rendered without
argument, states in full:
nearly identical."); cf. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462, 464 (1983) (applying same principles to judgments of the District of Columbia
courts).
There is little doubt that the Constitution would permit lower federal courts to
review state court judgments. The Federalist No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted
in Hart & Wechsler, supra note 7, at 30 ("I perceive at present no impediment to the
establishment of an appeal from the state courts, to the subordinate national tribunals; and many advantages attending the power of doing it may be imagined."). Congress has the authority to allocate the judicial power of the United States in many
other ways, such as the review of state court judgments in cases between citizens of
different states by regional appellate courts.
44. Plaintiffs could file in the Supreme Court as a trial court in cases where a state,
an ambassador, or a public minister was a party. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 13. Plaintiffs
could file cases with more than $500 at stake in the circuit courts as trial courts where
"the United States [were] [sic] the plaintiffs," where "an alien [was] a party, or where
the suit [was] between a citizen of the State where the suit [was] brought, and a citizen
of another State." Id § 11. (Yes, the "United States" was considered plural.) See
James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom 859 (1988) ("Before 1861 the two words
'United States' were generally regarded as a plural noun."). Plaintiffs could file in
district courts as trial courts in admiralty cases, seizure cases, certain alien tort cases,
suits against consuls and vice-consuls, and cases brought by the United States involving $100. Id. § 9.
45. Alien defendants in state court, out-of-state citizens defending a suit against a
home state plaintiff, and a party claiming title to land under a grant from one state
against an adversary claiming title under a grant from the forum state could petition
for removal of cases involving $500 from state court to the Circuit Court. Id. § 12.
46. Id. §§ 11-12.
47. Compare id § 11 (authorizing original jurisdiction of circuit courts over matters exceeding $500 and involving either the United States as a party, an alien as a
party, or diversity jurisdiction) with id § 12 (providing for removal of cases from state
courts to federal district courts).
48. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
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The court has considered this case, and is of opinion that the jurisdiction cannot be supported.
The words of the act of congress are, "where an alien is a party; or
the suit is between a citizen of a state where the suit is brought, and
a citizen of another state."
The court understands these expressions to mean, that each distinct interest should be represented by persons, all of whom are entitled to sue, or may be sued, in the federal courts. That is, that
where the interest is joint, each of the persons concerned in that
interest must be competent to sue, or liable to be sued, in those
courts.
But the court does not mean to give an opinion in the case where
several parties represent several distinct interests, and some of
those parties are, and others are not, competent to sue, or liable to
be sued, in the courts of the United States.
Decree affirmed.4 9
Strawbridge is universally cited as establishing a rule of complete
diversity-requiring diversity between each plaintiff and each defendant. 0 The Court in Strawbridge, however, explicitly reserved the
question of jurisdiction "where several parties represent several distinct interests."' 51 This reservation forms the root of separate controversy removal.
At the time Strawbridgewas decided, joinder of parties in actions at
law was governed by common law, which followed the substantive
law. Plaintiffs who were asserting joint rights had to sue jointly, while
those asserting several rights had to sue separately. 52 Similarly, defendants whose liability was exclusively joint-as was often the case in
49. Id. at 267-68.
50. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 7, at 1664; Hedwig M. Auletta, Note, Including Limited Partners in the Diversity JurisdictionAnalysis, 54 Fordham L. Rev. 607,
607 (1986); David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of
the Federal Courts, 1801-1835, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 646, 674 (1982); Richard D. Freer, A
Principled Statutory Approach to Supplemental Jurisdiction, 1987 Duke L.J. 34, 38;
Bruce A. Wagman, Second Bites at the JurisdictionalApple: A Proposalfor Preventing False Assertions of Diversity of Citizenship, 41 Hastings L.J. 1417, 1421 (1990).
It is now firmly established that Chief Justice Marshall was only, as he said, interpreting "[t]he words of the act of congress." Strawbridge, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 267.
Thus, because he was not interpreting the Constitution, the complete diversity requirement is only a matter of statutory, not constitutional, interpretation. State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967).
51. Strawbridge, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 267.
52. 7 Wright & Miller, supra note 32, § 1651, at 367-71; John N. Pomeroy, Remedies and Remedial Rights by the Civil Action According to the Reformed American
Procedure §§ 184-90, 222-23 (1876); see also Charles E. Clark, Handbook of the Law
of Code Pleading § 56, at 349-51 (2d ed. 1947) (describing situations in which the
courts required plaintiffs to sue jointly and exacted penalties for failure to do so and
discussing cases in which no joinder was allowed, despite common questions of law or
fact, because the parties' interests were several).
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contract actions-had to be sued together.5 3 If the defendants' liability was joint and several, however-as was typically the case in tort
actions-the plaintiff had the option of suing them separately or together.54 If plaintiffs had the option of suing jointly or severally
and
55
chose to sue jointly, Strawbridge applied with full force.
Equity courts, on the other hand, developed a tripartite view of
joinder of parties: 1) proper parties, denoting those who were interested in the subject matter of the action and the relief sought; 2) necessary parties, denoting those whose interests would be directly
affected by a decree and should be joined if possible; and 3) indispensable parties, denoting those whose interests were so inseparably involved that the court could not proceed in their absence.5 6 As a result
of these distinctions, it was in equity cases, as Justice Story explained,
where the "distinct and separate interest referred to in Strawbridge"
might arise.57

Such a distinct and separate interest, however, did not permit the
federal court to hear the entire case; instead, "if a distinct interest
vested in [one defendant] so that substantial justice, (so far as he was
concerned,) could be done without affecting the other defendants, the
jurisdiction of the court might be exercised as to him alone."58 Thus,
if a plaintiff filed a bill in equity that included a non-indispensable
defendant outside the court's jurisdiction, the court, even on appeal,
would only dismiss that defendant, not the entire case.59 Under
Strawbridge,then, out-of-state plaintiffs who feared that a state court
would be biased in favor of in-state defendants could, within the limits
of the law of joinder, forego some efficiencies of joining other parties
and obtain a federal forum by carefully structuring the suit to avoid
including any party that would defeat diversity jurisdiction. 60
53. Pomeroy, supra note 52, §§ 273-82; see also Clark, supra note 52, § 59, at 373
("Joint obligors had to be sued together in the law courts.").
54. 7 Wright & Miller, supra note 32, § 1651, at 367.
55. Corporation of New Orleans v. Winter, 14 U.S. 91, 95 (1816).
56. Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130, 139 (1854); Clark, supra note 52,
§ 56; 7 Wright & Miller, supra note 32, § 1601, at 7-8.
57. Smith v. Rines, 22 F. Cas. 639, 643 (C.C.D. Mass. 1836) (No. 13,100) (Story,
Circuit Justice).
58. Cameron v.McRoberts, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 591, 591 (1818).
59. Carneal v. Banks, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 181, 188 (1825).
60. The Strawbridge interpretation of the Judiciary Act of 1789 produced a different problem for out-of-state plaintiffs. They could not sue any out-of-state defendant
in federal court along with the in-state defendant-even if the out-of-state defendant
was from a different state than was the plaintiff. Thus, a citizen of New Jersey could
not sue a citizen of New York and a citizen of Massachusetts in the District of New
York (even if the Massachusetts citizen were served in New York), because the citizen
of Massachusetts was not a " 'citizen of the State where the suit is brought.'" Strawbridge, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 267 (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789 § 11).
The problem was particularly acute in cases involving corporations, because under
Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809), a corporation was
a citizen of every state in which a member of the corporation was a citizen. ld. at 65.
Congress remedied this problem in 1839, by permitting federal jurisdiction over an
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Defendants, however, were in a very different position. In a series
of circuit court cases, justices riding circuit held that Strawbridge applied where it was a defendant who sought the federal forum via removal.6 ' The argument for a different rule on removal was made
eloquently before Justice Story by Peleg Sprague, representing an outof-state defendant named Rines:
The plaintiff being a citizen of Massachusetts, the defendant,
Rines, a citizen of Maine, claims the right to a trial in this court, by
virtue of the constitution.., and the judiciary act of 1789... which
were intended to secure the citizens of each state against being compelled to have their controversies with citizens of another state decided by the local tribunals of the state of their adversary. This right
the defendant may waive, either by submitting to the state jurisdiction, or voluntarily incurring liabilities by joint contracts with citizens of another state. But such waiver must result from his own
voluntary act, and not from the will or act of his adversary. If this
action were founded on contract, it could not be maintained against
Rines alone, it would be necessary to prove a joint contract by the
defendants with the plaintiff, and in such cases Rines, by thus voluntarily associating himself with the defendants, citizens of Massachusetts, in making engagements to the plaintiff, might be held to have
subjected himself to the same jurisdiction as his associates, as the
remedy in actions ex contractu must be joint, and the plaintiff could
out-of-state defendant who was served in the forum. Act of Feb. 28, 1839, ch. 36, § 1, 5
Stat. 321. In Louisiana, Cincinnati & Charleston Railroad v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497
(1844), the Supreme Court relied on this statute to conclude that an in-state corporation could be sued in federal court by an out-of-state plaintiff, even though some of
the members of the corporation were also from out-of-state. Id. at 556-57. It was in
this context-not the broader context of the complete diversity rule-that the Court
observed that the 1839 Act was "passed exclusively with an intent to rid the courts of
the decision in the case of Strawbridge and Curtis [sic]," and that Chief Justice Marshall had "repeatedly expressed regret" regarding the Strawbridge decision. Id. at 55556; see also Ober v. Gallagher, 93 U.S. 199, 204 (1876) (commenting on the "embarrassments that frequently arose under the act of 1789 ... which limited [the] authority
[of circuit courts] to controversies between 'a citizen of the State where the suit is
brought and a citizen of another State' "); Wiggins v. European & N.A. Ry., 29 F. Cas.
1165, 1167 (C.C.D. Maine 1868) (No. 17,626) (sustaining jurisdiction, based on Letson, in a case by citizens of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New Jersey
against citizens of Maine and New Hampshire).
The Court in Letson went further, of course, and held that a corporation is to be
treated as a citizen of the state of its incorporation. Letson, 43 U.S at 558. By doing
so, it avoided the broader question of the complete diversity rule. Id. at 559.
61. See, e.g., Rines, 22 F. Cas. at 641 (Story, Circuit Justice); Ward v. Arredondo,
29 F. Cas. 167, 167 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1825) (No. 17,148) (Thompson, Circuit Justice);
Beardsley v. Torrey, 2 F. Cas. 1188, 1188 (C.C.D. Pa. 1822) (No. 1,190) (Washington,
Circuit Justice) (not explicitly citing Strawbridge);see also A. Conkling, A Treatise on
the Organization, Jurisdiction and Practice of the Courts of the United States 79
(Wm. & A. Gould & Co. 1985) (1831) ("The rule established relative to suits originally instituted in the courts of the United States, that where the jurisdiction depends
upon the character of the parties, all the individuals composing the respective parties,
plaintiff and defendant, must possess the requisite character, is applicable also to suits
removed from the state courts.").
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not sue the other defendants in the courts of the United States. But
this is an action of tort brought against Rines, and other persons
with whom he has never had any connexion or association, and with
whom he is now coupled, without any agency of his own, and
against his will, by the mere adversary act of the plaintiff. If there
could be no judgment against him unless the other defendants were
also found guilty, he would have the benefit of their cooperation in
the defence, and that security for the impartiality of the court, which
arises from the necessity of their giving judgment against their own
citizens at the same time and for the same cause as against a stranger. But in this case, a verdict and judgment might be rendered
against Rines alone, and he would have no right to contribution.
The interest of the other defendants may be adverse to him, for if
they have done wrong, it may suit their purposes to throw the whole
burthen upon a stranger.... Ought then Pines, a citizen of Maine,
to be deprived of the benefit of having a trial in the courts of the
United States, and compelled to submit to a final decision in the
state court of an adversary, merely because that adversary has seen
fit to bring
in other persons, all of whom are hostile in interest to
62
Rines.

Although Justice Story acknowledged that Mr. Sprague argued "very
ably,"'6 3 he concluded that Strawbridge "has always been understood
as equally applicable to all cases of suits removed from a state court.
And, looking to the words used in the eleventh and twelfth sections of
the act, as to this point, it seems absolutely impracticable to make any
solid distinction between them."' Justice Story relied upon the decisions of Justices Washington and Thompson on circuit, noting, "If I
entertained any doubt upon the subject the deliberate opinions of my
Brothers Washington and Thompson would be decisive with me."'
Moreover, partial removal was forbidden. As Justice Washington
stated: "[I]t is most obvious that [the state action] cannot be severed,
and a part only be removed. Not only would such a doctrine be attended with absurdity and inconvenience, but it would be repugnant
to the language, and to the clear meaning of the twelfth section.. .."6
Justice Story shared this view:
And this leads me, in the next place, to the consideration, which has
been so strongly urged at the bar, as to the right of removal of a
cause in part from a state court, leaving it still, as to other parties,
62. Rines, 22 F. Cas. at 641.
63. Id. at 642.
64. Id. Justice Story also concluded that because a tort plaintiff has the option of
suing jointly or severally, if he chooses to sue jointly, the Strawbridge rule applies. Id.
at 643 ("If a party has a distinct and separate interest, and also a joint interest ...it
has never been supposed, that the general rule laid down in that case did not apply.").
65. Id. at 645. He continued: "But I confess, that as an original question, I should
have entertained the same view of the matter, and the weight of their authority ought,
under these circumstances, to be quite conclusive with me." Id.
66. Beardsley v. Torrey, 2 F. Cas. 1188, 1189 (C.C.D. Pa. 1822) (No. 1,190) (Washington, Circuit Justice).
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depending therein. It appears to me, that the very terms of the act
prohibit any such partial removal of a suit. 67

Echoing Strawbridge, Justice Thompson noted that:
There may be cases in equity where the several parties represent
distinct interests, so that separate decrees may be made, where possibly some of the parties may take the cause into the circuit court,
and others remain in the state court; but it ought even in such cases
to be a very strong and palpable
case of separate and distinct inter68
ests to sanction such a course.

As the Supreme Court later explained, the removal provisions of
the Judiciary Act of 1789 "applied only to cases in which all the plaintiffs were citizens of the State in which the suit was brought, and all
the defendants citizens of other States.... If the whole suit could
not
' 69
be removed, no part of it could be taken from the State court.
From the beginning, it was clear that applying the Strawbridge rule
to removal provided a means for in-state plaintiffs to prevent an outof-state defendant from removing." Justice Washington
freely admit[ted] that the doctrine which this court finds itself compelled to sanction, may be attended by all the inconveniences
pointed out by the defendant's counsel, and that it may be so used,
in a great measure, to defeat the provisions of the twelfth section of

67. Rines, 22 F. Cas. at 644.
68. Ward v. Arredondo, 29 F. Cas. 167, 168 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1825) (No. 17,148)
(Thompson, Circuit Justice); see also Rines, 22 F. Cas. at 643 (noting that all the cases
"inwhich a separate and distinct interest ...is spoken of, were bills in equity, capable
in their own nature of separate and distinct decrees upon separate and distinct interests, where there was, or might be, no community of interest, and where the general
question was presented as to the proper parties necessary to be made in a suit in
equity").
69. Barney v. Latham, 103 U.S. 205, 209 (1880); see also Texas Employers Ins.
Ass'n v. Felt, 150 F.2d 227, 233 (5th Cir. 1945) ("From 1789 until 1866 the whole suit
remained in the state court, even though it contained a separable controversy of the
requisite jurisdictional amount wholly between citizens of different states, unless all of
the defendants joined in the petition to remove and were citizens of different states
from the plaintiff or all of the plaintiffs.").
70. The most obvious way that this could be done was by joining an in-state de-

fendant. The Judiciary Act of 1789, however, only granted diversity jurisdiction over

cases between a citizen of the state where the action was brought and a citizen of
another state (rather than more generally between citizens of different states). Thus,
a plaintiff could defeat removal by suing jointly with an out-of-state plaintiff-even if
the out-of-state plaintiff and out-of-state defendant were from different states.
In Hubbard v. Northern Railroad, 12 F. Cas. 781 (C.C.D. Vt. 1853) (No. 6,818),
joint administrators were appointed for a Vermont decedent. Id. at 782. One administrator was a citizen of Vermont, another of New Hampshire. Id. The defendant railroad was a New York corporation and therefore a citizen of New York. Id. When the
administrators filed suit against the railroad in Vermont state court, the railroad removed, but the case was remanded because one of the plaintiffs was not a citizen of
the state where suit was brought. Id. at 783.
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the judiciary law. But the remedy, if indeed the subject be remediable, must be provided by congress. 7 '

B. Separable Controversy Act of 1866
With the revolution in civil procedure started by the Field Code in
New York in 1848, the law of joinder of parties in all civil actions

began to move slowly and unevenly toward the equity rules, increasing the opportunity for plaintiffs to structure actions in ways that prevented removal.72 Of course, changes in areas far more important
than civil procedure were underway at the time as well. In the wake
of the Civil War, the thirty-ninth Congress struggled with President
Johnson over Reconstruction. In April of 1866, Congress overrode
President Johnson's veto of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and in June,
it sent the Fourteenth Amendment to the states for ratification. 3 In
July, Congress reduced the Supreme Court to seven members to prevent President Johnson from filling vacancies7 4 and, four days later,
provided a remedy for out-of-state defendants sued in state court by
enacting the Separable Controversy Act.' Under that Act, a non71. Beardsley v. Torrey, 2 F. Cas. 1188, 1189 (C.C.D. Pa. 1822) (No. 1,190). The
courts did provide some relief to out-of-state defendants by holding that nominal parties could be disregarded. E.g., Brown v. Strode, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 303 (1809);
Wormley v. Wormley, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 421, 451 (1823); Ward, 29 F. Cas. at 168.
72. 7 Wright & Miller, supra note 32, § 1651, at 366-71; see also Clark, supra note
52, §§ 57-58 (discussing rules for joinder of plaintiffs under code pleading); id. §§ 6061 (discussing rules for joinder of defendants under code pleading); Douglas Laycock,
The Triumph of Equity, 56 Law & Contemp. Probs. 53, 63 (1993) (discussing the pervasiveness of the traditions of equity in the current legal system, including in the law
of joinder); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. Pa. L Rev 909, 923 (1987)
(discussing the equity-dominated Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including the rules
of joinder).
73. Jett v. Dallas Ind. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701,720-21 (1989) (describing history of
Civil Rights Act of 1866 and Fourteenth Amendment). The Civil Rights Act of 1866
had its own removal provision that had nothing to do with either the citizenship of the
parties or the nature of the claim brought by the plaintiff. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch.
31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1988)). The provision
provided for the removal of both civil and criminal proceedings if the defendant was
denied or could not enforce in the state court the rights given by that act. Id.; see, e.g.,
Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 788 (1966) (ordering removal of criminal proceedings from state court if district court determined that defendants were asked to leave
and were prosecuted for trespassing on a place of public accommodation because of
their race).
74. Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 210, § 1, 14 Stat. 209, 209 (reducing number of
Supreme Court justices) (repealed 1911).
75. Ch. 288, 14 Stat. 306, 306-07 (1866) (authorizing separable controversy removal); see also Currie, supra note 1, at 23 ("[Tlhe original 'separable controversy'
removal statute seems best explained as based upon the desire to give defendants the
same escape from an overbroad complete-diversity requirement that plaintiffs already
enjoyed because of their ability to leave nondiverse parties out of the lawsuit.").
The Act provided, in relevant part:
[In any suit.., by a citizen of the State in which suit is brought against a
citizen of another State... [and] a citizen of the State in which the suit is
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resident defendant could remove part of a case filed in state court, so
long as the removed part was "separable" from the rest of the case.
As Circuit Judge Dillon 76 explained, the 1866 Act
enlarges the provisions of the judiciary act in that it contemplates
the case of several defendants, some residing in the state in which
the suit is brought, and some in a state other than that in which suit
is instituted; and it authorizes, in certain cases, the non-resident defendant to have the cause removed as to him and to proceed in the
state court as to the resident defendants. The effect of this statute is
plain:-without it no removal could be made, because all the defendants were not within the act, and under the ruling of the courts
before mentioned, unless77the cause was removable as to all, it was
not removable as to any.
brought ...

if the suit is one in which there can be a final determination of

the controversy, so far as it concerns him, without the presence of the other
defendants as parties in the cause ...

the defendant who is a citizen of a

State other than that in which the suit is brought, may... file a petition for
the removal of the cause as against him .... And such removal of the cause,
as against the defendant petitioning therefor ...

shall not be deemed to

prejudice or take away the right of the plaintiff to proceed at the same time
with the suit in the State court as against the other defendants, if he shall
desire to do so.
14 Stat. at 306-07.
76. Judge Dillon was one of the first Circuit Judges since the Midnight Judges
were appointed by President John Adams at the conclusion of his presidency in 1801.
Midnight Judges Act, ch. 4, § 3, 2 Stat. 89, 89 (1801) (repealed 1802). After the repeal
of the Midnight Judges Act the following year, it was not until 1869 that judges could
again be appointed to the circuit courts. Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 1, 16 Stat. 44,
44; see generally Hart & Wechsler, supra note 7, at 36 (tracing the evolution of the
circuit courts).
77. Sands v. Smith, 21 F. Cas. 345,347 (C.C.D. Neb. 1870) (No. 12,305). Similarly,
in Florence Sewing Machine Co. v. Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Co., 9 F. Cas.
298 (C.C.D. Mass. 1873) (No. 4,883) (authorizing piecemeal removal under the 1866
Act), Circuit Judge Shepley stated:
Before the passage of this act, no removal could be made in the causes to
which the act applies, because all the defendants were not entitled to petition for removal, and the courts had decided that unless it was removable as
to all, it was not so as to any. After the passage of the act of 1866, in certain
cases the alien, or non-resident, defendant could have the cause removed as
to him, while it was allowed to proceed in the state courts as to the resident
defendants.
Id. at 301-02.
Although the Supreme Court overruled this decision on another point, see infra
text accompanying note 85, it agreed with the interpretation of the 1866 Act. Case of
the Sewing Mach. Cos., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 553, 580 (1874), rev'g Florence Sewing
Mach. Co. v. Grover & Baker Sewing Mach. Co., 110 Mass. 1 (1872). Justice Clifford
wrote:
Before the passage of that act no removal could be made in such a case, as
some of the defendants are by that act supposed to be citizens of the State
where the suit is brought, and all the courts, Federal and State, had uniformly decided that unless the cause was removable as to all the defendants
it could not be removed at all, as the act of Congress contained no provision
warranting any such proceeding as summons and severance for any purpose.
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In determining whether a separable controversy involving the nonresident defendant existed, courts essentially determined whether the
defendant seeking removal was a necessary party to the state court
action or merely a proper party.7" This linkage of a jurisdictional standard concerning "separable controversies" with a joinder standard
concerning necessary and proper parties was only possible because
separable-controversy removal was limited to diversity cases and
therefore inherently involved the joinder of parties.
Significantly, removal under the 1866 Act occurred piecemeal.
Parts of cases that were filed in state court were removed to the federal circuit court and other parts of the same case remained in the
state court. While this helped to protect removal rights (at least marginally), it also created "[m]uch confusion and embarrassment, as well
as increase in the cost of litigation."' 9
C. Prejudice or Local Influence Removal Act of 1867
In March 1867, at the close of the second session of the thirty-ninth
Congress, Congress passed an act that purported to amend the 1866
Act." The Prejudice or Local Influence Removal Act of 1867 permitted removal by plaintiffs as well as defendants upon a filing of an affidavit that prejudice or local influence existed." It was argued that the
1867 Act was designed to broaden the inroads on Strawbridge made
by the 1866 Act and to
allow a non-resident to remove the cause to the federal tribunal,
whenever he had reason to believe that, from prejudice or local influence, he would be unable to obtain justice in the state courts,
although there were other codefendants who were residents of the
state in which the suit was brought.82
78. Barney v. Latham, 103 U.S. 205, 214 (1880); see also Pullman Co. v. Jenkins,
305 U.S. 534, 538 (1939) (discussing "separable" in terms of joinder principles).
79. Barney, 103 U.S. at 213.
80. Prejudice or Local Influence Removal Act of 1867, ch. 196, 14 Stat. 558 (entitled "An Act to Amend an Act entitled 'An Act for the Removal of Causes in Certain
Cases from State Courts' ").
81. The Act provided, in relevant part:
[W]here a suit is... pending... in any State court, in which there is controversy between a citizen of the State in which the suit is brought and a citizen
of another State... such citizen of another State, whether he be plaintiff or
defendant, if he will make and file, in such State court, an affidavit stating
that he has reason to and does believe that, from prejudice or local influence, he will not be able to obtain justice in such State court, may, at any
time before the final hearing or trial of the suit, file a petition in such State
court for the removal of the suit ....
Id at 559.
82. Florence Sewing Mach. Co. v. Grover & Baker Sewing Mach. Co., 9 F. Cas.
298, 299 (C.C.D. Mass. 1873) (No. 4,883) (argument of Messrs. Merwin, Abbott, and

Curtis).
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Circuit Judge Shepley accepted the argument,83 but in the Case of
the Sewing Machine Companies,' the Supreme Court held that the
Strawbridge interpretation of the Judiciary Act of 1789 applied to the
1867 Act as well:
Either the non-resident plaintiff or non-resident defendant may remove the cause under the [1867] act, provided all the plaintiffs or all
the defendants join in the petition, and all the party petitioning are
non-residents, as required under the Judiciary Act, but it is a great
mistake to suppose that any such right is conferred by that act
where one or more of the plaintiffs or one or more of the petitioning defendants are citizens of the State in which the suit is pending,
as the act is destitute of any language which can be properly construed to confer any such right unless all the plaintiffs
5 or all the
defendants are non-residents and join in the petition.
Thus, the Strawbridge rule remained applicable to removal, unless the
out-of-state defendant was involved in a separable controversy and
could take advantage of the 1866 Act.
D. JudiciaryAct of 1875
Several solutions were available to eliminate the problems caused
by the 1866 and 1867 Acts. One would have been to return to the pre1866 law and leave in state court any actions filed there that included
either an out-of-state plaintiff or an in-state defendant. A second solution would have been simply to overrule Sewing Machine Companies and permit removal of any case in which a non-resident had
reason to fear prejudice or local influence. Indeed, shortly after the
decision in that case, a bill was reported by the House Judiciary Committee, "specifically to write into law what the Supreme Court did not
find in the Act of 1867. ' ' a 6 Coincidentally, the victorious lawyer in
Sewing Machine Companies, Ebenezer Rockwood Hoar, was serving
his only term in the House at the time and vigorously opposed the
bill.87 He objected that such an expansion of federal jurisdiction at
the expense of state courts would be both unconstitutional and bad
83. Id. at 302; see also Sands v. Smith, 21 F. Cas. 345, 347-48 (C.C.D. Neb. 1870)
(No. 12,305) (Dillon, Circuit Judge) (explaining that the 1867 Act modifies the Acts of
1839 and 1866 to allow a non-resident plaintiff to remove from state court, even if
there is also a non-resident defendant).

84. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 553 (1874).
85. Id. at 587. Although the circuit court, in Florence Sewing Machine, and the
Supreme Court, in Sewing Machine Companies, were addressing the same case, the
case did not reach the Supreme Court on appeal from the circuit court's decision. Id.
at 554. Instead, the case reached the Supreme Court on writ of error to the state
court because the state court denied the petition for removal, tried the case, and entered judgment for the plaintiff. Id.
86. Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 67
(1927).
87. Id.
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policy.m Not surprisingly, the part of the bill that would have overruled Sewing Machine Companies was eliminated by the House.8
As finally enacted, the Judiciary Act of 187590 neither returned to
the pre-1866 law nor overruled Sewing Machine Companies. Instead,
it provided that where a suit in state court included
a controversy which is wholly between citizens of different States,
and which can be fully determined as between them, then either one
or more of the plaintiffs or defendants actually interested in such
controversy may remove said suit into the circuit court of the
United States for the proper district. 91
88. Id.
89. Id. at 67-68. Over time, Congressman Hoar proved wrong; there is nothing
unconstitutional about vesting the federal courts with jurisdiction over cases in which
only two parties are diverse. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523,
530-31 (1967).
As enacted, the Judiciary Act of 1875 contained language that could be construed
to overrule Strawbridge, both for direct filing and removal. It provided for jurisdiction over suits "in which there shall be a controversy between citizens of different
States." Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470, 470. In the Removal Cases,
100 U.S. 457 (1879), Justice Bradley argued in a concurring opinion that this language
provided for federal jurisdiction "where any of the contestants on opposite sides of
the controversy are citizens of different States." Id. at 481 (Bradley, J., concurring).
He dissented "from so much of the [majority] opinion as seems to assume that one
condition of Federal jurisdiction... is, that each party on one side of the controversy
must be a citizen of a different State from that of which either of the parties on the
other side is a citizen." Id. at 479. Bradley was particularly concerned that federal
jurisdiction extend to cases that "relate to the foreclosure and sale of railroads extending into two or more States, and winding up the affairs of the companies that own
them." Id.at 480.
Bradley's view, however, did not carry the day. Peninsular Iron Co. v. Stone, 121
U.S. 631, 632 (1887) (interpreting the Removal Cases as continuing the rule of complete diversity to direct-filed cases); Blake v. McKim, 103 U.S. 336, 337 (1880) (interpreting the Removal Cases as continuing the rule of complete diversity in removed
cases absent a separable controversy); see also Hart & Wechsler, supra note 7, at 1664
("Under all the varying formulations of the general grant of diversity jurisdiction in
successive judiciary acts, the Strawbridge decision has been consistently interpreted as
requiring that there be diversity of citizenship as between each plaintiff and each defendant."). Bradley did not object to these decisions, but did succeed in establishing
federal jurisdiction under the 1875 Act for all cases involving federally-chartered railroads. Pacific R.R. Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1, 11 (1885) (Bradley, J.) (holding that,
under the 1875 Act, a suit brought in state court against a United States corporation
may be removed by the corporation into federal court).
In reiterating the Strawbridge complete diversity rule, the Court in Stone also repeated the rule that the "several distinct interests" reservation in Strawbridge did not
apply when the plaintiffs chose to sue jointly. Stone, 121 U.S. at 632-33, (citing, inter
alia, New Orleans v. Winter, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 91 (1816) (holding that complete
diversity rule applies when plaintiffs sue jointly)). The Court observed, "This rule has
been adhered to steadily ever since... and in removal cases.., it has uniformly been
applied, unless there is a separable controversy." ld. at 633 (citations omitted).
90. Ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
91. Id. § 2. The Judiciary Act of 1875 provided, in relevant part:
[A]ny suit of a civil nature... pending... in any State court... in which
there shall be a controversy between citizens of different States . . . either
party may remove ....And when in any suit mentioned in this section there
shall be a controversy which is wholly between citizens of different States,
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In Barney v. Latham,' the Supreme Court concluded that this Act
provided "for the removal of the entire suit," not simply the separable
controversy. 93 Justice Harlan explained:
That such was the intention of Congress is a proposition which
seems too obvious to require enforcement by argument. While the
act of 1866 expressly confines the removal to that part of the suit
which specially relates to or concerns the defendant seeking the removal, there is nothing whatever in the act of 1875 justifying the
conclusion that Congress intended to leave any part of a suit in the
State court where the right of removal was given to, and was exercised by, any of the parties to a separable controversy therein.
Much confusion and embarrassment, as well as increase in the cost
of litigation, had been found to result from the provision in the former act permitting the separation of controversies arising in a suit,
removing some to the Federal court, and leaving others in the State
court for determination. It was often convenient to embrace in one
suit all the controversies which were so far connected by their circumstances as to make all who sue, or are sued, proper, though not
indispensable parties. Rather than split up such a suit between
courts of different jurisdictions, Congress determined that the removal of the separable controversy to which the judicial power of
the United States was, by the Constitution, expressly extended,
should operate to transfer the whole suit to the Federal court.94
Thus, the Strawbridgerule of complete diversity continued to apply in
cases filed directly in federal court, as well as to removed cases where
there was no separable controversy involving diverse parties. The
and which can be fully determined as between them, then either one or more
of the plaintiffs or defendants actually interested in such controversy may
remove ....
Id.
The Judiciary Act of 1875 is best known, of course, for its far more wide-ranging
change-the grant of general federal question jurisdiction to the circuit courts. Judiciary Act of 1875 § 1. Interestingly, the bill as introduced and as passed by the House
only concerned removal jurisdiction; the provisions granting general federal question
jurisdiction were added as an amendment by the Senate with little discussion. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 86, at 65-69; Hart & Wechsler, supra note 7, at 995; James
H. Chadbourn & A. Leo Levin, OriginalJurisdictionof Federal Questions, 90 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 639, 642-45 (1942); Ray Forrester, The Natureof a "FederalQuestion",16 Tul.
L. Rev. 362, 374-75 (1942). David Currie argues that with the 1875 amendment, "the
statute ceased to make sense, for it gave the defendant alone, unjustifiably, the opportunity to litigate in federal court without splitting one lawsuit into two." Currie, supra
note 1, at 23. This criticism ignores, however, that the 1875 Act permitted plaintiffs,
as well as defendants, to remove. Indeed, plaintiffs and defendants had equal removal
power under the 1875 Act. Moreover, Currie's criticism overlooks that defendants
and plaintiffs are, in general, differently situated with regard to the desirability of
splitting one lawsuit into two. See infra notes 429-36 and accompanying text (discussing how plaintiffs and defendants are differently situated).
92. 103 U.S. 205 (1880).
93. Id. at 212.
94. Id. at 212-13.
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rule, however, could be effectively avoided on removal in cases involving separable controversies wholly between citizens of different states.
The Court rejected the argument that if the plaintiff joined causes
of action that need not or should not have been joined in one suit,
only the cause of action between citizens of different states should be
removed, leaving the other cause of action in state court.95 Observing
that "[i]n a variety of cases it is in the discretion of the plaintiff as to
whom he will join as defendants," and that "[c]onsistently with established rules of pleading he may be governed often by considerations of
mere convenience," 96 the Supreme Court insisted that the entire case
be removed and such questions left "for the determination of the trial
court, that is, the Federal court, after the cause is there docketed." 9
If, after considering such joinder issues in accordance with federal
practice, the court determines that "the cause does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy within the jurisdiction of
that court, it can, under the fifth section of the act of 1875, dismiss the
suit, or remand it to the State court as justice requires."98
Despite Barney's insistence that the entire case be removed, the
Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois could not believe
that the Supreme Court meant what it said. In City of Chicago v.
Hutchinson," Chicago brought an action in state court to condemn
approximately 200 parcels of land to open a street. The owner of one
of the lots was a woman from Michigan, who filed a petition for removal. The circuit court first concluded that there was a separable
controversy between the city and her as to the value of her land that
could be fully determined as between them." ° Three days later, it
faced the question of whether this meant that the entire case was removed, or only that portion of the case involving the petitioner. The
court concluded that "the controversies between the city and the various parties are distinct and separate,"' 0' and therefore, only the controversy involving the removing defendant was removed, with the rest
of the case left in state court.'0 The court explained:
In taking this view of the case I concede we have, to some extent, to
qualify the general principle laid down by the supreme court of the
United States in [Barney v. Latham]. In that case there were several controversies between the parties, and the supreme court of the
United States held that did not deprive the court of jurisdiction, and
did not prevent the various controversies in the case from being
brought into the federal court, when application was made for re95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id at 214.
Id. at 215.
Id. at 216.
Id
15 F. 129 (C.C.N.D. IMl. 1882).
Id. at 132.
Id. at 136.
Id at 137.
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moval by one of the parties to a separate controversy. All I can say
about that is, that to some extent the various questions in that case
were blended together, although separate and distinct. But it is
clear, I think, that this kind of a case was not in the mind of the
supreme court when it made that decision, and if it had been, it
would have modified the language, or the principle would not have
been stated in such broad terms as are contained in the opinion of
the court.10 3

The circuit court professed to know what one suit really is-a view
informed by common law procedure-regardless of what the state
statutes authorized. Observing that the condemnation proceeding is
"unlike an ordinary case at law or in equity, and resting wholly on the
authority of the statute of the state, which describes the mode of proceeding,"'" the court determined that while "[i]n form the whole is
one suit, in which there are many defendants[,J in substance and reality one suit, in which each defendant who owns a particular lot is a
party ... is sole."10

Thus, a distinction was born between separable

and separate controversies, with the former resulting in removal of the
entire case under Barney0and
the latter resulting in removal only of
6
the separate controversy.
Hutchinson might have become regarded as simply an erroneous
lower court decision if the Supreme Court had not employed the same
reasoning in the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases.107 The Court's decision in the PacificRailroad Removal Cases is best known for its expansive view of statutory federal question jurisdiction, treating all cases in
which federally-chartered corporations are parties as cases "arising
under the law of the United States" within the meaning of the Judiciary Act of 1875.108 One of the cases, however, was remarkably similar
to Hutchinson: Kansas City instituted a proceeding to condemn land,
including land owned by the Union Pacific Railway Company, for the
purpose of widening a street. 1°9 The railway removed. 10 The
Supreme Court found the question of whether the removal brought
the entire case regarding the widening of the street to federal court
"embarrassing.""' Echoing Hutchinson without citing it, the Court
103. Id. (citation omitted).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Note, Separation of Causes in Removal Proceedings,41 Harv. L. Rev. 1048,
1048 nn.8-9 (1928) [hereinafter Note, Separation of Causes] (citing Hutchinson as the
origin of "separate" controversy removal).
107. 115 U.S. 1 (1885).
108. Id. at 11; 13B Wright & Miller, supra note 32, § 3571, at 176-85. This holding
has been legislatively overruled. 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (1988) (denying jurisdiction on
grounds of federal incorporation unless the United States owns more than one-half of
the stock).
109. Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U.S. at 5.
110. Id. at 6.
111. Id. at 19.
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concluded that the controversy between the city and the railway was a
"distinct and separate one" and therefore removable while leaving the
Just as Hutchinson had found that
rest of the case in state court.'

the portion of the case involving each owner was a single separately-

removable suit "in substance and reality,""' so too the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases found this to be true "to all intents and purposes.""' 4 Although the Supreme Court did not cite Barney, perhaps

because Barney involved separable controversy removal (which was
limited to diversity jurisdiction) and the Pacific Railroad Removal

Cases involved federal question removal, the decision nevertheless
opened the door to recreating the confusion, waste, and embarrassment of piecemeal removal that, as the Court had said in Barney,
Congress had acted to prevent."'
E. Removal Act of 1887
In 1887, two years after the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, Congress eliminated the power of plaintiffs to remove with the passage of
the Removal Act." 6 Furthermore, Congress rewrote the general re112. Id. at 23.
113. City of Chicago v. Hutchinson, 15 F. 129, 137 (C.C.N.D. II. 1882).
114. Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U.S. at 23.
115. Barney v. Latham, 103 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1880).
116. Ch. 373,24 Stat. 552 (1887); see generally Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 86,
at 94-95 (explaining the stages by which a bill was proposed, changed and eventually
became law). The following year, Congress made formal corrections and reenacted
the Removal Act of 1887. Act of Aug. 13, 1888, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433.
The 1888 Act provided, in pertinent part:
[T]he circuit courts of the United States shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature ...
arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States... or in which
there shall be a controversy between citizens of different States ....
[A]ny suit of a civil nature... arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States... of which the circuit courts of the United States are given
original jurisdiction by the preceding section, which may now be pending, or
which may hereafter be brought, in any State court, may be removed by the
defendant or defendants therein to the circuit court of the United States for
the proper district. Any other suit of a civil nature.., of which the circuit
courts of the United States are given jurisdiction by the preceding section,
and which are now pending, or which may hereafter be brought, in any State
court, may be removed into the circuit court of the United States for the
proper district by the defendant or defendants therein, being non-residents
of the State. And when in any suit mentioned in this section there shall be a
controversy which is wholly between citizens of different States, and which
can be fully determined as between them, then either one or more of the
defendants actually interested in such controversy may remove said suit into
the circuit court of the United States for the proper district. And where a
suit is now pending, or may be hereafter brought, in any State court, in
which there is a controversy between a citizen of the State in which the suit
is brought and a citizen of another State, any defendant, being such citizen of
another State, may remove such suit into the circuit court of the United
States for the proper district, at any time before the trial thereof, when it
shall be made to appear to said circuit court that from prejudice or local
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moval provision in a way that no longer defined removal jurisdiction

independently. 1 7 Instead, removal jurisdiction was defined by reference to the kinds of cases that could be brought directly in district

court." 8
In Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank," 9 the Supreme Court held
that a defendant could remove under the Removal Act only if the
plaintiff could have brought the case in circuit court.' 20 Justices
Harlan and Field dissented, arguing that the purpose of the Removal
Act was to limit removal to defendants, not to prevent defendants
influence he will not be able to obtain justice in such State court, or in any
other State court to which the said defendant may, under the laws of the
State, have the right, on account of such prejudice or local influence, to remove said cause: Provided,That if it further appears that said suit can be
fully and justly determined as to the other defendants in the State court,
without being affected by such prejudice or local influence, and that no party
to the suit will be prejudiced by a separation of the parties, said circuit court
may direct the suit to be remanded, so far as relates to such other defendants, to the State court, to be proceeded with therein.
At any time before the trial of any suit which is now pending in any circuit
court or may hereafter be entered therein, and which has been removed to
said court from a State court on the affidavit of any party plaintiff that he
had reason to believe and did believe that, from prejudice or local influence,
he was unable to obtain justice in said State court, the circuit court shall, on
application of the other party, examine into the truth of said affidavit and
the grounds thereof, and, unless it shall appear to the satisfaction of said
court that said party will not be able to obtain justice in such State court, it
shall cause the same to be remanded thereto.
Removal Act of 1887 §§ 1-2.
Frankfurter and Landis suggest that plaintiffs continued to have the right to remove
under the Removal Act if local prejudice were shown. Frankfurter & Landis, supra
note 86, at 94. The Act, however, not only limited "prejudice or local influence"
removal to defendants, but also permitted the court to remand the action as to other
defendants not subject to such prejudice if "no party to the suit will be prejudiced by a
separation of the parties." Removal Act of 1887 § 2. It appears that Frankfurter and
Landis may have been misled by the provision of the Act permitting a circuit court to
inquire into the truth of an affidavit of prejudice or local influence filed by a plaintiff,
and, if unsatisfied by it, to remand the action. Id. That provision, however, was not a
grant of removal jurisdiction, but only a grant of a remand power applicable to a suit
"which is now pending in any circuit court or may hereafter be entered therein, and
which has been removed to said court from a State court." Id.
Removal at the time was a two-step process. First, the party would file a petition
for removal in the state court. Second, the party would enter a copy of the state court
record in the federal circuit court "on the first day of its then next session." Id. § 3.
What was contemplated by the provision dealing with inquiry into the truth of removal affidavits filed by plaintiffs, then, was remanding not only cases already removed by plaintiffs and entered in the circuit court, but also cases in which the
plaintiff had removed the action from state court but not yet entered the record in the
circuit court because that court's next session had not yet begun. This interpretation
is confirmed by contrasting this language with the language of the removal provisions
in the Act, which apply to suits "which may now be pending or which may hereafter
be brought, in any State court." Id. § 2.
117. Removal Act of 1887 § 1.
118. Id.
119. 152 U.S. 454 (1894).
120. Id. at 462.

1995]

SECTION 1441(C)

1125

from removing on the basis of a federal defense. 2 In their view,
Congress defined removability by reference to jurisdiction over cases
brought directly in federal court to avoid repetition of the language
providing the jurisdictional predicates, including the jurisdictional
amount, not to restrict removal to cases that could have been filed
there directly."2
Since the decision in Union & Planters' Bank, the irony of testing
removal jurisdiction by determining whether a plaintiff who chose a
state forum could have chosen a federal forum has been "a more-orless constant feature of the removal statute, under which a case is removable if a federal district court could have taken jurisdiction had
the same complaint been ffled." 2 The result of this decision is not
only that a court considering a removal petition must determine
whether a plaintiff could have filed the case directly in federal district
court, but also that courts and commentators tend to have a reflexive
inclination toward insisting on parallelism in direct-filed and removed
cases. Nevertheless, despite the general parallelism created by the
Union & Planters' Bank interpretation of the Removal Act of 1887,
that Act continued to authorize defendants to remove the entire case
to the federal circuit court if actually interested in a separable controversy wholly between citizens of different states.
In addition, lower courts began to rely on the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases 2 4 to permit piecemeal removal of "separate" controver-

sies. 25 For example, in In re Stutsman County," the circuit court
permitted out-of-state citizens to remove that part of a condemnation
proceeding involving their property, while leaving the rest of the case
in state court. Citing the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, the court
stated that "[t]he matter which has been removed to this court is not a
'separable controversy,' but a separate suit."' 27
Similarly, in Deepwater Railway Co. v. Western Pocohontas Coal &
Lumber Co.,"2 the circuit court relied on Hutchinson, the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, and Stutsman to permit partial removal of a condemnation proceeding, explaining that the case presented "a
separable controversy or, speaking accurately, a distinct and separate
controversy.' 2 9 The court rejected as "untenable" the suggestion
121. Id at 469.
122. Id. at 469-72.
123. Franchise Tax Bd.v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1,19 n.18
(1983) (citation omitted).
124. 115 U.S. 1 (1885).
125. See supra notes 107-15 and accompanying text (discussing the Pacific Railroad
Removal Cases).
126. 88 F. 337 (C.C.D.N.D. 1898).
127. Id at 342; see also id. at 343 (noting that the removed matter is "to all intents
and purposes, a separate suit").
128. 152 F. 824 (C.C.S.D.W.V. 1907).
129. Id. at 826.
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that Barney required the removal of the entire case, reasoning that
Barney only applied where joinder was accomplished under "'established rules of pleading.' "130 The circuit court apparently viewed the
only "established rules" to be the rules of the common law. While the
court acknowledged that the state statute permitted joinder, it emphasized that "under the 'established rules' of common-law pleading, unaided by statutory permission, a demurrer for multifariousness and
misjoinder would have to be sustained instantly.' 31 Thus, the courts
continued to insist that, regardless of the enactment of laws governing
joinder, they knew what a suit "really" was.
F. Judicial Code of 1911
The Judicial Code of 1911132 carried forward the separable controversy provisions. 33 The only change was to make the federal district
courts the recipients of removed cases.13 4 Thus, under the 1911 Judicial Code, federal district courts exercised removal jurisdiction over
entire cases that contained a "controversy which is wholly between
citizens of different States, and which can be fully determined as between them.' 1 35 Indeed, in 1928, the Supreme Court reiterated its adherence to Barney, noting that its rule that separable controversy
removal results in the removal of the whole case "has never been varied or questioned."' 36
However, lower courts applied the distinction between "separable"
and "separate" to a broader range of cases.' 37 For example, in Idaho
v. American Surety Co.,138 the State of Idaho brought suit in state
court upon a bond against the surety on behalf of sixteen depositors in
a failed bank. 39 The defendant removed, but most of the depositors
did not have claims in excess of the federal statutory amount in con130. Id. at 830 (quoting Barney v. Latham, 103 U.S. 205, 215 (1880)).
131. Id.
132. Ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087.
133. Judicial Code of 1911 § 28.
134. Id. This change was necessary because the Judicial Code of 1911 also abolished the old circuit courts with their trial jurisdiction. Id. § 128; Hart & Wechsler,
supra note 7, at 39. Indeed, § 28 of the Judicial Code of 1911 carried forward the
provision permitting a federal court to inquire into the truth of an affidavit of prejudice or local influence filed by a removing plaintiff, even though there had been no
authorization for such a removal since 1887. Id. § 28.
135. Judicial Code of 1911 § 28.
136. Gainesville v. Brown-Crummer Inv. Co., 277 U.S. 54, 60 (1928); see also Hamilton v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 297 F. 422, 429 (8th Cir.) (authorizing removal of
entire case under Barney based on separable controversy), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 607
(1924).
137. The doctrine also continued to be applied in condemnation cases. See, e.g.,
Stuart v. Colorado E. R. Co., 156 P. 152, 155 (Colo. 1916) (permitting removal by
non-resident defendant in condemnation proceeding but leaving proceeding against
resident defendant in state court).
138. 218 F. 678 (S.D. Idaho 1914).
139. Id. at 679.

1995]

SECTION 1441(C)

1127

troversy. Conceding the "general rule that the removal of a separable
controversy carries with it the entire suit," the court nevertheless determined that each "claim must be held to constitute a separate and
140
distinct cause of action," and thus was separately removable.
Again, common-law joinder was the point of reference, with the court
commenting on how "unusual" it was that sixteen different plaintiffs
could effectively join their causes of action "with no joint or community interest" in one action 141 "to save the expense of numerous suits,
and for no other reason.' 42 Similarly, where a broker sued one defendant for commissions and a second defendant on the ground that it
had assumed the obligation to pay commissions, each cause of action
was treated as "separate," with the court noting that they could not be
joined at common law or even 43under an earlier version of the New
York Code of Civil Procedure.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit permitted
piecemeal removal of "separate" causes of action in Young v. South-

ern Pacific Co.' 44 In Young, sixteen plaintiffs sued the Southern Pacific Company, demanding a certain amount of stock. 145 Fourteen
were of diverse citizenship; two were not. The defendant sought removal as to the fourteen, but the plaintiffs objected-and the state
court found-that the claims were joint. Defendants filed the record
in federal district court and successfully moved for an injunction
against the state proceeding. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed,
reasoning that although the New York Practice Act authorized the
joinder for convenience, it "does not pretend to make joint causes of
action previously separate and single." 146 Moreover, even
if it were shown that the Legislature of New York intended by this
legislation to make something called a joint cause of action by permitting separate causes belonging to separate individuals to be
united in one complaint, then such joinder cannot operate to destroy the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States over such of
the separate controversies incorporated in one complaint as exist

between citizens of different states.' 47

140. Id. at 681.
141. Id.
142. Id at 679.
143. Lucania Societa Italiana di Navigazione v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 15 F.2d 568, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1923); see also State Improvement-Dev.
Co. v. Leininger, 226 F. 884, 888 (N.D. Cal. 1914) (authorizing federal officer to remove separate cause of action to district court in case against federal and state officials). In both of these cases, the removing party was performing a federal function
and, while not explicitly relied upon, this consideration may have influenced the
result.
144. 15 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1926).
145. Id. at 281.
146. Id. at 282.
147. Id.
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Although the court permitted the removal of these fourteen "separate" controversies while leaving the other two in state court, it did
not distinguish between "separate" and "separable.' 48 Indeed, it determined that "causes of action removed are in their nature separable," and that "a series of separable and removable controversies
exist[ed]."'1 49 The court did not discuss Barney, or even mention the
possibility that the whole case should have been removed based on
the "separable" or "separate" controversy, perhaps because the parties did not frame the issue this way.
In Tillman v. Russo Asiatic Bank,150 however, the same court explicitly distinguished between "separable" controversies, which are governed by the Barney rule requiring removal of the whole case, and
"separate" controversies, which are separately removable under
Young and the Pacific RailroadRemoval Cases.' The court reasoned
that each one of the "two entirely disconnected causes of action" that
were joined in accordance with local practice in order to eliminate
2
many trials, was "in every fundamental sense a separate suit."'
Similarly, in Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway v.
Hall,1 53 the plaintiff Hall sued the railway for negligence leading to
the death of his cattle. 54 In accordance with Texas procedure, the
railway filed a cross-action against a third-party, alleging breach of a
contract to maintain stock pens in a sanitary condition. When Hall
amended his claim to rely on the Interstate Commerce Act, the railway removed.' 55 Although the district court decided the entire case,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that the "two controversies here are
wholly distinct," and therefore only Hall's claim was removable. 56
The cross-action, which lacked an independent basis for federal jurisdiction and was outside the scope of "dependent" jurisdiction, could
not be heard in federal court as part of the whole case that. was removed under the separable controversy removal
provision because
57
that provision only applied in diversity cases.'
On the other hand, if the federal claim and the state claim were not
considered "separate," the unavailability of separable claim removal
in federal question cases meant that if a claim arising under federal
law were joined in state court with a state law claim outside the scope
of supplemental jurisdiction, the case had to remain in state court.
148. Id. at 283.
149. Id. at 282.
150. 51 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1931) (Learned Hand, J., on panel), cert. denied, 285 U.S.
539 (1932).

151. Id. at 1027-28.
152. Id.
153. 70 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1934).

154. Id.
155. Id. at 609.
156. Id. at 610.
157. Id.
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Thus, in Tullar & Tullar v. Illinois Central Railroad,15 8 the plaintiffs
sued a railroad in state court for charges in excess of those permitted
by the Interstate Commerce Commission and for damages caused by
a
1 59
delay in shipping. Under Iowa state law, the joinder was proper.
The defendant removed, but the court ruled that the removal was improper. The entire case could not have been brought directly in federal court because the delay claim was outside the scope of
supplemental jurisdiction and therefore could not be removed except
under the separable controversy provision.' 6° That provision, however, was unavailable because it only applied in diversity cases. The
court refused to allow the defendant "to compel [the plaintiff], by removal of the suit or otherwise, to split his suit into parts and prosecute
16
one part in one court and another part in some other court." '
Despite Congress' attempt in 1875 to avoid the waste, confusion,
and embarrassment resulting from piecemeal removal, 162 courts-in
both federal question and diversity cases-occasionally permitted the
removal of parts of cases on the grounds that the removed part, despite proper joinder under state law, should be considered its own separate suit. This judge-made distinction between separate and
separable controversies was attacked as unjustified by the language of
the removal statute and its history, because it lead to "widely divergent results in its application," and for "introducing further uncertainty and complexity into a subject already hopelessly confused."'6
Congress responded with § 1441(c) of the Revised Judicial Code of
1948.164

II. TiH

REVISED JUDICIAL CODE OF

1948,

SECTION

1441(c)

The Revised Judicial Code of 1948 made three significant changes
to the Judicial Code of 1911.165 First, it changed the requirement of a
separable controversy as the predicate for removal to "separate and
158. 213 F. 280 (N.D. Iowa 1914).

159. Id.at 281.
160. Id.at 283.
161. Id. at 284. The court left open the possibility that removal might be appropriate if a plaintiff joined a trifling state claim in order to defeat removal.
162. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text (discussing Judiciary Act of
1875).
163. Note, Separation of Causes, supra note 106, at 1049-50.
164. Ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C).
165. The Revised Judicial Code was "[riepresented to the Congress by distin-

guished statesmen as making no changes in the existing law which would not meet
with substantially unanimous approval." Arthur J. Keefe et al., Venue and Removal
Jokers in the New FederalJudicial Code, 38 Va. L. Rev. 569, 571 (1952). The changes
regarding separable claim removal were certainly substantial and, in Keefe's view,
based on a highly controversial determination to restrict diversity jurisdiction. Id. at
603-04.
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independent claim or cause of action."'166 Second, it changed the kind
of claim that could be the basis of removal from a "controversy...
between citizens of different States" 67 to a "claim or cause of action,
which would be removable if sued upon alone.' 161 8 Third, it gave the
district court discretion to remand matters not otherwise within its
original jurisdiction. 69
The revisers explained the first change as follows:
This quoted language has occasioned much confusion. The courts
have attempted to distinguish between separate and separable controversies, 70a distinction which is sound in theory but illusory in
substance.'
Subsection (c) permits the removal of a separate cause of action
but not of a separable controversy unless it constitutes a separate
and independent claim or cause of action within the original jurisdiction of United States District Courts. In this respect
it will some71
what decrease the volume of Federal litigation.'
The revisers made no mention of the second change. This omission
is rather odd because in the eighty-two years of its existence, the separable controversy provisions had always been limited to diversity
cases. Piecemeal removal on the basis of a "separate" claim, on the
other hand, was available in both diversity cases and federal jurisdiction cases, and the revisers clearly criticized the distinction between
"separate" and "separable." Nevertheless, by changing the kind of
claim that could be the basis of removal from a "controversy ... between citizens of different States"' 72 to a "claim or cause of action
which would be removable if sued upon alone," 17 the Revised Judicial Code of 1948 made removal of an entire case based on the presence of a separate claim available in federal question cases as well.
Moreover, by making separate claim removal applicable to federal
question cases, the revisers-perhaps unwittingly-set the stage for a
complex interaction between separate claim removal and pendent
jurisdiction.
166. Revised Judicial Code of 1948 § 1441(c) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.

§ 1441(c) (Supp. V 1993)).
167. Judicial Code of 1911 § 28 (amended 1948).
168. Revised Judicial Code of 1948 § 1441(c).

169. Id.; Hart & Wechsler, supra note 7, at 1783. In addition, the entity to be removed was described as an "action" rather than a "suit." This change underlined that
the whole case, not simply a part of it, was to be removed. See infra text accompanying note 263.

170. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1988) historical and revision notes (citing Note, Separation of Causes, supra note 106, at 1048-51 (discussing the distinction between separable and separate controversies) and Comment, Chaos of Jurisdictionin the Federal

District Courts, 35 I11.L. Rev. 566, 576 (1941) (advocating the implementation of a
comprehensive plan for redefining the jurisdiction of the federal district courts)).
171. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1988) historical and revision notes.
172. Judicial Code of 1911 § 28 (amended 1948).
173. Revised Judicial Code of 1948 § 1441(c).
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Finally, the revisers explained the third change, which provides the
district court with discretion to remand matters not within its original
jurisdiction, as follows:
Rules 18, 20, and 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit
the most liberal joinder of parties, claims, and remedies in civil actions. Therefore there will be no procedural difficulty occasioned
by the removal of the entire action. Conversely, if the court so
desires, 17it4 may remand to the State court all nonremovable
matters.

By giving district courts the discretion to exercise jurisdiction, the revisers not only provided another link to pendent jurisdiction, but they
also laid the groundwork for a broader claim of discretion to decline
the exercise of jurisdiction.
A. The Change from "Separable" to "Separate and Independent"
The change from "separable" to "separate and independent" was
ill-conceived from the start. The revisers correctly perceived that the
problem under the Judicial Code of 1911 was that courts attempted to
distinguish between "separable" and "separate" controversies. The
Judicial Code, however, contained no such distinction, but instead instructed the district courts to accept jurisdiction of the entire case
when it contained a separable controversy wholly between citizens of
different states. It was the courts that
created the problem by reading
75
such a distinction into the statute.1
The solution should have been clear-repudiate the cases that had
created the distinction and make clear that piecemeal removal was not
authorized under the statute. Ironically, that is precisely what the
Harvard Law Review Note cited by the revisers advocated: "It seems
best that this judge-made distinction between separate and separable
controversies, introducing further uncertainty and complexity into a
subject already hopelessly confused, should be discarded."176
Although the Harvard Note limited its critique to diversity cases, the
identical distinction was relied upon in federal question cases and was
equally subject to attack.
Alternatively, if a change in separable claim removal were necessary to decrease the volume of federal litigation, a return to the pre1875 practice of removing only the separable controversy, or even to
the pre-1866 practice of precluding any such removal, would have
been coherent. This change, however, would have been at the price of
either efficiency or the protection of removal rights.
Instead, the revisers chose to build into the statute the very distinction they correctly identified as the cause of the problem. Rather than
174. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (c) (1988) historical and revision notes.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 99-115, 124-31, and 137-64.
176. Note, Separation of Causes, supra note 106, at 1049-50.
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discarding the confusing distinction between "separate" and "separable," they insisted that "separate" claims or causes of action could be
177
the basis for removal while "separable" controversies could not.
Moreover, they then proceeded to ignore the very point of the distinction-that a "separate" controversy was so disconnected from the rest
of the case that it could be regarded as its own suit and removed separately while leaving the rest of the case in state court-by providing
for the removal of an entire case that contains a separate claim or
cause of action. 178 Thus, a case containing two controversies that
could properly be adjudicated separately had to remain together in
state court, while a case that contained two claims or causes of action
that were so separate from each other that they could be regarded as
two different suits could be kept together as one and removed in its
entirety to federal court.
One bright spot existed in all of this: by providing for removal of
the entire case based on the presence of a separate removable claim,
the revisers did at least repudiate the notion of piecemeal removal.
Thus, just as Congress in 1875 had abandoned its own short-term experiment with piecemeal removal, Congress in 1948 rejected the
court's invention of piecemeal removal based on the presence of a
separate claim.
In 1951, the Supreme Court considered the meaning of § 1441(c)
under the Revised Judicial Code of 1948. In American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn,'179 Florence Finn sued two insurance companies and
an insurance agent in state court after her house burned down.'8 0 She
claimed that she either had insurance coverage with one of the two
insurers or that the insurance agent was liable for failing to procure
82
such coverage.' 8 ' Both she and the agent were citizens of Texas. 1
The insurance companies were not citizens of Texas and removed the
case to federal court.' 3 After a jury trial, judgment was entered
against one of the insurance companies, American Fire & Casualty
Company, but in favor of the other insurance company and the
agent."s After affirmance by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, American argued to the Supreme Court that the removal was
improper because there was no separate and independent claim or

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1988) historical and revision notes.
Id.
341 U.S. 6 (1951), rev'g 181 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1950).
Id. at 7-8.
Finn, 181 F.2d at 846.
Finn, 341 U.S. at 7-8.
Id. at 8.
Id.
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cause of action. 85 The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.' 8 6

The Supreme Court concluded that Congress had two purposes in
adopting the "separate and independent claim or cause of action" test
in 1948. The first was to simplify the determination of removability;
the second was to limit removal." In light of the failure of the revisers to have a coherent rationale for § 1441(c), the Supreme Court, not
surprisingly, could discern no more substantial purpose.
This feature of § 1441(c) and the Finn decision alone would have
created enormous difficulties for lower courts, for it is difficult to apply a statute properly to widely differing cases without some guiding
principles more substantial than simplicity and reduction of caseloads.
The Supreme Court's opinion, however, sowed further confusion by
describing the characteristics of a "separate and independent claim or
cause of action" in two very different ways in the course of its opinion.
First, the Court spoke in terms of the number of wrongs to the
plaintiff: where a plaintiff "'suffered but one actionable wrong and
[is] entitled to but one recovery,'" there is "'a single wrongful invasion of a single primary right,' " and therefore only one cause of action.8s Finn, the Court noted, sought relief for a single wrong-"the
failure to pay compensation for the loss on the property." 18 9 Accordingly, there was only one cause of action and, therefore, no separate
and independent claim or cause of action against the insurance
companies.
In addition, however, the Court spoke in terms of factual relatedness. It noted that the "facts in each portion of the complaint involve
[the agent], the damage comes from a single incident," and that "the
allegations in which [the agent] is a defendant involve substantially
the same facts and transactions as do the allegations ...

against the

foreign insurance companies."'1 Therefore, "[i]t cannot be said that
there are separate and independent claims for relief as § 1441(c)
requires."'19 1

In 1961, William Cohen observed that these two aspects of Finn
echoed an academic debate in the 1920s and 30s regarding the meaning of "cause of action," and he identified the chief protagonists in
that earlier debate as Oliver McCaskill and Charles Clark. 9 As he
185. Id. at 18.
186. Id. at 18-19. On remand, the plaintiff was permitted to dismiss the case against
the insurance agent voluntarily and judgment was again entered against American
Fire & Casualty Company on the original jury verdict. Finn v. American Fire & Casualty Co., 207 F.2d 113, 117 (5th Cir. 1953), cert denied, 347 U.S. 912 (1954).
187. Finn, 341 U.S. at 9-10.
188. Id. at 13 (quoting Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321 (1927)).
189. Id. at 14.
190. Id. at 16.
191. Id
192. Cohen, supra note 3, at 16.
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saw it, the first aspect of Finn echoed McCaskill's view of a "cause of
action," while the second echoed Clark's view of a "cause of action."
In Cohen's view, Finn had one foot solidly in both the McCaskill camp
and the Clark camp in the battle over the proper meaning of "cause of
action."'1 93 Recently, however, Douglas McFarland has argued that
while "[t]he opinion in Finn does seem to waver between the two
schools of thought,"' 94 in the end, the Court "clearly adopts the Clark
view."'195 He goes so far as to interpret Finn as a knock-out punch to
McCaskill. 1 96 Both Cohen and McFarland, however, set the scope too
narrowly-the Supreme Court in Finn did not simply straddle the debate between Clark and McCaskill, it straddled a debate between the
two of them (together on the same side) and Pomeroy. To understand
this point, and thus to unravel Finn, requires a brief excursion into the
debate over the meaning of a cause of action.
To Pomeroy, a cause of action consisted of "one primary right and
one delict being a breach thereof."' 197 He noted that a "single primary
right" can include "particular subordinate rights," and cautioned
against the "mistake" of thinking that "a distinct cause of action will
arise from each special subordinate right included in the general primary right."' 98 Clark observed that application of Pomeroy's test in
practice "has seemed to revolve around the idea of the 'primary
right,'" and that "those applying this definition look[ ] for the primary
right as the principalor most important right in a group of legal relations."' 199 For example, "in actions of trespass to land, ejectment and
the like, my 'property right in the land' is sometimes viewed as the
primary right, which is over and above such subordinate and lesser
rights as my right that you shall not trespass upon it and the like."2
He found the concept "quite elusive," noting that "[i]n the case of
injury to person and property at the same time, there might be two
primary rights, a right to an uninjured personality [and] a right to uninjured property; or perhaps there is only one, a right not to be caused
loss by defendant's negligence. ' 20 ' To overcome this elusiveness,
193. Id. ("The Court's opinion seems to take both sides of the McCaskill-Clark
debate on the definition of a cause of action.").
194. McFarland, supra note 9, at 1070.
195. Id. at 1068.
196. Id. at 1070 ("Eight, nine, ten. Justice Reed counts McCaskill out and raises
Clark's arm, winner by a knockout.").
197. Pomeroy, supra note 52, § 454; see also id. § 453 ("[T]he primary right and
duty and the delict or wrong combined constitute the cause of action."); John N. Pomeroy, Code Remedies §§ 347-349 (4th ed. 1904) (asserting that a cause of action arises
from a "primary and corresponding duty and delict or breach"); George L. Phillips,
An Exposition of the Principles of Pleading Under the Codes of Civil Procedure
§§ 32-33 (1896) (referring repeatedly to "primary rights").
198. Pomeroy, supra note 52, § 455.
199. Charles E. Clark, The Code Cause of Action, 33 Yale L.J. 817, 826-27 (1924).
200. Id. at 827.
201. Id. at 826-27.
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Clark posited that "the cause of action is an aggregate of operative
facts, a series of acts or events, which gives rise to one or more legal
relations of right-duty enforceable in the courts."'
"The size of such
aggregate should be worked out in each case pragmatically with' 2an3
idea of securing convenient and efficient dispatch of trial business. 1 0
McCaskill, like Clark, rejected Pomeroy's view that "the character
and scope of a single cause of action... should be determined solely
from the number of primary rights and delicts involved." 201 He
agreed with Clark that a test that looks for "single rights and single
wrongs" is "indefinite" in scope."0 However, he rejected Clark's proposed solution-that the scope of a cause of action should be determined "by the trial judge pragmatically with a view to his notion of
administrative convenience"-believing instead that Clark's proposal
was also "elusive. '
McCaskill's solution was to "boldly take the position" that "the
character and scope of a single cause of action... will be found only
in a study of remedies." 2 7 McCaskill maintained that a "cause of action" was "that group of operative facts which, standing alone, would
show a single right in the plaintiff and a single delict to that right giving cause for the state, through its courts, to afford relief to the party
or parties whose right was invaded. ' 2" 8 Thus, for McCaskill, each different theory of recovery constituted a cause of action3' °9
McFarland uses the following tort hypothetical to illustrate the distinction between McCaskill's and Clark's views: "A approaches B, (1)
strikes B in the face, (2) calls B a horse thief, (3) grabs B's arm to
202. Id. at 828.
203. Id. at 837.
204. Oliver L. McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action, 34 Yale LJ. 614, 634

(1925).
205. Id.
206. Id.; see also Oliver L. McCaskill, The Elusive Cause of Action, 4 U. Chi. L
Rev. 281 (1937) (discussing uses of the term "cause of action").
207. McCaskill, supra note 204, at 634; see also id. at 638 n.42 ("The distinction
between [my definition] and the definition[ ] given by Pomeroy [is that mine] is definitely tied up to remedies.").
208. Id at 638.

209. In essence, McCaskill preferred a lawyer's perspective, insisting that the

"cause of action" reflects the underlying legal theory. Clark, however, preferred a
non-lawyer's perspective, viewing the "cause of action" as the facts that a non-lawyer

would group together to tell a story. Compare Clark, supra note 52, § 19, at 130 (defining a cause of action as a "group of facts... limited as a lay onlooker would to a
single occurrence or affair, without particular reference to the resulting legal right or
rights") with McCaskill, supra note 204, at 648 (observing that a rule that adopts the

Clark view of "cause of action" but requires a separate statement of distinct causes of
action "seems to be more in the interest of literary style in story telling than service in
the trial of law suits [because] it is difficult to see any practical advantage to be obtained in having [such] a separate statement... since facts are not grouped according
to the legal principles applicable to them in any part of the pleading"); see also McFarland, supra note 9, at 1065-66 (comparing McCaskill's perspective on pleading with

Clark's approach).

1136

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

prevent escape, and (4) takes money from B's wallet to pay for the
horse." 10 He correctly observes that both Clark and McCaskill would
agree that A has four rights of action against B, namely for (1) battery, (2) slander, (3) false imprisonment, and (4) conversion. 1 Clark,
however, would find only one cause of action, whereas McCaskill
would find four causes of action.212 Pomeroy, too, would likely find
four causes of action because of four primary rights invaded: (1) bodily safety, (2) good reputation, (3) freedom of movement, and (4)
ownership of property.
As a formal matter, Clark clearly won in 1938, the year the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated.21 3 The Federal Rules,
210. McFarland, supra note 9, at 1063.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1063-66.
213. It is far from clear that Clark has prevailed in practice. As McCaskill would
have preferred, it remains "common to draft complaints with multiple counts, each of
which specifies a single statute or legal rule." Shannon v. Shannon, 965 F.2d 542, 55253 (7th Cir. 1992). Perhaps, as McFarland suggests, this is simply old ways taking a
long time to die. McFarland, supra note 9, at 1067 n.26. There are, however, few
practicing lawyers today who were trained prior to 1938. It seems more reasonable to
suppose that practicing lawyers find some value in organizing complaints according to
legal theories and making clear what those legal theories are. And they are right.
They will have to organize the allegations in this way to defeat a motion to dismiss.
They will have to marshall the evidence in this way to defeat a motion for summary
judgment. They will have to argue the evidence in this way to prevail at trial. And,
they will have to think in this way before filing the complaint both to advise their
clients and in order to comply with Rule 11. Indeed, they will even have to think in
this way in order to determine in which court they can file. The "well-pleaded complaint rule" for federal jurisdiction, for example, certainly seems to envision a McCaskill-like complaint. Matasar, supra note 39, at 1436 (stating that a "well-pleaded
complaint" is one which contains what is "required to be pleaded in order to make
out the elements of the cause of action"). Thus, while McFarland argues that McCaskillites are "fighting a rear guard retreat [and] do not realize their base camp has been
captured," McFarland, supra note 9, at 1075, perhaps it is the Clarkians who do not
realize that the war is won or lost on the battlefield, not in the generals' war room.
None of this is to advocate a return to detailed fact pleading. See generally Richard
L. Marcus, The Revival of FactPleadingunderthe FederalRules of Civil Procedure,86
Colum. L. Rev. 433 (1986) (documenting revival of detailed fact pleadings). A complaint can be short, plain, simple, and quite bereft of factual detail, yet still be drafted
to make clear the legal theories on which it is based. Clark himself, while preferring
complaints to be organized in lay transaction terms, found it tolerable to organize
complaints by legal theory. Charles E. Clark, Joinder and Splitting of Causes of Action, 25 Mich. L. Rev. 393, 412-14 (1927).
Finally, it appears that the different senses in which earlier generations used "cause
of action"-including McCaskill's sense-have been reproduced in the current usage
of "claim." Thus, it is common for lawyers and judges to refer in a products liability
case to the "negligence claim," the "strict liability claim," and the "breach of warranty
claim," or in a securities action, to refer to the "section 10b-5 claim," the "section
12(2) claim," and the "state law fraud claim." See, e.g., Marcus, supra, at 493 (noting
that it is "often difficult to identify elements of a claim that plaintiffs should be forced
to establish"). Ironically, this is the sense in which Clark used the word "claim" when
he fought to establish his interpretation of "cause of action." See, e.g., Clark, supra at
401 (observing a "single cause of action upon which varying claims, both legal and
equitable, may be made"); Charles E. Clark, The Cause of Action, 82 U. Pa. L. Rev.
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drafted by an advisory committee with Clark as its reporter, abandoned the term "cause of action" and adopted instead the term
"claim"-designed to "track[] closely Clark's definition of 'cause of
action.' "214 Despite Clark's victory in the Federal Rules in 1938,
however, § 1441(c) of the Revised Judicial Code of 1948 used both
"claim" and "cause of action."
The Supreme Court in Finn did not distinguish between a "claim"
and a "cause of action," but treated the two words as synonymous. 1 5
Quoting its 1927 decision in Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 216 it set
forth "an accepted description" of cause of action:
Upon principle, it is perfectly plain that the respondent suffered but
one actionable wrong and was entitled to but one recovery, whether
his injury was due to one or the other of several distinct acts of
alleged negligence or to a combination of some or all of them. In
either view, there would be but a single wrongful invasion of a single primary right of the plaintiff, namely, the right of bodily safety,
whether the acts constituting such invasion were one or many, simple or complex.
A cause of action does not consist of 2facts,
but of the unlawful
17
violation of a right which the facts show.
354, 355 (1934) [hereinafter Clark, The Cause of Action] (criticizing common law joinder rules because they produced the "arbitrary grouping of legal claims"); see also S.
Elizabeth Gibson, Removal of Claims Related to Bankruptcy Cases: What is a "Claim
or Cause of Action?", 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 43 (1986) (recounting that it was Judge
Clark who argued for a narrow interpretation of the word "claim" in the context of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)). The meaning of "claim" in Rule 54(b) continues to be uncertain. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); see also Sussex Drug Prod. v. Kanasco Ltd., 920 F.2d 1150,
1154 (3d Cir. 1990) ("[L]eading commentators agree that uncertainty is the rule
.... "). In sum, what Justice Cardozo once said about "cause of action" can now be
said about "claim":
A ["claim"] may mean one thing for one purpose and something different
for another. It may mean one thing when the question is whether it is good
upon demurrer [or subject to a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6)], and something different when there is a question of the amendment of the pleading or of the application of the principle of res judicata. At
times and in certain contexts, it is identified with the infringement of a right
or the violation of a duty. At other times and in other contexts, it is a concept of the law of remedies, the identity of the cause being then dependent
on that of the form of the action or the writ. Another aspect reveals it as
something separate from writs and remedies, the group of operative facts
out of which a grievance has developed. This court has not committed itself
to the view that the [word] is susceptible of any single definition that will be
independent of the context or of the relation to be governed.
United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1933) (footnotes and
citations omitted).
214. McFarland, supra note 9, at 1066.
215. American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 12 n.5 (1951); see also McFarland, supra note 9, at 1070 n.45 (explaining the decision in Finn).
216. 274 U.S. 316 (1927) (a res judicata case).
217. Finn, 341 U.S. at 13 (quoting Phillips,274 U.S. at 321).
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Cohen interprets this quotation as a "clear endorsement" of McCaskill. 18 McFarland responds that "the language may sound like McCaskill, but the result [of Phillips] is pure Clark."2 19 Both are
wrong-the language and the result are Pomeroy. z°
Thus, when the Court in Finn concluded that "where there is a single wrong to plaintiff, for which relief is sought, arising from an interlocked series of transactions, there is no separate and independent
claim or cause of action under § 1441(c),"2' 1 it was not embracing
Clark, or blending Clark and McCaskill, but blending Clark and Pomeroy. If the Court were truly adopting Clark's view, it would have
simply said that there was only one claim or cause of action because of
the factual relatedness of all three legal theories. Instead, in speaking
of "a single primary right," "one actionable wrong," and "but one recovery,''22 it was applying a test that both Clark and McCaskill
rejected.' 3
Not surprisingly, Finn caused considerable confusion. Some courts
and commentators have relied on the "single wrong/single remedy"
aspect of Finn, treating two claims as separate and independent whenever the plaintiff's recovery on one claim would not preclude her recovery on another.224 Other courts and commentators have focussed
218. Cohen, supra note 3, at 16.
219. McFarland, supra note 9, at 1070 n.47.
220. Moreover, it is far more plausible that the Supreme Court in 1927 would apply
Pomeroy's view of a cause of action than either contrary view launched in the law
reviews a scant three years earlier. Indeed, as late as 1947, Clark noted that "the
definition of cause of action often quoted by the courts [is] that of Pomeroy." Clark,
supra note 52, § 19, at 130.
McFarland is correct that, on the facts of Finn-where "[liability lay among three
parties, but it was uncertain which one was responsible"-Clark would have found
only one cause of action while McCaskill would have found three. McFarland, supra
note 9, at 1063-66 (quoting Finn, 341 U.S. at 14). McCaskill, however, would have
observed that only the hypothesis that proved to be true was the plaintiff's cause of
action and that the other hypotheses were fictional causes of action that did not exist.
McCaskill, supra note 204, at 640. In making this distinction, McCaskill was distancing himself not from Clark, but from writers on pleading as early as Stephens who
treated different theories of a single recovery as "merely different ways of setting
forth the same cause of action." Id. at 639. McCaskill acknowledged that "[t]here
may be a reasonable difference of opinion" as to whether different theories of a single
recovery should be considered different causes of action or merely different ways of
setting forth the same cause of action. Id.
221. Finn, 341 U.S. at 14.
222. Id. at 13 (quoting Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321 (1927)).
223. Clark, The Cause of Action, supra note 213, at 358 (criticizing Pomeroy); McCaskill, supra note 206, at 283 (criticizing Pomeroy).
224. 1A James W. Moore & Brett A. Ringle, Moore's Federal Practice § 0.163[4.5] (2d ed. 1993) ("Whenever... two or more defendants individually act in such a
manner that each has invaded a separate right of the plaintiff and thereby caused as
many wrongs, the plaintiff has multiple claims against the several defendants individually; and although plaintiff joins defendants in one action, on the basis of a common
question of law or fact, the claims are separate and independent within the intendment of § 1441(c)."); see also Siegel, supra note 7, at 77 ("Perhaps the best measure of
what 'a separate and independent claim' is under the Finn test.., can be best deter.
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on the "same facts and transactions" aspect of Finn, treating two
claims as separate and independent only if they do not involve substantially the same facts and transactions.2' Courts using the first approach found cases relatively easily removable under § 1441(c); courts
using the second approach found almost no cases removable under
§ 1441(c).
It was this confusion that led to calls for the repeal of § 1441(c) and
eventually to its amendment in 1990. Before turning to these developments, however, the other major changes wrought by the 1948 amendment must be considered.
B. The Expansion of Separate Claim Removal to Federal Question
Cases and the Interaction with Pendent Jurisdiction
As noted above, separable controversy removal from 1866 until
1948 was only available in diversity cases. Indeed, it is best understood as a means of ameliorating for defendants some of the harshness
of applying the Strawbridge rule of complete diversity to removal.
The Revised Judicial Code of 1948 extended separate claim removal
to federal question cases. Although there is no evidence that either
Congress or the revisers were conscious of this extension, there is little
doubt that § 1441(c) applies to federal question cases. 26 The extension of separate claim removal to federal question cases led to a complex interaction between separate claim removal and pendent
jurisdiction and should have led courts to repudiate piecemeal removal of federal question cases.
Pendent jurisdiction permits a federal court exercising jurisdiction
over a federal claim 2 7 to exercise jurisdiction over a related state
mined by applying a kind of double-recovery test."); 14A Wright & Miller, supra note

32, § 3724, at 379 nn.43-47 (citing cases approving removal under § 1441(c)).
225. 14A Wright & Miller, supra note 32, § 3724, at 369 (apparently treating
§ 1441(c) as only available where unrelated claims are joined); id. at 370 nn.37-42
(citing cases denying removal).
226. "The addition was unusual, because the Revision Committee and Congress

believed they were restricting separate claim removal. This suggests Congress at that
time did not even consider the applicability of section 1441(c) to federal question

cases." McFarland, supra note 9, at 1080 (footnote omitted). The closest thing to a
doubt that has been expressed is by Judge Posner. Thomas v. Shelton, 740 F.2d 478,
484 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.) ("[it can be argued ... that it is wrong to attribute to
Congress in 1948 an intent to broaden removability by bringing federal-question cases
within the scope of the separate-claim removal section.").

227. I use the word "claim" in this discussion in the narrow, McCaskill-like sense of
legal theory of recovery, not only because that is common usage, but also because that
is how the Supreme Court has used the term in its pendent jurisdiction cases. See, e.g.,
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 720-25 (1966) (referring to a "state law
claim," a "claim under § 303," a "claim based on federal law," and "state and federal

claims"); Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238,239-40 (1933) (referring to "claim of infringement, .... claims other than for a violation of the copyright law," and "claim of unfair
competition"); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. V 1993) (authorizing federal courts to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over "all other claims that are so related to claims
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claim that would not, by itself, be within federal jurisdiction. 228 The
leading case on pendent jurisdiction 229
at the time of the Revised Judicial
Code of 1948 was Hum v. Oursler.
In Hum, the plaintiff alleged a federal claim against the defendant
for infringement of a copyrighted play and a "general law" claim for
unfair competition based on the defendant's use of that same copyrighted play.230 In addition, the plaintiff alleged an unfair competition
claim against the defendant for the defendant's use of a somewhat
different and uncopyrighted version of the same play. 231 The
Supreme Court held that the district court could properly exercise jurisdiction over both claims involving the copyrighted version of the
play because the two claims involving the copyrighted play were part
of the same cause of action, but could not exercise jurisdiction over
the claim regarding the uncopyrighted version of the play because it
was a separate and distinct cause of action. 32
In reaching this conclusion, the Court applied as a test its definition
of a cause of action from Phillips, 3 3 just as it later did in Finn.234 As
to the copyrighted version of the play, there was only one cause of
action because there was only "a single right, namely, the right to protection of the copyrighted play.' ' 3 5 "Thus tested, the claims of infringement and of unfair competition averred in the . . . bill of

complaint [were] not separate causes of action, but different grounds
asserted in support of the same cause of action.' ' 36 In contrast, the
"claim" for unfair competition regarding the uncopyrighted version of
the play involved a different right-"the right to the protection of the

in the action ...

that they form part of the same case or controversy" and permitting

court to decline supplemental jurisdiction if it dismisses "all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction").
228. See, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb, The Case Against Supplemental Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A Constitutional,Statutory, and Policy Analysis, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 721, 739
(1994) (observing that supplemental jurisdiction is "relied upon by federal courts...

to adjudicate jurisdictionally insufficient state law claims related to claims over which
federal jurisdiction exists"); McLaughlin, supra note 15, at 863 (noting that pendent
jurisdiction "permitted the exercise of jurisdiction over claims for which no independ-

ent basis of subject matter jurisdiction existed, provided the claims were closely related to claims within the proper jurisdiction of the court"); Wright, supra note 8, § 19

(discussing the evolution of supplemental jurisdiction).
229. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
230. Id. at 239. Hum was decided five years before Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,

304 U.S. 64 (1938).
231. Hum, 289 U.S. at 239.
232. Id. at 247-48.

233. See supra notes 216-20 and accompanying text.
234. Hum, 289 U.S. at 246.
235. Id.

236. Id. at 247.
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uncopyrighted play." 237 As we saw earlier, this is not McCaskill or
Clark, this is Pomeroy.A3
The connection between Finn and Hum is not simply that both relied on Phillips to define a cause of action. The Court in Finn quoted

from Hum as well in its discussion of what constitutes an independent

cause of action.3 9 Thus, the Hum test for pendent jurisdiction was

remarkably similar to the "single wrong/single remedy" test for separate claim removal. Both were connected to an older concept of

"cause of action" that had been under attack since the 1920s by both
Clark and McCaskill.

But just as Finn also relied on a broader concept of "cause of action," its emphasis on the factual relatedness of all of the claims in the
case also pointed toward a broader view of pendent jurisdiction. In
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,2" the Supreme Court vastly increased
the scope of pendent jurisdiction, noting that Hum was "unnecessarily
grudging."' 241 In words strikingly reminiscent of the "factual relationship" portions of Finn, the Court held that pendent jurisdiction
existed if the federally-cognizable claim and the non-federally-cognizable claim shared a "common nucleus of operative fact. '242 Again,
both the factual-relatedness test for separate claim removal and the
less grudging test for pendent jurisdiction were connected to the
broader concept of a "cause of action" advocated by Clark. Indeed,
McFarland notes of Gibbs that "Clark could hardly have written it
better."'24 3 Thus, Finn can be viewed as a transitional case in the de-

237. Id- at 248.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 192-223. Just as McFarland is wrong to
assert that Finn is a clear endorsement of Clark, he is wrong to assert that Hum
"defined cause of action broadly, along the lines urged by Clark." McFarland, supra
note 9, at 1076. Hum defined the cause of action, not in terms of factual relatedness
as Clark would have it, nor in terms of legal theories as McCaskill would have it, but
in terms of single primary rights, as Pomeroy would have it.
239. American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 13 n.ll (1951).
240. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
241. Id. at 725.
242. Id. Specifically, the Gibbs Court stated:
The federal claim must have substance sufficient to confer subject matter
jurisdiction on the court. The state and federal claims must derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact. But if, considered without regard to their
federal and state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming
substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear
the whole.
Id. (citation omitted). Although Gibbs can be read to establish a three prong test, the
"common nucleus of operative fact" prong "is the heart of the Gibbs test." McLaughlin, supra note 15, at 872. The "sufficient substance" prong is "the same jurisdictional
requirement that applies generally to all federal question claims." Id. at 871. The
"ordinarily expected to try" prong is essentially just "a restatement of the 'common
nucleus of operative fact' test." Id. at 873.
243. McFarland, supra note 9, at 1077; see also Matasar, supra note 39, at 1452
("Judge Clark's... views clearly influenced the Supreme Court in Gibbs."); McFarland, supra note 9, at 1077 n.77 (citing cases in which Clark used similar language).
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velopment of pendent jurisdiction. In part, it looked backward to
Hum and it part in looked forward to Gibbs.
The connection that Finn made between separate claim removal
under § 1441(c) and pendent jurisdiction raised doubts about the constitutionality of § 1441(c). To the extent that Hum marked the constitutional limits of pendent jurisdiction, § 1441(c) appeared
unconstitutional. That is, if a federal court could not constitutionally
exercise jurisdiction over a cause of action that was separate and distinct from the cause of action over which it had jurisdiction, then the
only cases for which § 1441(c) would authorize removal would be
those which the federal court lacked constitutional power to hear. 44
Those who found § 1441(c) constitutional tended to interpret Hum as
limiting pendent jurisdiction more narrowly than did the
Constitution.245
In addition, the connection between separate claim removal and
pendent jurisdiction meant that developments in pendent jurisdiction
influenced the interpretation of § 1441(c). Most significantly, once
Gibbs overruled Hum, courts and commentators tended to focus on
the Gibbs-like language in Finn rather than the Hum-like language in
Finn.24 6 As a result, the line of cases viewing Finn as precluding removal where the claims arose from the "same facts and transactions"
began to dominate, although the line of cases viewing Finn as precluding removal only where there was a "single wrong" did not fully
succumb. 247
The Supreme Court itself now reads Finn through the lens of Gibbs.
In Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill,248 the Court stated that a pendent claim is not a separate and independent claim within the meaning
of § 1441(c). 249 The dissenters agreed.250 Thus, although Cohill was
not, strictly speaking, a § 1441(c) case, because the case was not removed on the basis of § 1441(c), all members of the Court agreed that
244. Lewin, supra note 3, at 424; see also McFarland, supra note 9, at 1081 n.89
(citing other commentators).
245. See, e.g., 1A Moore & Ringle, supra note 224, § 0.163[3]; James W. Moore &
William VanDercreek, Multi-party, Multi-claim Removal Problems: The Separateand
Independent Claim Under Section 1441(c), 46 Iowa L. Rev. 489, 498 (1961); see also
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Taylor, 239 F. Supp. 913, 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
(noting the presumption of constitutionality cloaking all legislation and a "history of
decisions implicitly recognizing the constitutionality of removal of nonfederal, nondiverse controversies"), disapproved in Gardner & Florence Call Cowles Found. v. Empire Inc., 754 F.2d. 478, 482 n.5 (2d Cir. 1985).
246. As noted earlier, McFarland goes so far as to assert that Finn "clearly" adopts
the Clarkian view that animates Gibbs. McFarland, supra note 9, at 1068.
247. Compare 14A Wright & Miller, supra note 32, § 3724, at 128 nn.38-42 (Supp.
1994) (citing cases denying removal under § 1441(c)) with id. at 129 nn.43-47 (Supp.
1994) (citing cases permitting removal under § 1441(c)).
248. 484 U.S. 343 (1988).
249. Id. at 354.
250. Id. at 359-60 (White, J. joined by Rehnquist, J. and Scalia, J., dissenting).
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a claim that meets the Gibbs test for pendent jurisdiction fails the

§ 1441(c) test for separateness.
Cohill should have ended the confusion over the proper reading of

Finn. 5 ' Unfortunately, it appears that a number of courts and commentators addressing § 1441(c) overlook Cohill.2" Even the Working
Papers of the Federal Court Study Committee, while citing Cohill for
its holding, neglect to mention it at all in discussing § 1441(c) and

251. Cohill "makes clear beyond a doubt that claims cannot be both pendent and
'separate and independent,' within the meaning of the removal statute." Steinman,
supra note 33, at 983 n.290; cf. Teply & Whitten, supra note 7, at 149 ("The structure
and probable purpose of § 1441(c), together with the legislative history of the 1990
amendment to the section, should dispel any doubt about the meaning of the terms
'separate and independent.' Only claims that arise from entirely unrelated facts and
seek separate recoveries should be removable under the section.").
This understanding of Cohill should also eliminate (or nearly so) the confusion in
the cases regarding the application of § 1441(c) to third-party claims. Wright, supra
note 8, at 237 ("The cases are quite divided on whether § 1441(c) applies only to
claims joined by plaintiff or whether a third-party claim ... can be the basis for removal .... ); 14A Wright & Miller, supra note 32, § 3724, at 130 nn.60-65 (Supp.
1994) (collecting cases); Haden P. Gerrish, Note, Third-PartyRemoval Under Section
1441(c), 52 Fordham L. Rev. 133, 136 (1983) (observing that a minority of courts
permit third-party removal). Any claim that could properly be brought as a thirdparty claims under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or its state law
analogs would be within supplemental jurisdiction and therefore not separate and
independent. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 367-68 (1978)
(finding a third-party claim to be within ancillary jurisdiction); Thomas v. Shelton, 740
F.2d 478, 487 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that removal is not available "in the broad run of
third-party cases"); Patient Care, Inc. v. Freeman, 755 F. Supp. 644, 651 (D.NJ. 1991)
("[A]ny third-party claim for indemnification is not a claim 'separate and independent' from the main action."). I know of no procedural system that permits a defendant to bring in a third-party on a claim that is unrelated to the dispute already before
the court and can think of no reason why a procedural system would do so. Thus, the
only situations in which a "separate and independent" claim might arise in a thirdparty complaint is where a third-party plaintiff has a third-party claim against a thirdparty defendant that is related to the main action and has an unrelated claim against
that same party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 18 (permitting joinder of unrelated claims to a
Rule 14 claim). Moreover, now that § 1441(c) is limited to federal question cases, the
unrelated claim would have to be a federal question claim. The possibility that a
party would be sued in state court, and have a related claim against a third-party, and
have an unrelated federal claim against that party, and choose to join that unrelated
federal claim in the state action in order to trap the third-party defendant in state
court on a federal claim seems terribly remote. It is one thing to think that enterprising plaintiffs with federal claims who wish to stay in state court might join unrelated
state claims to achieve their objective; it is another to think that such plaintiffs would
wait until they were sued by others in state court on an unrelated matter, but in which
they could bring a third-party claim against the same party they wish to sue on the
federal claim.
252. See, e.g., Eyak Native Village v. Exxon Corp., 25 F.3d 773, 781-82 (9th Cir.)
(holding that the case is removable under § 1441(c) because "different 'primary
rights' are being asserted by different plaintiffs"), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 351 (1994).
Most surprisingly, McFarland does not mention Cohilleven though it is powerful support for his reading of Finn. Interestingly, Cohill is not cited under § 1441(c) in either
the U.S.C.A. or the U.S.C.S.
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seem to endorse the more Hum-like reading of Finn.5 As a result,
the confusion continued.
Meanwhile, the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction became increasingly complex in the 1970s and 80s. Neither Hum nor Gibbs had identified any statutory source for pendent jurisdiction, an omission that
proved costly. In Aldinger v. Howard 4 and Owen Equipment &
Erection Co. v. Kroger,"5 the Court held that pendent jurisdiction
could not be exercised in a particular kind of case if there was evidence that Congress would disapprove.-5 6
Aldinger and Kroger made it particularly difficult for federal courts
to exercise pendent-party jurisdiction, that is, jurisdiction over a claim
not independently cognizable in federal court based on its factual relationship to a federally-cognizable claim involving a different party.
The result was a no man's land in removed federal question cases: If
the claims were sufficiently related and did not involve the joinder of
additional parties, removal was appropriate under § 1441(a). If the
claims were sufficiently unrelated, removal was appropriate under
§ 1441(c). If the claims were related but involved the joinder of additional parties, however, removal might well be unavailable under
either §§ 1441(a) or (c).11
This unfortunate gap between pendent jurisdiction and § 1441(c)
led then-Judge Breyer to revive piecemeal removal. In Charles D.
Bonanno Linen Service v. McCarthy,".8 he concluded that piecemeal
removal was permissible in federal question cases where federal
claims were embedded in state cases that included state claims beyond
the federal court's pendent jurisdiction."5 9 To justify this conclusion,
he turned to the pre-1948 decisions that permitted such removal on
the grounds that the federal claims were "separate. 2 60 He reasoned
that prior to 1948, each "cause of action" was considered a separate
suit and that the change in language in 261948
from removing a "suit" to
1
removing an "action" was "cosmetic."
253. Federal Courts Study Comm., Working Papers and Subcommittee Reports 538

(1990) (remarking on "substantial reasons to doubt" lower court decisions treating
§ 1441(c) and Gibbs as coextensive because "Gibbs was not decided until 15 years
after Finn and the Court in Finn used language reflecting the then-prevailing under-

standing of pendent jurisdiction, which was narrower than Gibbs."). The Working
Papers are not to be construed as having been adopted by the Committee.
254. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
255. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).

256. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18-19; Kroger, 437 U.S. at 377.
257. E.g., Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv. v. McCarthy, 708 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.)
(Breyer, J.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936 (1983).

258. 708 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.) (Breyer, J.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936 (1983).
259. Id. at 10-11.
260. Id. at 11 (citing Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1885); Galveston,
H. & S.A. Ry. v. Hall, 70 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1934); and Tillman v. Russo Asiatic Bank,
51 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1931), cert. denied 285 U.S. 539 (1932)).
261. Id.
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Although this reasoning would seem to require him to declare that
the federal claim before the court was "separate" from the rest of the
case, he did not explicitly say this, evidently because it would clash too
obviously with his conclusion that the federal claim was not "separate
2 and independent" under section § 1441(c) as interpreted in Finn. 6
Moreover, even assuming that the change from "suit" to "action" was
merely cosmetic-a debatable point in light of the reviser's note that
removal of "the entire action" will cause no procedural difficulty because "'Rules 18, 20, and 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
permit the most liberal joinder of parties, claims, and remedies in civil
actions' "" 3-this reasoning ignores that the doctrine that permitted
piecemeal removal based on "separateness," and which was repudiated in 1948, was in no way limited to federal question cases, but instead was based on a judicial assertion of knowing that parts of a case
in state court are somehow "really" separate lawsuits.
264
Judge Posner made just such an assertion in Thomas v. Shelton.
There, he said that "[e]ven if we could think of some way in which a
plaintiff could impede the removal of a federal-question case, a way
that section 1441(c) was intended to block, '2 6 removal would not be
justified because, if two unrelated claims were joined, "there would
really be two cases, not one," and the federal case could be removed,
leaving the state case behind. 2"
Judge Posner further asserted, in accord with Judge Breyer's decision in Bonanno, that even if a plaintiff joined a relatedclaim that was
outside the scope of a federal court's supplemental jurisdiction (because pendent jurisdiction, particularly pendent party jurisdiction,
might be narrowly conceived), "this would again be a situation of two
cases masquerading as one."'2 67 In Thomas, Judge Posner sounded eerily like Judge Drummond in City of Chicago v. Hutchinson,2 68 asserting that what appears to be one lawsuit is "in substance and reality"
262. Id. at 10.
263. American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 10 n.28 (1951) (quoting 28

U.S.C. § 1441 historical and revision notes); see also Frances J. v. Wright, 19 F.3d 337,
340 (7th Cir.) (treating "action" under § 1441(a) to mean entire case), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 204 (1994); Adolph Coors Co. v. Sickler, 608 F. Supp. 1417, 1426-27 (D.C. Cal.
1985) (criticizing Bonanno, but ultimately following it in light of circuit precedent as

the "lesser of two evils"); Lewin, supra note 3, at 426 (noting the broad interpretation
of "civil action" to mean "all claims that have been properly brought procedurally in
the state court").
264. 740 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1984).
265. Id. at 484.
266. Id. at 483. Judge Posner stated, "We know of no federal-question case that
was held nonremovable before section 1441(c) was enacted merely because the plain-

tiff had joined a state claim with his federal claim." Id. This, however, is precisely
what had happened in Tullar & Thllar v. Illinois Central Railroad, 213 F. 280 (N.D.
Iowa 1914). For a discussion of Tullar, see supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
267. Thomas, 740 F.2d at 483.
268. 15 F. 129 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1882). For a discussion of Hutchinson, see supra notes
99-106 and accompanying text.
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more than one.26 9 The difference is that in the past, courts used the
common law of joinder as the reference point for what was "really" a
separate controversy in the teeth of contrary statutory joinder law,
while this time around, courts used the scope of supplemental jurisdiction (itself influenced by developments in the law of joinder) as the
reference point.270
C. The Grant of Discretion to Remand and the Interaction with
Pendent Jurisdiction
There was no provision in any of the successive separable-controversy removal statutes for a discretionary remand.27 One of the innovations of the Revised Judicial Code of 1948 was granting the district
court the discretion to remand "all matters not otherwise within its
original jurisdiction. 27 2 Thus, district courts had the discretion under
§ 1441(c) of the Revised Judicial Code of 1948 to remand those matters that could not have been brought directly in federal court, or
could not have been removed to federal court if sued upon alone, but
were removed to federal court solely because they were part of a case
that contained a separate and independent claim that could have been
brought directly in federal court or removed to federal court if sued
upon alone.27 3

This discretionary power to remand paralleled the discretionary
power to dismiss, without prejudice, state claims filed directly in federal court that were pendent to a federal claim. Indeed, in Cohill the
Supreme Court held that district courts have the discretion to remand
pendent claims in removed cases, reasoning by analogy from § 1441(c)
that because Congress gave courts in § 1441(c) the discretionary
power to remand separate and independent claims that could not have
been heard on their own in federal court, Congress would have (if it
had thought about it) also given courts the discretionary power to re269. Hutchinson, 15 F. at 137.

270. See, e.g., Samaroo v. Samaroo, 743 F. Supp. 309, 318 (D.N.J. 1990) (finding
that a divorce claim and an ERISA claim joined in state court pursuant to requirement of New Jersey joinder law were "really two cases masquerading as one" and
holding ERISA claim removable, while divorce claim was not).

271. The statutory provision permitting removal on the grounds of prejudice or local influence did, however, give the court discretion to remand the suit as to defendants who would not be affected by local prejudice or influence. Act of March 3, 1887,

ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 552, 553; Judiciary Act of 1911, ch. 231, § 28, 36 Stat. 1087, 109495; cf.Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 470, 472 (stating that the court shall
remand whenever "it shall appear to the satisfaction of said circuit court ... that such
suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within

the jurisdiction of said circuit court, or that the parties to said suit have been improperly or collusively made or joined, either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the purpose of
creating a case cognizable or removable under this act").
272. Revised Judicial Code of 1948, ch. 89, § 1441(c), 62 Stat. 869, 938 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (Supp. V 1993)).
273. Cohen, supra note 3, at 6-9.
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mand pendent claims that similarly could not have been heard on
their own in federal court.274
III. Ti

REMOVAL PROVISION OF SECTION 1441(c) REMAims
USEUL AND CONSTITUTIONAL

In 1990 the Federal Courts Study Committee issued a far-ranging
report advocating certain changes in the federal courts. Among its
recommendations was the following: "Congress should repeal 28
U.S.C. § 1441(c) (concerning removal of separate and independent
claims). 275
Strangely, the black letter recommendation of repeal is not consistent with the explanation of that recommendation. The explanation
states that § 1441(c) has caused great confusion in diversity cases and
should be repealed only if diversity jurisdiction is retained." 6 The
clear implication is that § 1441(c) itself should be retained if diversity
jurisdiction is eliminated. Indeed, the explanation specifically notes
that § 1441(c) has value in a small number of federal questions
cases. 2 If § 1441(c) has value in federal question cases and should be
retained if diversity jurisdiction is eliminated, it would follow-contrary to the Committee's black letter recommendation-that
§ 1441(c) should not be repealed but instead should simply be made
inapplicable to diversity cases and retained for federal questions cases.
A. The 1990 Amendment Limiting Section 1441(c) to Federal
Question Cases
In the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990,278 Congress amended
§ 1441(c) to limit separate claim removal to cases where the separate
and independent claim or cause of action is "within the jurisdiction
conferred by section 1331 of this title."2 7 9 Thus, removal under

§ 1441(c) no longer applies to diversity cases but is confined to federal
question cases. Although Congress has been repeatedly criticized for
failing to follow the Committee's recommendation that § 1441(c) be
274. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988); Swing, supra note
38, at 616 (suggesting that § 1441(c) would support remand in such circumstances).

275. Federal Courts Study Comm., supra note 4, at 94 (emphasis omitted). The
Working Papers put it this way: "On balance, we side with those commentators who
advocate outright repeal of § 1441(c) ....Our conclusion is buttressed by our skepticism that diversity jurisdiction is necessary at all. It would be preferable to dispense
with § 1441(c) ...." Federal Courts Study Comm., supra note 253, at 539-540.

276. Federal Courts Study Comm., supra note 4, at 95; see also Federal Courts
Study Comm., supra note 253, at 538 ("In any event, § 1441(c) plainly has serious,
possibly fatal, flaws .... [I]t is virtually never available in diversity cases ...
277. Federal Courts Study Comm., supra note 4, at 95.
278. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089.
279. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 § 312 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.

§ 1441(c) (Supp. V 1993)). Section 1331 states: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
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repealed,28 ° in fact Congress implemented the Committee's insights
regarding § 1441(c) more carefully than the Committee itself.
The House Report explained that § 1441(c) should be retained for
federal question cases to prevent a plaintiff from defeating removal by
joining an unrelated state claim to a federal question case.28 ' It noted
that joinder rules of many states make it possible to join completely
unrelated claims. 2 The underlying assumption, of course, was that
§ 1441(a) only authorizes removal if the entire case is within federal
jurisdiction and that § 1441(a) does not authorize piecemeal removal
of only the federal claim. Thus, just as it had done in 1875 and 1948,
Congress in 1990 again repudiated piecemeal removal.
280. See, e.g., Mengler et al., supra note 32, at 20 (observing that "perhaps Congress
would have been better advised to adopt the committee's recommendation to repeal
Sec. 1441(c) entirely"); Jason C. N. Smith, Comment, Update on Changes in Federal
Jurisdiction: SupplementalJurisdiction,Venue, and Removal, 23 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 571,
589 (1992) ("Congress should have heeded the committee's recommendation and
abolished 1441(c) entirely.").
281. H.R. Rep. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1990).
282. While the House Report did not specify how many states permit such joinder,
virtually all of them do. States that allow joinder of unrelated claims are: Alabama
(Ala. Ct. C.P.R. 18(a)), Alaska (Alaska Ct. C.P.R. 18(a)), Arizona (Ariz. Ct. C.P.R.
18(a)), Arkansas (Ark. Ct. C.P.R. 18(a)), California (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 427.10(a)
(West 1994)), Colorado (Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 7A (West 1990)), Delaware (Del. Ct.
C.P.R. 18(a)), Washington, D.C. (D.C. Ct. C.P.R. 18(a)), Florida (Fla. R. Civ. P.
1.110(g)), Georgia (Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-18(a) (1982)), Hawaii (Haw. Ct. C.P.R. 18),
Idaho (Idaho Ct. C.P.R. 18(a)), Illinois (Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 735, para. 5/2-614 (SmithHurd (1992))), Indiana (Ind. Ct. C.P.R. 18(a)), Iowa (Iowa Ct. C.P.R. 22), Kansas
(Kan. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 60-218(a) (Vernon 1983)), Kentucky (Ky. Ct. C.P.R.
18.01), Maine (Me. Ct. C.P.R. 18(a)), Maryland (Md. Ann. Code art. 2 § 303(c)
(1994)), Massachusetts (Mass. Ct. C.P.R. 18(a)), Minnesota (Minn. Stat. Ann. § 4818.01 (West 1979)), Mississippi (Miss. Ct. C.P.R. 18), Missouri (Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 509.060 (Vernon 1952)), Montana (Mont. Ct. C.P.R. 18), Nevada (Nev. Ct. C.P.R.
18(a)), New Jersey (N.J. Ct. C.P.R. 4:27-1), New Mexico (N.M. Ct. C.P.R. 1-018(a)),
New York (N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 601 (McKinney 1995)), North Carolina (N.C. Ct.
C.P.R. 18(a)), North Dakota (N.D. Ct. C.P.R. 18(a)), Ohio (Ohio Ct. C.P.R. 18(a)),
Oklahoma (Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2018 (West 1993)), Oregon (Or. Ct. C.P.R.
24(a)), Pennsylvania (Pa. Ct. C.P.R. 1020(a)), Puerto Rico (P.R. Ct. C.P.R. 14.1),
Rhode Island (R.I. Super. Ct. C.P.R. 18(a)), South Carolina (S.C. Ct. C.P.R. 18),
South Dakota (S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 15-6-18(a) (1994)), Tennessee (Tenn. Ct.
C.P.R. 18.01), Texas (Tex. R. Civ. P. Ann. R. 51 (West 1993)), Utah (Utah Ct. C.P.R.
18(a)), Vermont (Vt. Ct. C.P.R. 18), Virgin Islands (V.I. Ct. C.P.R. 18(a) (Butterworth 1995)), Washington (Wash. Ct. C.P.R. 18(a)), West Virginia (W. Va. Ct.
C.P.R. 18(a)), Wisconsin (Wis. Stat. Ann. § 803.02 (West 1994)), and Wyoming (Wyo.
Ct. C.P.R. 18).
Those states that restrict or do not allow joinder are: Connecticut (Conn. Practice
Book § 133) (requiring that joined claim be related-based on the same theory or
transaction-and affect all of the parties to the action), Louisiana (La. Code Civ.
Proc. Ann. art. 462 (West 1960)) (permitting plaintiff to cumulate two or more actions
based on different grounds if: (1) jurisdiction and venue are proper, and (2) they are
mutually consistent and employ the same form of procedure), Michigan (Mich. Ct.
C.P.R. 2.203) (requiring same transaction), Nebraska (Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-701
(1979)) (requiring that claims be related), New Hampshire (no mention of joinder of
claims in statutes or rules), Virginia (Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-272 (Michie 1994)) (permitting joinder of any claim in tort or contract if same transaction).
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With the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, the transformation of
separate claim removal was complete. Originally applicable only to
diversity cases and extended to federal question cases without apparent thought, it was now available only in federal question cases. In
another sense, however, it had returned to its original purpose, which
had been largely obscured since 1948, of preventing (in some circumstances) a plaintiff from using the options available under state joinder
rules to defeat removal.
B.

The Usefulness and Constitutionalityof Section 1441(c)

The interconnections between § 1441(c) and pendent jurisdiction
continued in the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990. In addition to
amending § 1441(c), the Act codified supplemental jurisdiction to the
apparent limits of the Constitution.3 The Act provided for supplemental (i.e., pendent and ancillary) jurisdiction "over all other claims
that are so related to claims in the action within [a district court's]
original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution."'
As a result of the expansion of supplemental jurisdiction to the apparent limits of the Constitution, doubts about the constitutionality of
§ 1441(c) again came to the fore. Indeed, a number of commentators
have suggested that the amended version of § 1441(c) has no constitutional applications whatsoever: If the state claims are sufficiently related to the federal claims to be within supplemental jurisdiction, then
the case is removable under § 1441(a) and § 1441(c) does not apply,
while if the state claims are sufficiently unrelated to the federal claims
to be beyond the constitutional scope of supplemental jurisdiction,
then § 1441(c)'s apparent attempt to bring them within federal jurisdiction is unconstitutional.'
The constitutional question was evidently brought to Congress' attention during the legislative process.'
While the House Report
contained a section-by-section analysis of the bill that indicated that
§ 1441(c) would obviate the need to determine whether pendent jurisdiction existed, when the section-by-section analysis of the bill was
placed before the Senate, this sentence was deleted. Instead, Senator
Grassley, who had served on the Federal Courts Study Committee,
283. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 § 310(a) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367
(Supp. V 1993)). In codifying supplemental jurisdiction, Congress was responding to
the Supreme Court's decision in Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989), a decision that had invalidated pendent-party jurisdiction and cast doubt on all forms of
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.
284. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 § 310(a).
285. See supra note 7 (listing commentators).
286. Teply and Whitten contend that Congress "overlooked" this problem. Teply &
Whitten, supra note 7, at 154. However, Teply and Whitten refer only to the House
Report, and overlook the proceedings on the floor of the Senate. Id. at 155 n.375.
287. H.R. Rep. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23 (1990).
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stated that any portion of the removed case that was beyond the scope
of Article III would of course have to be remanded to state court.288
Thus, it appears that Congress chose to address the constitutional difficulty by counting on federal courts to use the power of remand.
There are certainly cases in which § 1441(c) can operate constitutionally. Congress has determined, in certain limited circumstances
such as the Federal Employer's Liability Act ("FELA"), 8 9 to give
plaintiffs an undisturbed choice of forum for federal claims by barring
removal. 290 For example, if a plaintiff files a FELA claim in state
court and joins an unrelated Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA") 291 claim, § 1441(c) permits removal of the entire case.
The ADEA claim is a separate and independent claim within the jurisdiction conferred by § 1331 joined with a nonremovable FELA
claim.
While courts have debated whether the bar on removal of FELA
claims in § 1445 trumps the removal power of § 1441(c), the real difficulty in these cases has been their generous Hurn-like reading of "separate and independent. ' '29 The key to unravelling this problem is to
288. 136 Cong. Rec. S17,577-78 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Grassley); see also Casad, supra note 7, at 1618 ("If the state law claim is unrelated to
the federal claim and the parties are not diverse ...the federal court would have to
remand the state claim, despite the discretionary language of § 1441(c)."). This deletion removes the only possible basis for suggesting that somehow Congress wanted
the Supreme Court to interpret the words "separate and independent"-which were
left unchanged-in a different way than it had previously. Arthur D. Wolf, Codification of Supplemental Jurisdiction:Anatomy of a Legislative Proposal,14 W. New Eng.
L. Rev. 1, 37 n.20 (1992) (suggesting such Congressional power and referring to the
omitted section of the House Report).
289. Ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988)).
290. 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a) (1988). Section 1445(a) states: "A civil action in any State
court against a railroad or its receivers or trustees, arising under Sections 51-60 of
Title 45, may not be removed to any district court of the United States." Id.
291. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
292. Compare Gamble v. Central Ry., 486 F.2d 781,782-83 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding
that § 1445 prohibits removal under § 1441(c)), overruled in part by Lirette v. N.L.
Sperry Sun, Inc., 820 F.2d. 116, 116 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (holding that plaintiff
waives the bar of § 1445 by failure to raise a timely objection to removal) with Palser
v. Burlington N.R.R., 698 F. Supp. 793, 794-95 (E.D. Mo. 1988) (removal under
§ 1441(c) permitted despite bar of § 1445); Hages v. Aliquippa & So. R.R., 427 F.
Supp. 889, 891-92 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (same); Emery v. Chicago B. & Q.R. Co., 119 F.
Supp. 654, 657 (S.D. Iowa 1954) (same); see also 14A Wright & Miller, supra note 32,
§ 3724, at 409 (suggesting that the argument that § 1441(c) overcomes a statutory bar
on removal because it does not have an "except as otherwise provided by law" clause
"has considerable force"); cf.Hunter v. Missouri-Pacific-Texas R.R., 252 F. Supp. 590,
591 (N.D. Ok. 1966) (allowing no removal under § 1441(c) because FELA claim not
separate and independent); Hall v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 152 F. Supp. 549, 552-53 (W.D.
Ky. 1957) (same); Harold K. Watson, Modern Practice Considerationsin Maritime
PersonalInjury Litigation: ProceduralWeapons for Venue Battles, 68 Tul. L. Rev. 473,
497-98 (1994) (observing that claims under the Jones Act, which is based on FELA,
are rarely removable under § 1441(c) because joined claims are seldom separate and
independent).
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recognize, as the Supreme Court did in Cohill,293 that claims that are
within the scope of supplemental jurisdiction are not "separate and
independent." 294 Once this is done, both § 1441(c) and § 1445 can be
given full effect. If a plaintiff joins, with the FELA claims, only claims
that are sufficiently related to be within the scope of supplemental
jurisdiction, § 1441(c) does not apply and the case must remain in
state court. This is consistent with the Congressional decision to give
FELA plaintiffs an undisturbed choice of a state forum, in the same
way that supplemental jurisdiction itself is necessary to give effect to
the Congressional decision to permit federal question plaintiffs to
choose federal court. Just as a plaintiff who could not use supplemental jurisdiction to bring her related state law claims in federal court
might be dissuaded from exercising her statutory right to a federal
forum, so too a FELA plaintiff who could not keep related federal
claims in state court might be dissuaded from either raising her federal
claims or exercising her statutory right to a state forum for her FELA
claim. On the other hand, if a plaintiff joins unrelated federal claims
and a FELA claim, § 1441(c) applies so that the presence of the
FELA claim does not prevent removal. While it is important to implement plaintiff's forum choice under FELA to keep related claims
in state court, there is no justification to empower the plaintiff to defeat a defendant's removal rights on unrelated federal claims. Such a
use of § 1441(c) is fully consistent with the Congressional purpose of
preventing plaintiffs from joining unrelated claims in order to defeat
removal.
FELA is not the only example of a statutory bar on removal. The
Securities Act of 1933295 also gives plaintiffs a choice of forum by denying removal. 9 6 Courts have been similarly troubled with the interaction between its non-removal provision and § 1441(c). 2 " The
answer should be the same: Removal should only be available if the
plaintiff joins an unrelated federal claim with the non-removable
claim under the 1933 Act. Of course, using § 1441(c) to permit adjudication of the entire case in such circumstances would be plainly constitutional because both claims would be federal question claims.298
293. See supra notes 248-50 and accompanying text.
294. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 354 (1988).
295. Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1988 & Supp. V

1993)).
296. Id. § 22(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1988)).
297. E.g., Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Hamilton Hotel Partners, 702 F. Supp.
1417,1420-22 (W.D. Ark. 1988); U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 348 F. Supp. 1004, 1012-16

(D. Del.1972), rev'd on other grounds, 540 F.2d. 142 (3d Cir. 1976), cert denied, 433
U.S. 908 (1977); Pinto v. Maremont Corp., 326 F. Supp. 165, 167-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
298. Oakley, supra note 32, at 749-50 n.45. McFarland acknowledges this in a footnote. McFarland, supra note 9, at 1079 n.81 (citing Oakley). He does not, however, let
this interfere with his conclusion that § 1441(c) is unconstitutional. While it would be

constitutional to adjudicate the entire case, it would better serve Congressional intent
for the court to remand the FELA or the '33 Act claim (and any related claims) while
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Similarly, a plaintiff could join a federal question claim (say, under
the ADEA) with an unrelated state claim (say, for strict liability in
tort arising from the sale of a consumer good) in which there was minimal diversity. Again, removal would be possible under § 1441(c) because the ADEA claim would be separate and independent from the
state contract claim. Moreover, exercising jurisdiction would be perfectly constitutional because, while minimal diversity is an insufficient
jurisdictional predicate for a direct filing in federal court under 28
U.S.C. § 1332,299 minimal diversity is sufficient under Article 111.30
If the only constitutional use of § 1441(c) were to prevent a plaintiff
from defeating removal of a federal claim by joining an unrelated
claim in which there is minimal diversity or that happens to be one of
the handful as to which removal is statutorily prohibited, it might not
be worth the trouble. The usefulness of § 1441(c) would be this limited if-but only if-the courts were to interpret the constitutional
"case" (and thereby the scope of supplemental jurisdiction under
§ 1367) to include all claims that the law of joinder permits to be
joined. While Richard Matasar has made a powerful argument that
this is the correct methodology for determining the scope of a constitutional case,3 0 ' there is little sign that courts are accepting this
view. 30 2 Moreover, even if Matasar is correct-and I tend to think
that he is-that the scope of a case is ultimately subject to legislative
rather than judicial determination,30 3 Congress has punted the quesretaining the ADEA claim. Cf Oakley, supra note 32, at 750-51 & n.49 (suggesting
that amended remand clause narrows the district court's remand powers and supersedes case law encouraging remand of FELA claims).
299. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988) (defining diversity jurisdiction).
300. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967);
Oakley, supra note 32, at 749 & n.45.
301. Matasar, supra note 39, at 1478-79 (arguing that the scope of a "case" is defined by the law of joinder); cf Harold Feld, Saving the Citizen Suit: The Effect of
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife and the Role of Citizen Suits in Environmental En-

forcement, 19 Col. J. Envtl. L. 141 (1994) (asserting, unpersuasively, that "Congress
can authorize the courts to act beyond their constitutional limits if at least one ele-

ment of the case satisfies the constitutional requirements of Article III").
302. Teply and Whitten agree with Matasar. Teply & Whitten, supra note 7, at 129
n.286. They have observed, however, that only one court has found factually unrelated claims to be within supplemental jurisdiction. Id. (citing Wesley v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., No. 91-C3368, 1991 WL 169204 (N.D. II1. Aug. 23, 1991)). In

Wesley, however, it appears that the claims were factually related; the primary claim
challenged an installment contract under the Truth in Lending Act and the counterclaim sought recovery under the underlying installment contract. Wesley, 1991 WL

169204, at *1.
303. Perhaps if Matasar's view were reformulated as a rational basis test, it might
receive a warmer reception in the courts. So reformulated, Congress does not have a
free hand to determine the scope of a case, but instead only needs to have a rational
basis for its determination of the scope of a case. There is a rational basis for hearing
in one case not only those matters that are factually related, but also those matters

that are related in any way, including those involving property before the court or
even simply those where the parties involved are the same. It is hard to imagine that
Congress would ever permit the joinder of claims that have no relationship to each
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tion right back to the courts. Not only do the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure explicitly provide that they "shall not be construed to ex-

tend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts,"30
but when Congress defined the scope of supplemental jurisdiction in
§ 1367 in constitutional terms, it also plainly indicated in the legislative history of that statute that it viewed
the Gibbs test of factual relat30 5
edness as the constitutional standard.
If Gibbs marks the outer limits of a constitutional case, as most believe it does,3 °6 then it would be unconstitutional for federal courts to

adjudicate claims merely because they were joined with claims that
are within federal jurisdiction. It is this assumption, of course, that
leads the critics of § 1441(c) to conclude that it is unconstitutional because it purports to permit courts to do exactly that.

The critics of the constitutionality of § 1441(c), however, fail to
make a crucial distinction between the constitutionality of permitting
the removal of an entire case in the first instance and the constitutionality of ultimately adjudicating that entire case. Simply because,
under Gibbs, it may be unconstitutional to adjudicate factually unreother at all (e.g., A's claim against B joined with C's claim against D even though
there is no relationship whatsoever between the two claims), but if it were to do so, it
would probably flunk the rational basis test and therefore, on this view, be
unconstitutional.

This is not to suggest that Congress can make questions that are not fit for judicial
resolution into a "case" within the meaning of Article III simply by calling them a
case. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 409 (1792); see also Hart & Vechsler,

supra note 7, at 66-67 (discussing letter from Justices of Supreme Court declining to
answer questions posed by Washington and Jefferson). Instead, the point is that
where a judicially cognizable dispute is present-one that properly results in a judgment-and where some part of that dispute is within the judicial power of the United

States, it is up to Congress to determine the boundaries of the dispute to be heard in
one proceeding. Osbom v. United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 737 (1824). Put another
way, what counts as a single case (or a single dispute) rather than multiple cases (or
multiple disputes) is a matter for legislative determination. I am indebted to Judge
John J. Gibbons for this insight.
304. Fed. R. Civ. P. 82.
305. H.R. Rep. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 29 n.15 (1990); Teply & Whitten,
supra note 7, at 128.
306. Wright, supra note 8, § 19, at 120; Block-Lieb, supra note 228, at 759; McFarland, supra note 9, at 1078 n.78 (collecting authorities); cf. McLaughlin, supra note 15,
at 907-13 (suggesting reformulation of Gibbs test but in way that still precludes unrelated claims). But see Richard A. Matasar, supra note 39, at 1463 ("[Sleveral courts,
including the Supreme Court, have upheld supplemental jurisdiction in many ancillary
jurisdiction cases that do not meet the Gibbs fact relationship requirements."); 1A
Moore & Ringle, supra note 224, § 0.163[3] (suggesting that ancillary jurisdiction is
broader than Gibbs).
If Gibbs does not mark the outer boundaries of Article 1I1, and if § 1367(a) is interpreted in accordance with its legislative history as codifying Gibbs rather than in accordance with its text as reaching the constitutional limit, § 1441(c) is useful and
constitutional even to the extent that it authorizes adjudication of claims that are
factually unrelated, but legally joined. Teply & Whitten, supra note 7, at 155; see also
Wolf, supra note 288, at 37-38 (noting that if Congress has power to define constitutional case more broadly than Gibbs, § 1441(c) might very well be constitutional).
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lated claims, does not mean that it is unconstitutional for Congress to
authorize a defendant to remove the entire case in the first instance so
that the federal court can determine the scope of its own jurisdiction.
That is, while there may be cases in which it would be unconstitutional
under Gibbs to "determine all issues therein," it does not follow that
30 7
§ 1441(c) is unconstitutional in authorizing removal of such cases.
"A primordial element of our jurisprudence is that federal courts
have jurisdiction to determine whether they have subject matter jurisdiction. 30 8 As Justice Holmes stated:
[E]ven if the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to entertain [the petition for a writ of habeas corpus], and if this court had no jurisdiction
of the appeal, this court, and this court alone, could decide that such
was the law. It and it alone necessarily 3had
°9 jurisdiction to decide
whether the case was properly before it.
Moreover, "[r]emoval proceedings are in the nature of process to
bring the parties before the United States court. '310 Thus, to permit a
defendant to remove an entire action to federal court even though the
federal court may ultimately determine some part of it to be outside
the scope of federal jurisdiction, as § 1441(c) does, should be no more
controversial than permitting a plaintiff to file an action directly in
federal court even though the federal court may ultimately determine
some part of it to be outside the scope of federal jurisdiction. Surely it
is preferable to have the federal court decide the scope of its jurisdiction on removal rather than leave it to the state court (by addressing
removal petitions to it as was done in most cases prior to 1948)311 or to
307. Surely, it is commonplace that a statute may be perfectly constitutional in certain applications and unconstitutional in other applications. Students of civil procedure deal with that concept all the time in testing whether long-arm statutes can be
constitutionally applied in particular situations. Moore seems to overlook this point
when he argues that § 1441(c) is constitutional even to the extent that it authorizes
jurisdiction over unrelated claims because "ft]he authority conferred on Congress by
the Constitution is not limited to a legislative course of perfection." 1A Moore &
Ringle, supra note 224, § 0.163[3]. While a statute is not wholly invalid simply because it sweeps broadly enough to have unconstitutional applications, this does not
mean it is somehow constitutional even when applied unconstitutionally.
308. Shannon v. Shannon, 965 F.2d 542, 545 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 677
(1993).
309. United State v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 573 (1906); see also United States Catholic
Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, 487 U.S. 72, 79 (1988) (citing Shipp).
310. Mackay v. Unita Dev. Co., 229 U.S. 173, 176 (1913); see also Wenzler v. Robin
Line S.S. Co., 277 F. 812, 819 (W.D. Wash. 1921) (remarking that removal "is merely
the machinery for getting the case into the right court").
311. 1A Moore & Ringle, supra note 224, § 0.168[2]. The state court's decision was
not conclusive, but could be challenged either on ultimate appeal to the United States
Supreme Court or by filing a transcript of the record in federal court and either asking
it to enjoin the state proceeding or pursuing both actions simultaneously. Id.; see also
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. McCabe, 213 U.S. 207,222 (1909) (holding that the federal
court had jurisdiction to determine whether the case was removable or not). The
result, naturally, was "friction." 1A Moore & Ringle, supra note 224, § 0.16812].
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the defendant (by permitting piecemeal removal) to make such
decisions.

It might be objected that a defendant can always remove a case and
leave it to the federal court to determine its jurisdiction. But there is a

crucial difference. Absent § 1441(c), if a defendant removes a case
that includes a claim outside the federal court's jurisdiction, the district court is obliged to remand the entire case because § 1441(a) permits removal only if the entire case is within the district court's
original jurisdiction.3 12
McFarland's example illustrates the point: A plaintiff sues a nondiverse defendant in state court for (1) violation of the federal civil
rights laws in firing the plaintiff, (2) common law breach of the employment contract, and (3) common law breach of an entirely unrelated business contract. 313 If the plaintiff joined only the first two
claims, the defendant could remove the entire case under § 1441(a)
because, if plaintiff brought the entire case there directly, the district
court would have original jurisdiction over it. The first claim is within
the district court's general federal question jurisdiction, 3 14 and the second claim is within the scope of its supplemental jurisdiction.1
McFarland seems to think that, even absent § 1441(c), the case
would be removable even if joined with the third claim, although the
court would have to remand the third claim.31 6 Despite the authori312. This appears to be the view of Professor Rowe. Oakley, supra note 32, at 750
n.45 (citing correspondence with Professor Rowe); see also Frances J. v. Wright, 19
F.3d 337, 341-42 (7th Cir.) (treating "action" under § 1441(a) to mean entire case),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 204 (1994); Nolan v. Boeing Co., 919 F.2d 1058, 1066 (5th Cir.
1990) ("In federal practice, the terms 'case' and 'action' refer to the same thing, i.e.,
the entirety of a civil proceeding. . . ."), cert denied, 499 U.S. 962 (1991); Gibson v.
City of Glendale Police Dept., 786 F. Supp. 1452, 1457 (E. D. Wisc. 1992) ("Is the
entire 'civil action' within the original jurisdiction of the district court or is it not? If
...it is not, removal is improper ....
).
313. McFarland, supra note 9, at 1085. Ironically, McFarland has organized his hypothetical complaint as a good McCaskilite would, with three counts each expressing
a different legal theory of recovery.
314. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
315. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. V 1993). One might have thought this obvious because there would be pendent jurisdiction even under Hurn's single primary right
approach, but several district courts disagree. See, e.g., Benton v. Kroger Co., 635 F.
Supp. 56,59 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (holding that there was no common nucleus of operative
fact between a sex discrimination claim and a workers' compensation retaliation
claim, even though plaintiff contended that she was fired for one or both of these
illegal reasons); Mason v. Richmond Motor Co., 625 F. Supp. 883,888 (E.D. Va. 1986)
(finding that there was no common nucleus of operative fact between ADEA claim of
unlawful discharge and contract claim for breach of employment contract's guarantee
of continued employment and alternatively declining to exercise pendent jurisdiction), aff'd, 825 F.2d 407 (4th Cir. 1987). Distressingly, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit has recently stated that these decisions are "compelling." Lyon v. Whisman, Nos. 94-7190, 94-7283, 1995 WL 23671, at *5-*6 (3d Cir. Jan.
19, 1995).
316. McFarland, supra note 9, at 1085.
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ties that have seemingly endorsed this view,317 the history of removal
statutes demonstrates that this is wrong. From the Judiciary Act of

1789 forward, it has been clear that the general removal statutes do
not permit removal of an entire case on the basis that a part of the
case is removable; that is precisely why the Separable Controversy
Act and its successors were passed.3 a8 Moreover, that is precisely the
understanding of § 1441(a) demonstrated by Congress in amending
§ 1441(c) in 1990.3 19 If the general removal statutes authorized the
removal of an entire case based on the presence of some claim within
federal jurisdiction, with the understanding that the rest of the case
would then be remanded, all of the successive statutes discussed in
this Article that Congress enacted would have been unnecessary. Perhaps most graphically, Strawbridge would not apply on removal-the
presence of a controversy between any two diverse parties would authorize the removal of the entire case and the district court would
simply remand the rest of the case.
Nor could the defendant remove only the first two claims, leaving
the third claim in state court. There is simply no statutory authority
for such piecemeal removal and history makes clear why: From 1789
until 1866, piecemeal removal was forbidden. 320 The experiment with
piecemeal removal under the Separable Controversy Act of 1866 resulted in confusion, waste, and embarrassment,3 21 so Congress abandoned it nine years later in 1875.322 When courts reintroduced
piecemeal removal by viewing certain parts of a state proceeding as
"separate" from other parts, the result was the same, and Congress
again repudiated piecemeal removal. 3 2
This understanding that removal under § 1441(a) is only available if
the entire case is within the federal court's jurisdiction also resolves
the division among the Courts of Appeals regarding the removability
of cases that include claims barred by the Eleventh Amendment. As
317. E.g., Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv. v. McCarthy, 708 F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir.)
(Breyer, J.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936 (1983); Adolph Coors Co. v. Sickler, 608 F.
Supp. 1417, 1427-28 (C.D. Cal. 1985); Steinman, supra note 33, at 984-88 (endorsing
results in Bonanno and Sickler).
318. See supra part I.B (tracing the history of the Separable Controversy Act and
its successors).
319. H.R. Rep. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1990) (explaining that § 1441(c)
should be retained for federal questions cases in order to prevent a plaintiff from
defeating removal by joining an unrelated state claim to a federal question case).
320. See supra text accompanying notes 66-71.
321. See supra text accompanying notes 72-79.
322. See supra part I.D. Indeed, perhaps Congress intended to repudiate piecemeal
removal the next year when it passed the Prejudice and Local Influence Act of 1867,
ch. 196, 14 Stat. 558. The Supreme Court, however, did not read the Act this way.
Case of the Sewing Mach. Cos., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 553, 580 (1873); see also Swing,
supra note 38, at 608-09 (discussing Supreme Court's interpretation of the 1867 Act in
Sewing Machine Companies); supra text accompanying note 85 (discussing Sewing
Machine Companies).
323. See supra text accompanying notes 99-115, 124-31, 137-64, 260-70, and 275-82.
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the Seventh Circuit recently put it, "if even one claim in an action is
jurisdictionally barred from federal court by a state's sovereign immunity, or does not otherwise fit within the original or supplemental ju-

risdiction of the federal courts, then, as a consequence32 4of § 1441(a),

the whole action cannot be removed to federal court.

The Sixth Circuit reached a contrary result in Henry v. Metropolitan
Sewer District,3" and a student note 326 has recently argued in support

of Henry. The flaw in both Henry and the student note is the apparent
assumption that as long as any part of a case is removable, the entire
case is removable. Neither Henry nor the student note reconciles this
view with the history of removal or explains how this view would not
overrule Strawbridge in removal cases.32 7 In FrancisJ. v. Wright,3 8 on

the other hand, the Seventh Circuit noted that "preventing a defendant from splitting a single case into two, one state and the other federal, furthers judicial economy. "329
It is particularly appropriate to prohibit removal where jurisdiction
over part of the case is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, because
in almost all cases it will be state officials seeking removal, and it is
difficult to justify state officials removing cases to federal court. 3
324. Frances J. v. Wright, 19 F.3d 337, 341 (7th Cir.) (citation omitted), cerL denied
115 S. Ct. 204 (1994); see also McKay v. Boyd Constr., 769 F.2d 1084, 1088 (5th Cir.
1985) (vacating District Court's judgment because the Eleventh Amendment barred
the exercise of jurisdiction over one claim); Simmons v. California, 740 F. Supp. 781,
785 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (following McKay); Berman, supra note 32, at 706 (reconstructing McKay in this way).
325. 922 F.2d 332, 338-39 (6th Cir. 1990); see also Boyle v. City of Liberty, 833 F.
Supp. 1436, 1453 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (following Henry); Texas Hosp. Ass'n v. National
Heritage Ins. Co., 802 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (following Henry).
326. Berman, supra note 32, at 702-09.
327. Id. at 707 (stating that there is "no warrant for reading the removal statute to
direct the district court to resolve all jurisdictional questions before it grants removal"); cf. id at 698-99 (arguing that an "out-of-state defendant should be able
either to separate and remove all claims asserted only against herself or to remove the
entire case" and observing that the only reason defendants can not remove in such
circumstances is to limit diversity jurisdiction). Berman also reads § 1441(a) to permit
"removal of parts of cases," but overlooks the repeated Congressional repudiation of
such piecemeal removal. Id at 708.
Berman concludes that district courts should have the discretion to balance the
interest in a federal court adjudicating the federal questions versus the interest in
maintaining a single suit in determining what to do upon removal of a case including
both a federal claim barred by the Eleventh Amendment and a federal claim not
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 714-16. Congress, however, has already
done this balancing based on decades of experience. Cf. id. at 715 n.186 (suggesting
that discretion is better than a legislative solution).
Like the Seventh Circuit, I find Berman's analysis "unpersuasive." Wright, 19 F.3d
at 341 n.5.
328. 19 F.3d 337 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 204 (1994).
329. Id. at 341.
330. Gibson v. Glendale Police Dep't, 786 F. Supp. 1452, 1457 (E.D. Wisc. 1992);
Susan N. Herman, Beyond Parity: Section 1983 and the State Courts, 54 Brooklyn L
Rev. 1057, 1084-92 (1989) (arguing that § 1983 actions should not be removable);
Mark Tushnet, General Principles of the Revision of FederalJurisdiction: A Political
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Furthermore, it is galling for state officials to remove and then raise
the bar of the Eleventh Amendment. As the Wright court observed,
"We are curious why Defendants would engage in such a paradoxical
jurisdictional33 1maneuver, unless they merely had hoped to split" the
case in two.
Of course, if a plaintiff joins an unrelated claim that is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment to a federal claim that is not barred by the
Eleventh Amendment, § 1441(c) permits removal. This serves to prevent a plaintiff from trapping a defendant in state court on a federal
332
claim by joining a claim that is not related to the removable claim.
So understood, Congressional removal policy emerges as rational
and coherent, consisting of two basic rules and one exception. First, a
case can only be removed if the entire case is within the federal court's
jurisdiction. Second, parts of cases cannot be removed, only entire
cases. If a plaintiff joins an unrelated claim that would otherwise defeat removal, however, removal is nonetheless permitted. Returning
to McFarland's example,333 the entire case is removable under
§ 1441(c) and only under § 1441(c). 331 Once removed, the district
court should (1) remand the unrelated breach of contract claim because it does not share a common nucleus of operative fact with the
federal civil rights claim; (2) exercise or decline supplemental jurisdiction over the breach of employment contract claim in accordance with
the standards of § 1367(c); and (3) at least ordinarily, retain and adjudicate the federal civil rights claim.
The question that remains is whether there are any properly removed cases in which the court can and should also remand the federal claim as well. It is to that remand power that we now turn.

Analysis, 22 Conn. L. Rev. 621, 643-45 (1990) (stating that "even one [removed

§ 1983 case] is a conceptual anomaly" that "probably has no basis in the reasons for
which the federal courts exist" but unlikely to be eliminated because liberals are committed to the use of the federal courts and conservatives are committed to protecting
state officials as defendants); cf Steinman, supra note 7, at 318-19 n.40 ("Denial of
the federal forum to federal claims, particularly to claims that constitutional rights
were violated under color of state law ... seems highly questionable.").
331. Wright, 19 F.3d at 340.
332. The Wright court dismissed the applicability of § 1441(c) in a footnote, reason-

ing that because it calls for the court to determine "all issues therein," it is "incompatible with a case of this sort." Id. at 340 n.4. The right reason to conclude that
§ 1441(c) was inapplicable there, however, was simply that the claims were not "separate and independent."
333. See supra notes 313-15 and accompanying text.

334. Cf. 14A Wright & Miller, supra note 32, § 3724, at 122 (Supp. 1994) ("It is
difficult to see .

question cases.").

.

. what was gained by leaving Section 1441(c) at play in federal-
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1441(c) Now AUTHORIZES THE REMAND OF
FEDERAL

QUESrION CASES

In the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Congress also amended
the remand provision of § 1441(c).33 5 Now, district courts are explicitly given the discretion, in cases removed under § 1441(c), to "re-

mand all matters in which State law predominates." 336 This
amendment has led to an assertion of power by district courts to re-

mand not only separate and independent claims that could not have
been brought on their own in federal court, but also to remand entire

cases, including federal claims that could have been brought on their
own in federal court.
Soon after the enactment of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990,
Thomas Mengler, Stephen Burbank, and Thomas Rowe observed that
the term "matters" in § 1441(c) could be construed broadly enough 3to
include the entire case,337 but argued against such a construction.
David Siegel similarly noted the possibility of construing § 1441(c) to
permit the remand of the entire case.339 He did not address whether
§ 1441(c) should be interpreted in this way, perhaps because he confused the question of predominance with the question of strength. He
asserted that if state law predominates, then the federal claim is a
"weakling," as to which "summary judgment shouldn't be too far
away." 34 Nevertheless, federal district courts quickly began asserting,
first in dicta but then in holdings, the power to remand entire federal
question cases that had been removed from state court. 34I
A.

Opinions Interpreting the Amended Remand Clause of
Section 1441(c)

Judge Acker of the Northern District of Alabama pointed the way
in Martin v. Drummond Coal Company.342 Martin filed an action in
state court in Alabama for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. 34 3 Mar335. Judicial Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 312 (2), 104 Stat.
5089, 5114 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (Supp. V 1993)).
336. Id
337. Mengler et al., supra note 32, at 20 ("If courts construe the term "matters" as
synonymous with constitutional cases or controversies, then the language authorizes
the district court to remand an entire case or controversy-including the federal question claim-to the state court if the case or controversy is one in which state law
issues predominate.").
338. Id. at 21.
339. Siegel, supra note 7, at 78 ("If 'matters' is construed to include all 'claims',
then a combination of claims in which a federal claim is one but in which state law is
found to 'predominate' may justify a remand of the whole case ... .
340. Id.
341. To date, only district courts have directly addressed this question, both because the statute is so new and because of the impediments to review of remand
decisions. See supra note 33 (discussing impediments to review).
342. 756 F. Supp. 524 (N.D. Ala. 1991).
343. Id. at 526.
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tin then amended his complaint in anticipation of a res judicata defense based on a Delaware judgment, claiming that enforcement of
that judgment would violate his federal due process rights. The defendants removed and Martin sought remand. As Judge Acker acknowledged, a straightforward application of the well-pleaded
complaint rule barred removal and required remand. 3 44 But Judge
Acker was not content to rely on a straightforward application of the
well-pleaded complaint rule. Instead, he read the 1990 amendment to
§ 1441(c) as granting "broad discretion" to a federal district court to
make a "value judgment" as to whether or not "state law predominates. '345 He concluded that the word "matter," as used in amended
§ 1441(c), permits remand of the entire matter, that is, the entire
case. 346 Accordingly, because state law predominated in Martin's
case, the entire case was remanded.
Without citing Martin, Judge Patrick Kelly of the District of Kansas
reached the same conclusion in Peoples National Bank v. Darling.347
There, the plaintiff sued in Kansas state court alleging violations of
section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 34 Kansas securities law,
and Kansas common law. Defendants removed and plaintiff sought
remand. Noting that Congress expressly made section 12(2) claims
non-removable,34 9 Judge Kelly ruled that there was no other federal
claim that would support removal.35 ° Judge Kelly also rejected the
defendants' contention that § 1441(c) supported removal. First, he
observed that, as amended, § 1441(c) only applies to cases within the
district court's federal question jurisdiction and stated there was no
344. Id. Oddly, although Judge Acker stated that the "well-pleaded complaint rule
is so ingrained in federal question removal jurisprudence that it needs no citation of
authority," he also noted that if he were "inclined to do so," he could distinguish both
Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936), and In re Carter, 618 F.2d 1093 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 949 (1981). Martin, 756 F. Supp. at 526.
345. Martin, 756 F. Supp. at 527. He also observed that he had been "privileged to
attend a seminar at Yale Law School at which the legislation which ended up as the
Act adopted on December 1, 1990, was under consideration by Congress" and that
there he saw "virtual unanimity" among the federal judges present and the Congressional representatives "over the need to subtract substantially from the removal jurisdiction of the federal courts." Id. at 526. The seminar at Yale was a conference on
"Modem Civil Procedure: Issues in Controversy," co-sponsored by the Yale Law
School Program in Civil Liability and Aetna Life & Casualty. It was held on June 1516, 1990. Undated note from the Honorable William M. Acker, Jr., N.D. Ala., to
Edward Hartnett, Assistant Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law
(on file with author).
346. Martin, 756 F. Supp. at 527.
347. No. 91-1052-K, 1991 WL 45716 (D. Kan. Apr. 1, 1991).
348. Ch. 38, § 12(2), 48 Stat. 74, 84 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988)).
349. Darling,1991 WL 45716 at *2 (citing 15 U.S.C § 77v(a) (1988)).
350. Id. at *5.Judge Kelly rejected arguments that the § 12(2) claim was so baseless as to constitute a fraudulent attempt to defeat federal jurisdiction and that the
state law security claim was merely an artfully pleaded federal claim under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at *2-5.
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such federal question in plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint. 351 Second,
he concluded that the plaintiff's claims were not separate and independent because they were "interlocked, closely related and allege
essentially one wrong for which a single relief is sought."3 2 Accordingly, he ordered remand.353 Almost in passing, he observed that the
1990 amendment to § 1441(c) "gives the federal court discretionary
authority, where before it had none,
to remand the entire case to state
3' 54
court if state law predominates.
In Darling, as in Martin, the discussion of the 1990 amendment to
§ 1441(c) did not affect the disposition of the case-remand of the
entire case was required in any event because the case should not
have been removed.355 In Holland v. World Omni Leasing, Inc.,356
another decision by Judge Acker, this view of amended § 1441(c) did
make a difference. There, plaintiffs filed an action in Alabama state
court alleging fraud, breach of contract, and a violation of the federal
357
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO").
The "predicate acts" alleged for the RICO claim were essentially the
same facts involved in the state law fraud and breach of contract
claims. Defendants removed and plaintiffs moved to remand. The action was undoubtedly removable because plaintiff's well-pleaded
complaint contained a RICO claim, which plainly arises under federal
law.
At oral argument, Judge Acker expressed some doubt about
whether he had been correct in his interpretation of § 1441(c) in Martin. Upon further reflection, including consideration of Darling, he
concluded that "even if there is a federal question identified in plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint, as is true in the instant case, § 1441(c)
can still justify remanding the entire case 'if state law predomi-

351. Id. at *6. In this regard, Judge Kelly appears to have overlooked that the

§ 12(2) claim was within the district court's federal question jurisdiction if the plaintiff
had chosen to file the action in federal court. In effect, he, quite sensibly, read the
statute as if it continued to include the phrase "which would be removable if sued

upon alone," a phrase that was omitted in the 1990 amendment. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(c) (Supp. V 1993); see also Field et al., supra note 32, at 58 (Supp. 1994) (asserting that "1441(c) must mean that the entire case is removable only if the federal
question claim 'would be removable if sued upon alone' as the statute provided

before the 1990 amendment").
352. Darling,1991 WL 45716 at *6.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Similarly, in Lang v. American Elec. Power Co., 785 F. Supp. 1331 (N.D. Ind.
1992), the court noted that the removal was defective due to failure of all defendants
to join. Id. at 1334-35. But instead of remanding on this basis, the court relied on
Martin to remand the "entire case, including federal claims... [because] state law
predominates." Id. at 1334.
356. 764 F. Supp. 1442 (N.D. Ala. 1991).
357 Id. at 1441
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nates.' "358 Finding that state law predominated, he remanded the entire case, including the federal RICO claim.359
In Moore v. DeBiase,3 ° Judge Lechner of the District of New Jersey
built upon the foundation laid by Judge Acker. Moore, a police officer for the Borough of Dunellen, New Jersey, sued the Chief of Police, various other public officials, the Dunellen Police Department,
and the Borough of Dunellen in state court in New Jersey, alleging
that the defendants initiated a campaign to discredit and terminate
him in retaliation for the filing of a grievance against the Chief of
Police.36 ' The bulk of Moore's nineteen-count complaint relied upon
state common law. The thirteenth count sought recovery for violation
of an unspecified constitution.362 The fourteenth and fifteenth counts
sought recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a deprivation of both
state and federal constitutional
rights. The defendants removed and
363
Moore sought remand.
Judge Lechner first concluded that removal was proper because the
§ 1983 claims arose under federal law and the state law claims were
within the scope of supplemental jurisdiction. 364 Accordingly, he held
that remand under § 1447(c) 365 was not appropriate. 366 He then addressed the possibility of remand under367§ 1441(c), even though the
plaintiffs did not specifically mention it.
After tracing the legislative history of § 1441(c), Judge Lechner
cited Judge Acker's opinion in Martin and stated, "By permitting remand of a case in which state law predominates, Congress granted
district courts broad discretion to decide whether to retain such a removed matter or remand it to state court. '368 He recognized, however, that "Congress did not state whether 'matters' refers to the
entire case or just that portion in which state law can be said to
predominate. '369 Prior to the 1990 amendment, Judge Lechner observed that "a district court could remand the state law claims not
within its original jurisdiction but was required to retain the federal
358. Id. at 1444 (citation omitted).
359. Id. Judge Acker reasoned that to retain only the RICO claim and remand the

state claims would result in a "race-to-judgment" and a serious res judicata problem
that "may have influenced Congress when it chose its words in the amendment to
§ 1441(c), imperfect though these words may be." Id.

360. 766 F. Supp. 1311 (D.N.J. 1991).
361. Id. at 1313.
362. Id. at 1314.
363. Id.

364. Id. at 1315.
365. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1988). Section 1447(c) provides, in part, that "[i]f at any
time before the final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." Id.
366. Moore, 766 F. Supp. at 1315.
367. Id. at 1315 n.7.

368. Id. at 1319-20 (footnote omitted).
369. Id. at 1320.
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law claims."3' 70 Reasoning that the change in statutory language from

"all matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction" to "all matters in which State law predominates" should be interpreted as a
meaningful change, Judge Lechner inferred that "Congress intended
to change the scope of what a district court could remand."" 1 He
stated:
Before, a district court could only remand the claim over which it
did not have original jurisdiction: a non-federal law claim between
non-diverse parties. Under the amended section 1441(c), it appears
a district court may remand even a claim over which it has original
jurisdiction, so long as state law somehow predominates in that particular claim or cause of action. In other words, the term "matters,"
construed in the context of amended section 1441(c), should be read
to permit remand of the entire case if the circumstances justify such
remand. Congress, by granting the discretion to remand all matters
in which state law predominates, intended to permit a district court
to remand the entire case and not just the state law claims. 3"
Judge Lechner observed that sixteen of the nineteen counts were
based purely on state law while only the fourteenth and fifteenth
counts involved federal law claims.3 73 Moreover, he noted that "even

the Counts containing the federal law claims invoke state law." 4 He
concluded, "State law is implicated and therefore predominates in
every aspect of this action and remand of the entire case is
appropriate.

3 75

In Alexander v. Goldome Credit Corp.,37 6 Judge Hobbs of the Middle District of Alabama signed on to the view that § 1441(c) now permits remand of federal question cases. In Alexander, the plaintiffs
gave a mortgage on their home to a credit company to obtain financing for certain home improvements but refused to sign a certification
of completion because, they contended, the construction company's
work was unsatisfactory. After the credit company paid the construction company anyway, the plaintiffs filed suit in state court in Alabama against the construction company, an agent of the construction
company, and the credit company. The plaintiffs alleged state law
fraud and breach of contract claims against all of the defendants. In
addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the credit company violated the

370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1320-21.
1& at 1321.
Id.
Id.
772 F. Supp. 1217 (M.D. Ala. 1991).
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federal Truth in Lending Act.3 77 The credit company, but not the
other defendants, removed, and the plaintiffs sought remand.37 8
It was clear that if the credit company had been the only defendant
3 79
It
in the case, removal "undoubtedly" would have been proper.
was similarly clear that the failure of the other defendants to join or
consent to the removal would have been fatal to the removal unless
the case could be brought within § 1441(c). 3 80 In Judge Hobbs' view,
the Truth in Lending Act claim was "separate and independent"
from the fraud and breach of contract claims because it was "possible that [the credit company] may have violated the provisions of
the Truth in Lending Act, but that the work on plaintiffs' residence
was performed properly by [the construction company]. 3 8 1 He
concluded, therefore, that the case was properly removed under
382
§ 1441(C).
Turning to the issue of remand under § 1441(c), Judge Hobbs followed the "clear trend among the few jurisdictions that have considered this question ... that the amended remand clause of § 1441(c)
now allows for a remand of the entire case, federal claim included,
where 'state law predominates.' "383 He reasoned that this interpretation is consistent with Congressional intent to restrict removal jurisdiction and "allows a court to avoid piecemeal litigation and to
properly limit those cases removed to federal court to those that truly
present federal issues. ' 38" In his view, removal of a case with a "relatively insignificant federal claim when compared to the state law

377. Pub. L. No. 90-321, §§ 101-45, 82 Stat. 146, 146-59 (1968) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-67 (1988)).
378. Alexander, 772 F. Supp. at 1218-19.
379. Id. at 1221.
380. Id. at 1222.
381. Id. at 1223. Judge Hobbs cited American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S.

6 (1951), and acknowledged that "the subsequent application of the Finn test has
resulted in a substantial lessening of the number of cases that can be removed under
§ 1441(c)." Alexander, 772 F. Supp. at 1223; see also supra notes 179-225 and accompanying text (discussing Finn). However, he concluded that "[ilt cannot be said that
the Supreme Court ... meant to completely foreclose the use of § 1441(c) as a basis
for removal." Alexander, 772 F. Supp. at 1223. Especially in light of Carnegie-Mellon
University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988), however, Judge Hobbs was wrong to treat

these claims as "separate and independent." See supra notes 248-53 and accompanying text (discussing Cohill).
382. Alexander, 772 F. Supp. at 1223. Judge Hobbs also noted that § 1441(c), as
amended, "will see little use," and is "not really needed," because supplemental jurisdiction "will provide all the jurisdictional support that is needed, or could be pro-

vided, to bring a case involving a mix of federal and nonfederal claims before the
court under § 1441(a) and (b)." Id. at 1222-23. As he saw it, the only situation in
which § 1441(c) would find some use is in cases such as Alexander where "procedural
irregularities have rendered § 1441(a) and (b) unavailable." Id. at 1223.

383. Id. at 1224.
384. Id. at 1225.
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claims is a classic illustration of 'the tail wagging
the dog.' ,,3as Ac3 6
cordingly, he ordered remand of the entire case.
These judges are not alone. Judge Zatkoff of the Eastern District of

Michigan has sua sponte remanded a case involving a federal claim for

breach of a collective bargaining agreement. 3 7 He reasoned that district courts now have "considerable discretion" to " 'remand ... the
whole case, with the federal claim[s] included,' where state law claims

are found to predominate. ' 3 1 Judge Alesia of the Northern District
of Illinois has used § 1441(c) to remand a case including a federal civil
rights claim. 3 8 9 He agreed with the "uniform[ ]" interpretation "that
the court has discretion to remand an entire case, including federal

claims, if it determines that questions of state law predominate." 3 90

Judge Marovich, also of the Northern District of Illinois, has remanded a case that included a claim asserting a violation of the due

process clause of the United States Constitution. 391 He concluded

that § 1441(c) "gives discretion ... to remand the whole case, both
' ' 39
state and federal claims, when matters of state law predominate. 2

Moreover, in addition to these judges who have asserted and exercised a power to remand federal question cases under § 1441(c), at
least one district judge has asserted such a power but declined to exercise it in the circumstances of the case.3 93
385. Id Judge Hobbs noted that state court resolution was particularly appropriate
in Alexander because the plaintiff sought to "prevail on an exception to the general
rule in Alabama that punitive damages are not recoverable for breach of contract."
Id
386. Id.
387. Moralez v. Meat Cutters Local 539, 778 F. Supp. 368, 370 (E.D. Mich. 1991)
(citing Alexander v. Goldome Credit Corp., 772 F. Supp. 1217 (M.D. Ala. 1991);
Moore v. DeBiase, 766 F. Supp. 1311 (D.NJ. 1991); Holland v. World Omni Leasing,
Inc., 764 F. Supp. 1442 (N.D. Ala. 1991); and Martin v. Drummond Coal Co., 756 F.
Supp. 524 (N.D. Ala. 1991)).
388. Moralez, 778 F. Supp. at 370 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
389. Neal v. Fairman, No. 92-C6785, 1992 WL 370454 at *3 (N.D. I11.December 2,
1992).
390. Id. at *2.
391. Libertyville Community High Sch. Dist. 128 v. North Chicago Unit Sch. Dist.
187, No. 93-C2464, 1993 WL 222488, at *2 (N.D. I11.June 22, 1993).
392. Id.
393. Dobiecki v. Chicago Osteopathic Hosps. & Medical Ctrs., No. 93-C1595, 1993
WL 266579, at *6 (N.D. Ill. July 15, 1993) (Hart, J.) ("When state law would
predominate, the entire case can be remanded to the state court."). The judge exercised his discretion in favor of keeping the entire case in federal court because the
plaintiff was considering amending his complaint to assert another federal claim and
because the plaintiff's brother had a similar action pending before the court. Similarly, in Roe v. Little Co. of Mary Hospital, 800 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. I11.1992), Judge
Parsons appeared to read § 1441(c) to permit remand of the entire case where jurisdiction was based on § 1331. Id. at 626. He found § 1441(c) inapplicable, however,
because jurisdiction was based not on § 1331 but on the Congressional charter of the
Red Cross. Id.; see also 36 U.S.C. § 2 (1988) (charter provision). The Supreme Court
has interpreted the Congressional charter of the Red Cross as an independent jurisdictional grant. American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465, 2471-72 (1992); see
also Padilla v. City of Saginaw, 867 F. Supp. 1309, 1315 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (citing
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On the other hand, several district judges have concluded that they
lack the power to remand federal question cases despite the 1990
amendments to § 1441(c). All of these judges rely on Buchner v.
FDIC.394 In Buchner, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
stated that "federal question jurisdiction is not discretionary with the
district court" 395 and that a district court "has no discretionary authority" to "remand a federal cause of action to state court. ' 3 96 As a resuit, district judges in the Fifth Circuit have concluded that they lack
power to remand federal question cases.3 7 In addition, in Kabealo v.
Davis,3 98 Judge Graham of the Southern District of Ohio relied on
Buchner in holding that § 1441(c) "does not authorize the remand of
claims arising under federal law which are properly removed and
which fall within the district court's subject matter jurisdiction. '399 In
light of Buchner, Judge Graham concluded that "[t]he word 'matters'
[in § 1441(c)] is reasonably construed as meaning 'claims.' ,14o
While the broad language in Buchner certainly supports the decision in Kabealo (and while it is certainly reasonable for district judges
within the Fifth Circuit to rely on that broad language), Buchner did
not analyze the meaning of "matters" in § 1441(c) or so much as mention any of the cases interpreting the amended § 1441(c) to permit
remand of the entire case. Instead, because the removed action was
against the FDIC, and Congress has declared that "all suits of a civil
nature ...

to which the [FDIC], in any capacity, isa party shall be

deemed to arise under the laws of the United States,''4 1 the Buchner
court concluded that "all of the component claims are conclusively
deemed to have arisen under federal law" and § 1441(c)'s remand
provision is inapplicable. 4' z Thus, neither Buchner nor the cases relying on it significantly undermines those decisions holding that the
Moralez v. Meat Cutters Local 539, 778 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Mich. 1991), and conclud-

ing that while § 1441(c) does not apply to cases where the state and federal claims
derive from a common nucleus of operative fact, remand of the entire case is proper
when the case truly involves separate and independent claims).
394. 981 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1993).

395. Id. at 820.
396. Id. at 817.
397. See, e.g., Marcel v. Hall-Houston Oil Co., 1994 WL 605921, at *1 (E.D. La.
Nov. 3, 1994); Stephens v. LJ Partners, 852 F. Supp. 597, 600 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
398. 829 F. Supp. 923 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
399. Id. at 926.
400. Id. Kabealo also relied on the description of § 1441(c) in Carnegie-Mellon
University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988), as permitting remand of a "removed statelaw claim." Kabealo, 829 F. Supp. at 926 (quoting Cohilo. Kabealo ignores, however,
that Cohill was decided prior to the 1990 amendment of § 1441(c).
401. 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(A) (1988). There is an exception where the FDIC is

acting as a receiver of a state insured institution by the exclusive appointment of state
authorities. 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(D) (1988).
402. Buchner v. FDIC, 981 F.2d 816, 819 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Spring Garden
Assocs. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 26 F.3d 412, 415-17 (3d Cir. 1994) (deeming civil

action in which RTC is a party to arise under federal law and to be removable in its
entirety).
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amended § 1441(c) permits the remand of entire cases, including federal question claims. 4 3
B.

An Analysis of the Amended Remand Clause of Section 1441(c)

Are the federal district judges who believe that they possess the
4a
power to remand federal question cases in their entirety correct?
Or are the commentators, who are
nearly unanimous that the district
4 5
judges lack such power, correct? 0
There is certainly textual support for the judges' reading of the remand clause of the statute.'
To interpret "matters" as limited to
state law claims would render the phrase "in which State law predominates" meaningless because State law predominates in every state law
claim. 4°7 If Congress intended simply to provide the district courts
with discretion to remand state law claims, it could have left the remand clause unchanged, thus continuing to authorize the remand of
only those matters not within the district court's original jurisdiction.
It might be thought that the amendment to the remand power was
designed to refer to the discretionary power to remand supplemental
state law claims. Indeed, a letter from Larry Kramer to Judge Weiss
contained in the legislative history of the 1990 amendments suggests
that § 1441(c) should contain a cross-reference to § 1367(c), the provision codifying the discretion to decline to exercise supplemental juris403. The Buchner court may well have been hampered by poor briefing of the issue
by Buchner's counsel. The court specifically criticized that brief for making "patently
inaccurate assertions," such as "Plaintiffs' last Amended Petition does not state any
claims arising under federal law but seeks relief for violation of the National Bank
Act." Buchner,981 F.2d at 819 n.10. Judge Acker certainly has not been convinced to
change his mind. See, e.g., Burnett v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 861 F. Supp. 1036,
1039 (N.D. Ala. 1994) (adhering to his prior decisions).
404. See supra part IV.A.
405. See supra note 32 (listing commentators).
406. Siegel, supra note 7, at 78 ("If 'matters' is construed to include all 'claims',
then a combination of claims in which a federal claim is one but in which state law is
found to 'predominate' may justify a remand of the whole case."); Mengler et al.,
supra note 32, at 20 ("If courts construe the term 'matters' as synonymous with constitutional cases or controversies, then the language authorizes the district court to remand an entire case or controversy-including the federal question claim-to the
state court if the case or controversy is one in which state law issues predominate.");
cf Teply & Whitten, supra note 7, at 156 (noting that there is "only the barest justification under the statutory language" for remand of the entire case). The discussion
here is limited to the remand clause. I address later whether any of these decisions
correctly interpret the removal clause of the statute. See infra notes 437-40 and accompanying text.
407. Mengler et al., supra note 32, at 21 ("If, instead, courts construe the term 'matters' to mean discrete claims to relief... presumably every state 'matter' is necessarily
one in which state law predominates."). Thus, Teply and Whitten's criticism that the
word "matters" did not include entire cases before the 1990 amendment and therefore does not after the amendment is unpersuasive-the phrase "in which State law
predominates" was not in the statute prior to the 1990 amendment. Teply & Whitten,
supra note 7, at 156 n.380.
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diction.40 8 At first blush, this makes sense because the language "in
which State law predominates" appears both in Gibbs and in § 1367(c)
as grounds for the decline of supplemental jurisdiction. In that context, it is clear that the federal court only has discretion to dismiss the
supplemental claim, not the federal claim.40 9 Treating cases directly
filed in federal court and those removed to federal court in a parallel
manner has an attractive symmetry, and our view of removal jurisdiction since the decision in Tennessee v. Union & Planters'Bank410 has
largely been one of such symmetry.
Closer analysis, however, makes this symmetry impossible on a textual level. In the direct-filed context, both Gibbs and § 1367(c) permit
the federal court to decline to exercise jurisdiction over the state law
claims if state law predominates in the case as a whole. In that context, one looks to the whole to test for predominance and, if the test is
satisfied, remands a part of the whole. Thus, the entity that is tested

for predominance of state law is a superset of the entity that is not
adjudicated if the test is met.
Under § 1441(c), however, "matters" is both the entity to be tested
and the entity to be remanded. The text does not support reading

"matters" to refer to the case as a whole in order to determine predominance and simultaneously reading "matters" to refer only to the
state law claims in order to determine the scope of the remand. 411 To
408. Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act and Civil Reform Act:
Hearing on H.R. 5381 and 3898, Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 720 (1990) (letter dated Aug. 21, 1990 from Larry Kramer, Visiting
Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School); see also Oakley, supra note
32, at 750 (noting that "matters" presumably means "claims"); Rosenberg et al., supra
note 32, at 35 ("Would it have been better to provide that, when removable claims
are joined with non-removable claims as to which there would be supplemental competence under § 1367(a), the entire case may be removed but that the district court
may remand in the circumstances specified in § 1367(c)?").
Although the general notion from Gibbs of discretionary power to decline supplemental jurisdiction is codified in § 1367(c), the statute "channels the application of the
underlying values to a greater degree than the Gibbs regime." Executive Software
North Am. v. United States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 24 F.3d 1545, 1556
(9th Cir. 1994).
409. The statute empowers courts to "decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction," not to decline to exercise jurisdiction over the case. 28 U.S.C. 1367(c) (Supp. V
1993); see, e.g., Joan Steinman, Reverse Removal, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 1029, 1102 (1993)
(stating that the "discretion not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction does not apply
to claims within federal question or diversity jurisdiction").
410. 152 U.S. 454 (1894); see also supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text (discussing the interpretation of the Removal Act of 1887 in Union & Planters' Bank).
411. "A term appearing in several places in a statutory text is generally read the
same way each time it appears. We have even stronger cause to construe a single
formulation . . . the same way each time it is called into play." Ratzlaf v. United
States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 660 (1994) (citation omitted). "[T]o give a single term two
different and inconsistent meanings ... for a single occurrence is an offense so unlikely that no common prohibition has ever been thought necessary to guard against
it." BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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read the statute that way, in effect, would rewrite it to provide that the
district court "may remand all state law claims if state law predominates in the action as a whole."
It is possible, of course, to read the statute as if it had been written
this way and conclude that Congress was simply sloppy.4 12 The difficulty with doing so is that the effect of the amendment would be to
narrow the district court's authority to remand. Prior to the amendment, the district court had the discretion to remand all matters not
within its original jurisdiction. This discretion was in no way limited
to cases in which state law predominated. It is unlikely that Congress,
at the same time that it eliminated separate claim removal for diversity cases,
narrowed the power of district courts to remand state law
4 13
claims.

Moreover, the codification of supplemental jurisdiction was contained in the very same act as the amendment to § 1441(c).414 There is
no doubt that supplemental jurisdiction is available in removed cases
as well as in direct-filed cases. 415 Therefore, district courts "may de412. Congress certainly was sloppy. As originally enacted, the remand clause provided that the district court, "in its discretion, may may [sic] remand all matters in
which State law predominates." Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L No. 101650, § 312, 104 Stat. 5089, 5114. This was corrected the next year. Act of Dec. 9, 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-198, § 4, 105 Stat. 1623. Sloppiness is not surprising, considering that
the Act was the last public act by the 101st Congress and was passed after midnight,
after enactment of the massive budget act. Oakley, supra note 32, at 737 n.2.
Similar problems beset the 1887 Act, which had to be corrected in 1888:
Parts of the act ... are obscure and very ambiguous; in several places its
language is extremely confused .... Indeed, as the act was first officially
promulgated, the profession was astonished to find that it so abounded in
errors of grammar and orthography as to be, in places, absolutely
unintelligible.
John F. Dillon, Removal of Causes § 35 (5th ed. 1889).
It is lamentably true... that it is obscure and ambiguous; that the unjustifiable practice of changing laws so momentous as these, in the turmoil, impatience, partisanship, and confusion incident to the closing hours of a
Congressional term, is for every reason deplorable.
Emory Speer, Removal of Causes 9, 10 (1888), quoted in Note, The Constitutionality
of FederalRemoval Jurisdictionover Separable ControversiesInvolving Citizens of the
Same State, 94 U. Pa. L. Rev. 239, 240 n.11 (1946).
413. Some, however, appear to read the statute this way. 14A Wright & Miller,
supra note 32, § 3724, at 122 (Supp. 1994) ("It is unclear what policy interests are
served by narrowing a district court's power to remand unrelated claims ....");see
also Steinman, supra note 7, at 321 n.53 (stating that courts possess discretion to remand under § 1441(c) "only when state law predominates"). Steinman, however,
continues to believe that Cohill was wrongly decided. l at 319; see also Steinman,
supra note 33, at 923 (criticizing the reasoning in Cohill).
414. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 310(a), 104 Stat.
5089, 5113 (enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. V 1993)); see also id. § 312 (amending
§ 1441(c) (Supp. V 1993)).
415. Karen N. Moore, The Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute" An Important But
ControversialSupplement to Federal Jurisdiction,41 Emory L.J. 31, 57 (1992); Steinman, supra note 7, at 308-10. Some seek to raise doubts by observing that the supplemental jurisdiction statute does not specifically mention removed cases and that a
prior draft of the statute did. Michael D. Moberly et al., Penetratingthe Thicket: Pen-
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cline to exercise [supplemental] jurisdiction" in any of the circumstances listed in § 1367(c) in removed cases as well as in direct-filed
cases.4 16 The difference is that when a court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in direct-filed cases, it dismisses the supplemental claims without prejudice, whereas when a court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction in a removed case, it may (and usually does)
remand the supplemental claims. Indeed, even Joan Steinman, a leading and persistent critic of Cohill, agrees that if Cohill is followed, a
court "can remand some or all of the claims that it declines to
'
hear."417
Thus, under Cohill, there was no need to provide for the
discretionary remand of state law claims if state law predominated in
the action as a whole in § 1441(c) because that power was provided
for in § 1367(c). Indeed, to construe the remand power in § 1441(c) as
limited to state law claims makes the remand provision of § 1441(c)
redundant of § 1367(c).
Perhaps, then, amended § 1441(c) should be read as if Larry
Kramer's suggestion has been accepted.418 That is, perhaps § 1441(c)
should be read as if it simply contained a cross reference to § 1367(c)
to allay any fears that the discretionary power to decline supplemental
jurisdiction in § 1367(c) might have been read as inapplicable to cases
removed under § 1441(c). Under this reading, Congress' choice of
language was ham-fisted, but there would be beautiful symmetry between direct-filed cases and removed cases.
dent Party Removal Jurisdictionin the Ninth Circuit, 30 Idaho L. Rev. 1, 29-30 (1993-

94); Wolf, supra note 288, at 35. The earlier draft provided for supplemental jurisdiction in any civil action of which the district courts have "original jurisdiction, including an action removed from a state court." McLaughlin, supra note 15, at 55; Wolf,
supra note 288, at 57. Thus, the earlier draft treated removal jurisdiction as a subset
of original jurisdiction. Freeman v. Bee Mach. Co. 448, 452 (1943) ("[T]he jurisdic-

tion exercized on removal is original not appellate."); cf. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 349-50 (1816) (treating Supreme Court review of state court
judgments as a removal mechanism). Viewed in this light, the phrase "including an
action removed from a state court" was unnecessary.

The real difficulty with the supplemental jurisdiction statute's failure to address
removed cases directly is whether and how the limitations on the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in § 1367(b) apply to removed cases. McLaughlin, supra note 15,
at 949-52, 992; Moore, supra, at 57.
416. Steinman, supra note 7, at 318.

417. Id. at 320. In this regard, she is surely correct. While Cohill itself involved a
case where all federal claims were eliminated and only state claims remained, there is

no reason to treat discretionary refusals to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under
§ 1367(c)(3) (where only state claims remain) differently than discretionary refusals to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(1), (2), and (4). See Carnegie-Mel-

lon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351 (1988) ("[Tjhe animating principle behind
the pendent jurisdiction doctrine supports giving a district court discretion to remand

when the exercise of pendent jurisdiction is inappropriate."). Steinman, however,
would insist that district courts declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in removed cases dismiss rather than remand because, in her view, Cohill was wrongly
decided. Steinman, supra note 7, at 319-20.
418. See supra note 408 and accompanying text.
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Such an interpretive revision of the remand provision of § 1441(c)
might be justified if there were important reasons, other than aesthetic, for symmetry between direct-filed and removed cases. However, there are none. Instead, there is good reason to treat direct-filed
and removed cases differently, particularly where state law predominates in the case as a whole.
If a plaintiff files directly in federal court a case that contains a federal claim but in which state law predominates, the district court
under § 1367(c) may dismiss the supplemental state claims without
prejudice.419 The result is to force the plaintiff to make a choice between a federal forum for the federal claim and the economy of a
single forum for all claims. If a federal forum for the federal claim is
sufficiently important, the plaintiff can continue to pursue the federal
claim in federal court and file the state claims in state court. Alternatively, if the economy of a single forum for all claims is more important to the plaintiff, the plaintiff can voluntarily dismiss the federal
claim and refile the entire action in state court. Section 1367(d) is
designed to facilitate the latter choice by tolling the statute of limitations on any claim that is voluntarily dismissed upon the court's decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.4 m
Consider the same case-one that contains a federal claim but in
which state law predominates-filed as an initial matter in state court
but removed to federal court. If the federal district court concludes
that state law predominates in the case as a whole and treats the case
the same as a direct-filed case, the court would remand the state
claims but retain the federal claim. The plaintiff would not then be
faced with a choice between a federal forum and judicial economy,
but would be forced to either abandon the federal claim or litigate in
both state and federal court.421 In essence, the plaintiff has already
419. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (Supp. V 1993).
420. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (Supp. V 1993). Suppose the plaintiff acts as invited by

§ 1367(d) by voluntarily dismissing the federal claim and refiling in state court. Suppose further that the defendant then removes pursuant to § 1441(a). Surely the federal district court should be able to remand the entire case to implement both its
decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction and the Congressional policy embodied

in § 1367(d). Thus, just as supplemental jurisdiction is necessary to avoid discouraging a plaintiff from choosing a federal forum for a federal claim, the power to remand
an entire federal question case is necessary to avoid discouraging a plaintiff from raising a federal claim in a case in which state law predominates. Cf. supra note 292 and
accompanying text (discussing the importance of protecting a plaintiff's statutory
right to choose, and keep, a state forum for a FELA claim).
421. It might be thought that the ability of plaintiffs to voluntarily dismiss their
federal claims and refile them in state court makes it unnecessary for federal courts to
have the power to remand the entire case including the federal claim. This would
only be true if, when the plaintiff refiled in state court, the defendant would be barred

from removing a second time. Certainly, if the plaintiff filed a new action in state
court, separate from the remanded one, the new action would be removable. But

even if the plaintiff raised the federal claim by amendment in the remanded action, it
would seem that the defendant could remove a second time.
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made the choice between a federal forum and judicial economy and
opted for judicial economy. Thus, the direct-filed and removal situations are not the same, and attempting to treat them in the same way
is inappropriate. 2 2 If the plaintiff would have been forced to choose
between a federal forum for the federal claim and judicial economy if
the plaintiff filed directly in federal court, the entire case-including
the federal claim-should be remanded if the case is filed in state
court and removed to federal court.
A recent case illustrates that this is not a fanciful concern. In Padilla v. City of Saginaw,4' the personal representative of a decedent's
estate sued the City of Saginaw and two police officers in state court,
alleging that a police officer shot and killed the mentally disabled decedent while he was naked and unarmed. The complaint raised various state law claims, including assault and battery, tortious violation
of duties, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of
Certainly, there is no flat prohibition on subsequent removal petitions. Instead, the
longstanding, pre-Cohill rule has been that a defendant may not remove a second
time on the same grounds as the first removal, but may remove a second time on new
grounds. Fritzlen v. Boatmen's Bank, 212 U.S. 364, 372-74 (1909); Powers v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 169 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1898); St. Paul & C. Ry. v. McLean, 108 U.S. 212,
217 (1883); see generally 1A Moore & Ringle, supra note 224, § 0.169[3] (discussing
rules pertaining to second petition for removal). "These cases stand for the proposition that a defendant who fails in an attempt to remove on the initial pleadings can
file a removal petition when subsequent pleadings or events reveal a new and different
ground for removal." Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Santiago Plaza, 598 F.2d 634, 636
(1st Cir. 1979).
This general rule need not be applied woodenly to bar subsequent removals. See,
e.g., Doe v. American Red Cross, 14 F.3d 196, 203 (3d Cir. 1993) (permitting second
removal, based on same grounds, after intervening Supreme Court decision involving
same defendant); Sawyer v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 847 F. Supp. 96, 101 (N.D.
Ill. 1994) (finding that defendant incorrectly removed to Central District of Illinois
and permitting subsequent removal to correct district, the Northern District of Illinois). A defendant who seeks to remove a second time after a plaintiff amends to
restore a voluntarily dismissed federal claim, while relying on the same ground as the
first removal, is relying on a previously successful basis for removal, not trying a second bite at the same removal apple.
The Supreme Court in Cohill observed that a district court has discretion to keep
the supplemental claims even after a voluntary dismissal of the federal claims, if the
plaintiff has engaged in manipulative tactics. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484
U.S. 343, 357 (1988). Thus, if the district court suspects this ploy in advance, it can
simply deny remand. If the court does not foresee that a plaintiff might seek to reinstate its federal claims upon remand, the defendant should not be foreclosed from
removing again. The contrary rule would be too open to easy manipulation: any
plaintiff who wanted to litigate a federal claim in state court could simply amend her
complaint to drop the federal claim, thereby hoping to prompt a remand, and then
bar defendants from a second removal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (permitting unilateral
amendment of a complaint before answer); Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c) (applying rules to
removed actions).
422. Thus, the decision in Bodenner v. Graves, 828 F. Supp. 516 (W.D. Mich. 1993),
which relies on the § 1441(c) decisions, discussed above, to dismiss a direct-filed case
in its entirety-including a federal RICO claim-is clearly wrong. See supra notes
342-93 and accompanying text (discussing decisions under § 1441(c)).
423. 867 F. Supp. 1309 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
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state civil rights. In addition, the complaint raised claims for violation
of federal civil rights.424 The defendants removed and plaintiff sought
remand.' z Judge Cleland concluded that because the case was properly removed under §§ 1441(a) and (b), remand of the entire cases
under § 1441(c) was unavailable. 4 6 Instead of remanding the entire
case, Judge Cleland remanded all of the state claims, noting that
"Plaintiff's counsel intimated at oral argument that Plaintiff might
prefer to abandon her federal claims rather than pursue them in federal court."'42 7 The result is remarkable: state officials were not only
permitted to remove from their home court to the federal court, but,
by doing so in a case in which state law predominated, evidently coerced the plaintiff into abandoning the federal claim against them.
It might be thought that the direct-fied and removed cases are parallel and that the difference is that in the direct-filed case the plaintiff
is given the choice between a federal forum and judicial economy
while in the removal situation it is the defendant who is given the
choice between a federal forum and judicial economy. That is, if the
court on removal were to remand the state claims and retain the federal claims and the defendant preferred judicial economy to a federal
forum, the defendant could seek remand of the federal claim as well.
Even if there were no statutory authority to do so, it seems unlikely
that a court would deny a request to remand if all parties agreed, particularly because the same result is readily achieved by dismissal and
refiling.41
Plaintiffs and defendants, however, are not similarly situated with
regard to the choice between a federal forum and judicial economy.
Structurally, a decision by a plaintiff to seek a federal forum for a
federal claim is likely based on a belief that the federal forum will be
424. Id at 1311.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 1312-14. The court was especially critical of Moore for relying on
§ 1441(c) in a case where the state and federal claims share a common nucleus of
operative fact. Id at 1314. On the other hand, the court agreed that, in cases removed
under § 1441(c), remand of the entire case was permissible. Id. at 1315 (citing Moralez
v. Meat Cutters Local 539, 778 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Mich. 1991)). Finally, the court
declined to "enter th[e] legal thicket" regarding whether § 1367(c) authorizes a court
to remand federal claims along with supplemental claims. Id. at 1315 n.4 (citing Administaff, Inc. v. Kaster, 799 F. Supp. 685 (W.D. Tex. 1992); Bodenner v. Graves, 828
F. Supp. 516 (W.D. Mich. 1993); and Kabealo v. Davis, 829 F. Supp. 923 (S.D. Ohio
1993)). In my view, Padilla illustrates the importance of distinguishing between direct-filed cases such as Bodenner-as to which under § 1367(c) a court cannot dismiss
a federal claim-and removed cases such as Administaff and Padilla-asto which
§ 1441(c) can be used by analogy to remand entire federal question cases.
427. Padilla,867 F. Supp. at 1316 n.5. While the basis for the remand of the state
claims was the risk of jury confusion, it also appears that state law predominated in
the case.
428. See Sellick Equip., Inc. v. Boutte, 114 S. Ct. 1399, 1399 (1994) (denying certiorari to an unreported decision of the Fifth Circuit in a case where the district court
apparently remanded based on the consent of the parties).
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more protective of that federal claim, while a plaintiff who chooses a
state forum for a federal claim must not be significantly motivated by
fear of state court hostility to the federal claim. 429 Defendants, who
may not remove on the basis of a federal defense, must be motivated
by considerations other than fear of state court hostility to a federal
claim in seeking a federal forum. 430 For example, a defendant may be
attracted by the greater availability of summary judgment in federal
court.431 Similarly, a defendant may seek the federal court's requirement of jury unanimity.432 Worse, if the case cannot be decided on
motion, a defendant may simply want to impose the higher costs usually associated with federal court litigation on an adversary less able to
pay or one represented
by an attorney unfamiliar with and uncomfort433
able in federal court.
Moreover, as a general matter, plaintiffs and defendants differ in
their litigation resources and therefore in their need for a single forum. Plaintiffs are more likely than defendants to feel the need to

429. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, Toward ProceduralParity in Constitutional Litiga-

tion, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 725 (1981) (arguing that federal courts are better fora

for constitutional claims due largely to procedural advantages); Burt Neubome, The
Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1977) (arguing that federal fora are preferred
by litigators for adjudication of constitutional rights).
430. Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts, A.L.I.
at 91 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1967) ("The number of cases in which defendant removed because he feared that a state court would give an over-generous interpretation to plaintiff's claim must be very small indeed."); see also Berman, supra note 32,
at 715 n.185 ("That defendants are sometimes motivated to remove action for tactical
reasons unconnected to an interest in litigating in a federal forum is well recognized."). Indeed, it has long been questioned whether defendants should be able to
remove on the basis of the plaintiff's federal claim at all. Herbert Wechsler, Federal
Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 Law & Contemp. Probs. 216,
233-34 (1948).
431. Compare Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324-25 (1986) (liberalizing
federal summary judgment standards); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248-50 (1986) (same); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 590-95 (1986) (same) with, e.g., Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807
S.W.2d 476, 481 (Ky. 1991) (rejecting Celotex and Anderson); Parker v. Haller, 751
P.2d 372, 376-77 (Wyo. 1988) (rejecting Anderson); Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W. 2d 551,
555 (Tex. 1989) (rejecting Anderson); Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So. 2d 686, 688-89 (Ala.
1989) (rejecting Celotex, Anderson, and Matsushita). See generally D. Michael Risinger, Another Step in the Counter-Revolution: A Summary Judgment on the Supreme
Court'sNew Approach to Summary Judgment, 54 Brook. L. Rev. 35 (1988) (criticizing
the Supreme Court's new approach); cf. Janet C. Alexander, Judge's Self-Interest and
ProceduralRules: Comment in Macey, 23 J. Legal Stud. 647, 664 n.69 (1994) ("Some
employers routinely remove employment discrimination cases filed in state courts to
federal court because it is easier to win summary judgment motions brought before
federal judges.") (citing Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, Preliminary Report
Discussion Draft 116 n.11 (July, 1992)).
432. Fed. R. Civ. P. 48.
433. In an adversary system, it must be rare for a defendant to remove a federal
claim solely for the greater expertise of federal judges in federal law. An advocate
seeks the best result for the client, not the most expert decision.

1995]

SECTION 1441(C)

1175

avoid litigation in multiple forums. 434 Thus, while it may be difficult
for a plaintiff to choose between a federal forum for the federal claim
and judicial economy, a defendant may view the choice as a win-win
solution-not only does the defendant get a federal forum for the federal claim, but also he forces the plaintiff to litigate in two different
forums. This disparity in litigation resources between plaintiffs and
defendants is especially dramatic in removed cases. The majority of

cases that get removed are those filed by individuals against
corporations. 435
Therefore, there is good reason to treat removed cases differently
than direct-filed cases and permit district courts to remand an entire
case where state law predominates.43 6 Accordingly, the language of
§ 1441(c) should not be revised through interpretation to achieve sym-

metry between direct-filed and removed cases.
C. Applying the Remand Clause of Section 1441(c) to Cases
Removed Under Section 1441 (a)

One might object that the above rationalization of the amended remand provision of § 1441(c) and the recent decisions under it go too
far, for there is nothing in the analysis above that is limited to cases
removed under § 1441(c). Thus, if this analysis is correct, district
courts should have the discretion to remand the entire case when state
law predominates, even if the case contains no separate and independent claim. Indeed, recent decisions remanding the entire case have
been criticized for improperly concluding that there were separate and
independent claims in the first place.43 7

434. Cf. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'y Rev. 95, 108-09 (1974) ("[T]he great bulk of
litigation" is brought by institutional "repeat players" against individual "one-shot"
defendants.). While this may be true of the routine collection, eviction, and enforcement cases that Galanter discusses, such cases are rarely removable or removed.
435. Neal Miller, An EmpiricalStudy of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under
Diversity and FederalQuestion Jurisdiction,41 Am. U. L Rev. 369,391 (1992) ("[Tlhe
typical removal case involved an in-state individual plaintiff suing an out-of-state corporation."); see also Berman, supra note 32, at 714 n.183 (noting a "likely nonrandom
distribution of persons who will be plaintiffs and defendants" in federal question cases
against state officials); Thomas B. Marvell, The Rationalesfor FederalQuestion Jurisdiction: An Empirical Examination of Student Rights Litigation, 1984 Wis. L Rev.
1315 (discussing students' rights litigation against educational institutions).
436. This analysis is similar to that offered by Judge Posner, who argues that critics
of the current doctrine, which permits plaintiffs to invoke federal jurisdiction for federal claims but prevents defendants from invoking federal jurisdiction for federal defenses, overlook that defendants may well benefit from the cost and delay brought
about by the remand of a case removed on the basis of a weak federal defense, while
plaintiffs suffer if they invoke federal jurisdiction only to have to start again in state
court. Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 190-91 (1985).
437. Field et al., supra note 32, at 65 (observing that "claims [in Goldome] seem too
related to be 'separate and independent' "); see also Williams v. Huron Valley Sch.
Dist., 858 F. Supp. 97, 100 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (criticizing Martin and Holland);Teply &
Whitten, supra note 7, at 156 (criticizing Neal and Moore for applying § 1441(c) to
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There is little doubt that most of these recent decisions have not

involved separate and independent claims, at least after Cohill, which
teaches that pendent claims are not separate and independent. Probably the best known example is Moore v. DeBiase,4 38 where the court

explicitly stated that "the factual allegations in the federal and state
law claims are related and are largely the same."439 Surely such claims
are not separate and independent. Although not all of the opinions
contain a sufficient description of the claims involved to be fully confident regarding the factual relationship of the claims, only one case
appears to have perhaps involved truly separate and independent
claims.440
Although most, if not all, of these decisions were wrong in their
application of the removal provision of § 1441(c) as interpreted in
Cohill, Cohill also teaches that it is proper to rely on § 1441(c)'s remand clause by analogy for cases that are not removed under
§ 1441(c). 41 Thus, these courts should not have attempted to shoehorn their cases into the removal provision of § 1441(c) to justify remand of the entire case, but instead should simply have invoked
Cohill to use the amended remand authority of § 1441(c) by analogy.' 2 One court has done exactly this.
cases that were removed under 1441(a) and (b)); 14A Wright & Miller, supra note 32,
§ 3724, at 124-25 (Supp. 1994) (criticizing Moore for applying § 1441(c) to a case removed under § 1441(a)).
438. 766 F. Supp. 1311 (D.N.J. 1991).
439. Id. at 1321 n.17.
440. In Moralez v. Meat Cutters Local 539, 778 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Mich. 1991), an
unrepresented plaintiff raised, among other claims, a claim for breach of a collective
bargaining agreement against a union and a claim for battery against certain individuals. Id. at 369. As far as can be told from the opinion, these claims arose from "factual
scenario[s]" that were "separate and distinct," involving "[dJifferent parties [and]
dates." Id. at 370; see also Padilla v. City of Saginaw, 867 F. Supp. 1309, 1315 (E.D.
Mich. 1994) (asserting that the claims in Moralez are "truly separate and independent"); cf. Administaff, Inc. v. Kaster, 799 F. Supp. 685, 689 n.9 (W.D. Tex. 1992)
(treating Moralez and Goldome as involving separate and independent claims); Georgene M. Vairo, Selected Forum Selection Developments: A Review of the 1988 and
1990 Statutory Changes in Diversity and Venue; the New Supplemental Jurisdiction
Statute; and Personal Jurisdiction and Forum non Conveniens Cases, C915 ALI-ABA
1261, 1226 (1994) (same).
441. See supra note 274 and accompanying text. Teply and Whitten contend that
the "remand provision of 1441(c) was not designed to provide additional remand authority to the district courts in non-1441(c) cases," and that there is "no support in the
language or legislative history" for such an interpretation. Teply & Whitten, supra
note 7, at 156. The same, however, could have been said of § 1441(c) before its
amendment, yet the Supreme Court in Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S.
343 (1988), relied on § 1441(c) to justify remand in a case removed under § 1441 (a).
Id. at 354. In particular, Cohill permitted a remand not authorized by § 1447(c) over
a dissent complaining that cases "may be remanded only for reasons authorized by
statute." Id. at 358 (White, J., dissenting). The majority in Cohill found strong support for its conclusion in § 1441(c), even as it acknowledged that § 1441(c) was "not
directly applicable." Id. at 354.
442. Thus, there is no need to go as far as Mr. Berman suggests and posit a highly
controversial "broader principle that courts can effectively add to and subtract from
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In Administaff, Inc. v. Kaster,"3 the plaintiff was a staff leasing company that claimed that state officials improperly refused to consider it
an employer under the Texas Unemployment Compensation Act. It
sued in state court, alleging state law claims including violation of that
Act, breach of a settlement agreement, and interference with contractual relations. In addition, the plaintiff asserted a claim under § 1983,
alleging a denial of equal protection and due process.4 " The defendants removed and plaintiff sought remand, arguing that state law
predominated.
Although Judge Sparks "agree[d] with the underlying reasoning" in
the decisions remanding entire cases under § 1441(c)," 5-citing "the
difficulty and waste of splitting up federal and state law claims factually tied together"4 6 -he refused to remand under § 1441(c) because,
he concluded, § 1441(c) did not apply.' 7 The reason that § 1441(c)
was inapplicable was that "[a]ll of Plaintiff's claims are based on a
'common nucleus of operative fact.' "4"
Thus, under Gibbs, they
were within the court's pendent jurisdiction and, under Cohill, they
were not "separate and independent." 449 Judge Sparks nevertheless
remanded the entire case, relying on § 1441(c) by analogy, just as the
Supreme Court had done in Cohill:
The Court [in Cohill] also found support for a district court's discretion to remand in Section 1441(c), although it held that section did
not apply to cases involving pendent jurisdiction. Because Section
1441(c) [at that time] authorized remand of independently nonremovable claims, the Court stated that it "clearly manifests a belief
that when a court has discretionary jurisdiction over a removed
state-law claim and the court chooses not to exercise its jurisdiction,
remand is an appropriate alternative." Now that Section 1441(c)
authorizes remand of an entire case, and not just the pendent state
claims, it lends even stronger support to the authority of a court to
remand an entire case when a court could otherwise decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under Cohill or Section 1367(c)

statutory grants of jurisdiction in the interests of judicial economy, fairness, convenience, and comity." Berman, supra note 32, at 725; see also David L Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 544 (1985) (arguing that in determinations
of the reach of federal jurisdiction, broad discretion should be given to federal
courts).
443. 799 F. Supp. 685 (W.D. Tex. 1992).
444. Id at 686.
445. Id at 689 n.9.
446. Id
447. Id at 687-88; see also Clark v. Milam, 813 F. Supp. 431, 434 n.3 (S.D. W. Va.
1993) (holding that remand under § 1441(c) is inappropriate where no separate and
independent claim exists).
448. Administaff, 799 F. Supp. at 688 (citation omitted).
449. Id at 687-88.

1178

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

where, as in this case, state law claims predominate and novel issues
of state law are involved.450
Judge Sparks also relied on abstention under Railroad Commission
v. Pullman Co.45 to justify the remand, reasoning that resolution of
the difficult state law claims could make a federal constitutional decision unnecessary. 452 While Judge Sparks was the first to rely explicitly
on Pullman abstention in addition to § 1441(c) for his remand order, it
is striking how many of the decisions remanding entire cases under
§ 1441(c) raise concerns similar to those of Pullman. For example, the
plaintiff in Neal v. Fairman 53 alleged federal constitutional violations
as well as violations of various administrative regulations of the Illinois Department of Corrections.454 In ordering remand of the entire
case, Judge Alesia echoed Pullman without citing it, observing that
the state regulations may provide greater protection than required by
federal due process, thus enabling "the state court ...

to decide the

case without reaching the merits of the federal claim. '' 45 5 Similarly, in
Libertyville Community High School District 128 v. North Chicago
Unit School District 187,456 several school districts brought suit in
state court against another school district seeking to block the defendant school district from dissolving. Apparently seeking to avoid having to absorb the students from the dissolving district, they claimed
that the statutory scheme for dissolution violated their rights under
the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution and the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Illinois Constitution.457
Judge Marovich remanded the entire case, reasoning not only that
§ 1441(c) "gives discretion to the court to remand the whole case,
both state and federal claims, when matters of state law
450. Id. at 689 (footnotes and citations omitted); cf. Willams v. Huron Valley Sch.
Dist., 858 F. Supp. 97, 100-01 (E.D. Mich 1994) (criticizing Holland for using
§ 1441(c) in a case not removed under § 1441(c), reasoning that "federal courts already possess the power to remand a case involving supplemental claims under 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) and (2) as well as [Cohill]"). As Judge Sparks noted, one court
had remanded a case against various state agencies and officials that included a § 1983
claim but was based largely on state tort law, even before the 1990 amendment to
§ 1441(c). Administaff, 799 F. Supp. at 689 (citing Harrison v. Texas Dep't of Corrections, 694 F. Supp. 226, 228-29 (E.D. Tex. 1988)). Although Harrisonwas wrongly
decided because at the time § 1441(c) did not allow remand of properly removed
federal question cases, I am quite sympathetic to the result-the last people who
should be able to remove cases from state courts are state agencies and officials. See
supra note 330.
451. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). In Pullman, the Supreme Court held that federal courts
may stay a federal action presenting a federal constitutional question that might be
avoided by resolution of a difficult question of state law. Id. at 501-02.
452. Administaff, 799 F. Supp. at 690 (citing Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312
U.S. 496, 489-500 (1941)).
453. No. 92-C6785, 1992 WL 370454 (N.D. 11.Dec. 2, 1992).
454. Id. at *1.
455. Id. at *2.
456. No. 93-C2464, 1993 WL 222488 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 1993).
457. Id. at *1.

1995]

SECTION 1441(c)

1179

predominate,"458 but also that the state law claims were "novel,"
"unique," "far-reaching," and closely connected to state "public policy
45 9
concerns," while the federal claim was "clearly a secondary issue."
Finally, while Judge Lechner did not discuss the issue in Moore v.
DeBiase,4' ° the § 1983 claim in that case for alleged deprivation of
federal constitutional rights might have been effectively mooted if the
plaintiff recovered on any of his numerous state common law claims.
At first blush, this comparison to Pullman abstention seems to cast
a shadow on remand of the entire case because, when a district court
abstains in a direct-fied case under Pullman, it retains jurisdiction of
the federal claim in order to adjudicate it, if necessary, at the conclusion of the state court proceedings. Under England v. Louisiana State
Board of Medical Examiners,"I the plaintiff in such cases has a choice
between reserving the federal claim for the federal court or submitting
the federal claim to the state court. Moreover, the Court in England
stated that "the defendant also, by virtue of the removal jurisdiction
... has a right to litigate the federal question [in federal court and] ...
may protect his right.. . with the appropriate reservation.""
Despite this dictum, there is no reason to permit a defendant to
invoke the England reservation.463 The holding in England is troubling enough because it is difficult to square with the statutory requirement that federal courts give full faith and credit to state court
judgments.464 Assuming the legitimacy of Pullman abstention in the
first place, the ultimate justification of England is that a party seeking
to vindicate a federal claim may need the fact-finding capability of a
federal district court because Supreme Court review of a state court
judgment is insufficient to protect against fact-finding by a state court
hostile to the federal claim. 4" 5 With regard to the choice of a federal
458. Id at *2.
459. Id at *3.
460. 766 F. Supp. 1311 (D.NJ. 1991).
461. 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
462. Id. at 422 n.13. Wright and Miller take the position that all defendants, not
merely removing defendants, may invoke the England reservation. 17A Wright &
Miller, supra note 32, § 4243, at 76 n34.
463. Cf. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 n.17 (1980) (describing England solely
in terms of plaintiffs invoking federal jurisdiction).
464. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988); Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed., 465 U.S.
75, 87 (1984) (holding that petitioner's state court judgment has the same claim
preclusive effect in federal court that the judgment would have in the Ohio state
courts); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980) (asserting that state court adjudications of § 1983 actions must be given full faith and credit and are binding on the
federal courts). Under Migra and Allen, it would seem that the state court judgments
rendered after a Pullman abstention would be entitled to full faith and credit pursuant
to state preclusion law, but England prevents this result. Instructional Systems, Inc. v.
Computer Curriculum Corp., 35 F.3d 813,822 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 63 U.S.LW.
3628 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1995) (No. 904-1033).
465. In this regard, England is in accord with Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479
(1965), limited by Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963), overruled by Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991); and Townsend v.
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forum, plaintiffs and defendants are not similarly situated. When a
defendant invokes federal jurisdiction by removal of the plaintiff's
federal claim, the reason is certainly not concern that the state court
will be hostile to the federal claim.
Thus, in a removed case, if a court abstains under Pullman, the England reservation should not be permitted and the entire case should be
remanded.466 My point is not that Judge Sparks was correct to abstain
under Pullman in Administaff, and certainly not that the other judges
who remanded entire cases should have abstained under Pullman. To
the contrary, I merely assume (not endorse) the legitimacy of Pullman
abstention. My point is simply that the similarity in the § 1441(c)
cases to Pullman-which can result in retention of the federal claim
pursuant to an England reservation-does not undermine those decisions because an England reservation should not be available to defendants. Indeed, remand under § 1441(c) is more legitimate than
Pullman itself because it is rooted in an Act of Congress and is not
merely a judicially-created common law doctrine. 67
Those who have argued against interpreting § 1441(c) to permit remand of the entire case argue that such an interpretation undermines
the central purpose of the removal provision of § 1441(c)-preventing
plaintiffs from defeating removal by joinder of unrelated state
claims.468 This concern can be addressed, however, if courts exercising their discretion keep in mind both this central purpose of the removal provision of § 1441(c) and the reason for reading the remand
clause to permit remand of cases in their entirety.
Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), limited by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct 1715 (1992).

See generally David M. Liebenthal, A Dialogue on England: The England Case, Its
Effect on Abstention Doctrine, and Some Suggested Solutions, 18 W. Res. L. Rev. 157

(1966) (arguing for the necessity of flexibility in the interpretation of the abstention
doctrine if the ends of federal jurisdiction are to be attained).
466. Surely England reservation should not be permitted in order to preserve a

federal forum for a federal defense in light of the unavailability of federal defense
removal in the first place. But see InstructionalSystems, 35 F.3d at 820 (authorizing
England reservation for a federal defense).
467. See generally Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the

Limits of the JudicialFunction, 94 Yale L.J. 71 (1984) (criticizing abstention as illegitimate judicial lawmaking). Moreover, while there is a considerable tension between
Pullman abstention and the general rule that exhaustion of state remedies is not re-

quired in § 1983 actions, see Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 516
(1982); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 190-92 (1961), there is no need to be concerned

about imposing an exhaustion requirement on plaintiffs who choose to invoke state
remedies and file their actions in state court. Again, it is simply wrong to assume,
without analysis, that direct-filed and removed cases should be treated identically.
468. Mengler et al., supra note 32, at 20-21; Teply & Whitten, supra note 7, at 156
(arguing that because remand of both federal and state claims undermines the pur-

pose of 1441(c), the "better interpretation" is "that only nonremovable claim(s) can
be remanded"); cf. Berman, supra note 32, at 738 ("[T]he only effect of the change in

wording is to enable district courts to remand claims technically within their 'arising
under' jurisdiction.").
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Where a plaintiff joins an unrelated state claim to a federal claim
that would be removable if sued on alone, § 1441(c) permits removal
despite the joinder of the unrelated claim. Upon removal, the unrelated state claim should be remanded. Because the remanded claim is
not related to the federal claim, there is little (if any) cost to judicial
economy by splitting the case, a difficult constitutional question is
avoided, and the defendant's removal rights are preserved against manipulation. Even if the state claim predominates, a court should not
remand the whole case. To do so would not significantly further judicial economy and would permit the very manipulation that Congress
sought to prevent.
Where a plaintiff joins both a related state claim and an unrelated
state claim to a federal claim that would be removable if sued on
alone, § 1441(c) again permits removal despite the joinder of the unrelated claim. As in the previous example, the unrelated state claim
should be remanded. In deciding whether to remand the federal claim
and the related state claim, the court should consider whether the related state claim predominates over the federal claim. In thinking
about this question, the district judge should imagine the plaintiff filing the federal claim and the related state claim in federal court. If
the response would be to dismiss the state claim because state law
predominates, the entire case should be remanded. If the response to
such a direct filing would be to retain the state claim, it should likewise be retained on removal.
Finally, where a plaintiff joins a related state claim to a federal
claim that would be removable if sued on alone, the action is removable under § 1441(a), not § 1441(c). Nevertheless, by analogy to the
remand provision of § 1441(c), the district court should remand the
entire case if state law predominates such that it would dismiss the
state claim if the case were directly filed in federal court.
CONCLUSION

The basic removal statutes have been construed from the beginning
to permit removal from state court to federal court only of whole
cases and only when the whole case could have been brought in federal court. For just as long, the opportunity that this basic doctrine
gives to plaintiffs to use state joinder rules to prevent removal has also
been obvious.
For the most part, Congress has chosen simply to tolerate this possibility, finding it less troubling than permitting piecemeal removal. Indeed, on the one occasion that Congress authorized piecemeal
removal, it quickly abandoned the experiment, and when courts invented a doctrine to permit piecemeal removal, Congress repudiated
it. However, if a plaintiff goes so far as to join an unrelated claim to a
removable federal claim, § 1441(c) permits removal of the entire case.
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This useful function is constitutional, although the court must remand
any claims that are outside the scope of Article III.
Finally, as amended in 1990, § 1441(c) now permits the district court
to remand an entire case removed under § 1441(c)-and, by analogy,
of an entire case removed under § 1441(a)-if state law predominates.
In keeping with the purpose of § 1441(c), this power to remand the
entire case should only be exercised if, had the federal claim and the
related state claims been filed directly in federal court, the court
would have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
state claims.

